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Financial incentive is one of the common strategies used to attract healthcare 
workers in rural and remote areas. Both high-income and low-income countries 
extensively use financial strategy to tackle the disparity distribution of healthcare 
workers. However, most studies were conducted in developed countries and assessed 
positive incentives programs. Previous studies showed the effectiveness of financial 
incentives on recruitment and retention of healthcare workers. Current studies show that 
most of the financial incentives supported for education such as scholarships and loan 
repayment programs are effective. A few studies assessed the effectiveness of direct 
payment incentive programs, especially in low-middle income countries. The evaluated 
studies of the effect of financial incentive reduction on the health workers’ decision to 
stay or leave their practice location and the relationship between the health providers’ age 
and their location choice after the reduction of financial incentive are required also. 
This study have three specific aims. First aim is to examine the effectiveness of 
direct payment (Hardship Allowance) on retaining dentists in rural and remote areas. 
Second aim is to examine the impact of financial incentive reduction, due to the changed 
HA areas categorization, on rural and remote healthcare workers. The last one is to 
examine the relationship between dentists’ age and dentists’ location choice on financial 




A retrospective observational study was conducted for answering all three specific 
aims.  Data used for aim#1 is the resignation data of dentists from 2003 to 2016 and an 
annual report on dentist’s location. This data set were obtained from the Human Resource 
Management and the Policy and Strategy Bureau, Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in 
Thailand. The fixed effect panel analysis and difference in difference regression was used 
to analyze the effectiveness of Hardship Allowance implemented in 2008. 
Data used for aim#2 and #3 is the rural and remote dentist's location annual 
report, including the relocation and resignation from 2013 to 2018. This data set were 
obtained from the Human Resource Management Department and the Policy and Strategy 
Bureau at the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in Thailand. The difference in difference 
regression with fixed effect panel analysis was used to analyze the effect of Hardship 
Allowance reduction on dentists’ decision to stay or leave their location. The triple 
differences regression with random effect estimation was used to analyze the panel data 
of dentists’ resignation and relocation by age groups, in changed areas after the policy 
implementation. 
Data from 2003 to 2016 showed that 2,351 dentists who resigned from the 
hospital under the MoPH. Over than 60% of resigned dentists were between 22-28 years 
old. The resignation rate from 2003 to 2016 showed that dentists who were located in 
rural areas had the highest rate compared with dentists in urban and remote areas. The 
highest resignation rate in rural areas in 2004 was at 29.4%. When the Hardship 
Allowance policy was implemented in 2008, the resignation rate started decreasing 
dramatically in all areas, but especially in rural areas. Additionally, the regression 
analysis showed that the resignation rate of  dentists in rural areas significantly decreased 
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after 2008 at 10.09% (p-value <0.001), while in urban areas after 2008 the resignation 
rate decreased at 2.23% (p-value <0.001). Data of 2,384 rural and remote dentists is used 
to determine the location choice between the changed and unchanged areas categorization 
after the policy implementation in December 2016 which answer the specific aim#2 of 
the study. The outcome shows that the resignation of dentists in unchanged and changed 
areas is not significantly different. However, the relocation of dentists from rural to urban 
in changed areas after the policy implementation is more likely to increase significantly.   
Data of 2,384 rural and remote dentists from 2013 to 2018 were used for specific 
aim#3 of the study. The percentage of dentists by age groups 22-28, 29-35, 36-45, and 
46-60-year-old is 28%, 42%, 23%, and 5.4%, respectively. About 70% of 22-28-year-
olds, and 29-35-year-olds are in rural areas, while approximately 60% of the other two 
groups are in urban areas. The regression analysis of dentists’ resignation and relocation 
on dentists’ age in changed areas after the policy implementation shows that the oldest 
group in changed areas is the less likely to resign significantly from their location after 
the policy implementation compared with the youngest group.  
In conclusion, the study showed that after the policy implementation the 
resignation rate of dentists decreased in all areas. When comparing the resignation rate in 
rural and urban areas, the resignation rate in rural areas decreased higher than in urban 
areas after 2008. Therefore, the Hardship Allowance programs could retain dentists in 
rural and remote areas in Thailand.  Furthermore, our findings show that the direct 
payment reduction does not affect the number of resignations, but the relocation of 
dentists. The dentists decide to leave their location after the direct payment HA reduction 
policy was implemented. Therefore, the reduction of financial incentives could 
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deteriorate the retention of health workers in rural and remote areas. We also found that 
dentists’ age is related with the dentists’ decision to leave or stay in rural and remote 
areas when the HA was reduced. Although, the policy implementation caused the 
reduction of financial incentives, most of the oldest group decided to stay in their practice 
location. Besides financial incentive, age is another factor that influences that the 
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Human Resources for Health 
              The healthcare workforce is one of the most important inputs of a health 
system. According to the World Health Organization (WHO) Health System Framework, 
the health workforce is one of the six building boxes. These six building boxes are the 
basic functions of healthcare system and include service delivery, health workforce, 
information, medical product /vaccine /technology, financing, and governance (WHO 
report, 2000).  Health system goals are improving health and health equity, by ways that 
are responsive, financially fair, and efficient (WHO report, 2000). To achieve these goals, 
all basic functions in the six building boxes must be implemented effectively.  
To achieve the goal of improving population health, the government has to 
allocate qualified healthcare workers sufficiently and equally. For healthcare workforce, 
governments require qualified people with knowledge, skills, motivation and 
responsibility to organize and deliver quality health services. In addition, government is 
required to supply and distribute these qualified workers sufficiently and fairly in 
response to population health need and equity (WHO, 2007).  Evidence showed the 
association between health worker density and health outcomes (Chen, 2004). For 
example, several studies found that areas with shortages in healthcare workers had high 
incidences of mortality, especially in children under five years of age (Chen, 2004; 




Several strategies have been implemented to supply qualified healthcare 
workers adequately, especially in rural areas.  Many studies showed the effectiveness of 
educational strategies, for example the special admission program showed that choosing 
rural background students to health professional schools have potential to increase health 
workers in rural areas (Wibulpolprasert, 2003; Daniels, 2005; Halass, 2008). In addition, 
evidence showed that dentists, who attended in school containing a rural rotation 
curriculum, were more likely to practice in rural communities (Woloschuck, 
2002; Capstick, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004; Halass, 2008). The Cadetship program in 
Australia which has the mandatory service contract for postgraduate training showed that 
43% of program participants were practicing in rural areas compared with 20% of non-
program participants (Dunbabin, 2006).   
Evidence of the effectiveness of financial incentive programs for the healthcare 
workers is needed. In 2010, WHO suggested four major interventions to address health 
worker density issues including: education, regulatory, financial incentives, and 
professional and personal support strategies. Among recommended strategies, financial 
incentives are commonly used both in developed and developing countries. However, 
current evidence is insufficient to clarify the actual effectiveness of the programs 
especially in developing countries (Dolea, 2010; Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; 
Grobler, 2015). This study proposed to examine the effectiveness of direct payment 
financial incentive to reduce pattern of the dentist resignation from rural and remote areas 
in Thailand. We expect to gain valid and reliable evidence to support policy makers 





Disparities in Health Workforce Distribution  
Geographic disparities in the distribution of health workforce affects the access 
for healthcare service for rural communities. The shortage and inequitable distribution of 
healthcare human resources is a global issue (Chen, 2004; WHO, 2010). Many countries 
have shortages in healthcare human resources for several reasons, including limited 
production capacity, deficient skills healthcare workers and migration of the health 
workforce within and across countries (Dolea, 2010). Providing people living in rural 
areas with access to a qualified healthcare workforce is a critical public health issue. 
Governments of both developed and developing countries have set goals to achieve 
health equity and to meet their populations’ health needs particularly for vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups (Dolea, 2010).  
The uneven proportion of healthcare workers between urban and rural areas is 
apparent worldwide. Rural and remote areas remain some of the most affected by 
healthcare workforce shortages and disparities in access to care, both developed and 
developing countries (WHO, 2010). Statistics show that 50% of world populations are 
rural, while 24% of physicians worldwide are in rural areas (WHO, 2010). In the United 
States, data shows that 20% of the US population lives in rural areas, but only 9% of 
physicians are located there (Hancock et al., 2009). In urban areas of Canada and 
Australia, there are approximately 2.6 and 4.0 physicians per 1000 people, respectively, 
while in rural areas of both countries there are 0.9 physicians per 1000 people (Viscomi, 
2013).   
The disproportion is worse in many developing countries. In Pacific and Asian 




critical issue hindering efforts to improve population health outcomes. Many strategies 
have been implemented to diminish the shortage and maldistribution of qualified health 
workers problems, but the insufficient and inequitable distribution of healthcare workers 
is still a critical issue in these regions (Leymann, 2008; Henderson,2008). For example, 
in Vietnam at least 53% of physicians are located in urban areas while 72% of 
Vietnamese live in rural areas. Only 67% of rural health centers in Vietnam have a 
physician (Vujicic, 2011). In Cambodia, approximately 54% of physicians served in 
capital city, despite the fact that only 9.6% of Cambodians reside in Phnom Penh. In 
2005, physician density in the urban areas was about 0.41 per 1000 Cambodian 
population while in the most remote areas the density of physician was only 0.06 per 
1000 population (Chhea, 2010). Many countries in Africa also showed the 
unequal geographic distribution. For example, only 12% of physicians and 19% of nurses 
serve in rural areas of South Africa, despite the fact that 46% of citizens live in rural 
communities (Hamilton and Yau, 2004).  The density of health workers in urban 
Tanzania is three times higher than in rural areas (Munga, 2014).  
Strategies Used to Address the Healthcare Workforce Distribution Disparity  
Several strategies have been used to attempt to attract health workers to rural and 
remote areas worldwide (Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Grobler, 2009; WHO, 
2010; Dolea, 2010). These strategies were suggested by WHO in 2010 to attract, recruit 
and retain health workforce in rural and remote areas. Traditionally, governments have 
pursued four main categories for recruitment: education, regulatory, financial incentive, 




 1) Education, such as students from rural backgrounds, health professional school 
outside of major cities, clinical rotations in rural areas, and curricula that reflect rural 
health issues.  
2) Regulatory, such as enhanced scope of practice, different types of health 
workers, compulsory service, and subsidized education for return of service.   
3) Financial incentives, such as scholarship, loan repayment, or direct payment 
programs.  
4) Professional and personal support, such as better living conditions, safe and 
supportive working environments, and career development programs.  
 For this study, we will focus on financial incentives. The strategy of providing 
financial incentives to rural physicians is used in many countries ranging from the US, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Africa (Barnighausen and 
Bloom, 2009;  Dolea, 2010). Besides examining the effectiveness of financial incentives, 
we will analyze how age and opportunity for continuing education influence the decision 
to leave the practice area. Both age and the opportunity for continuing education have 
been identified as important factors related to physicians’ decision to leave or stay in 
rural and remote areas (WHO, 2010; Henderson, 2008). In 2012, Adzei examined the 
impact of financial and non-financial incentives for retaining health workers in Ghana. 
The study showed that both financial and non-financial incentives influence the retention 
of health workers significantly, and opportunity for continuing education was one of the 
significant non-financial factors.  
Many governments have implemented financial incentive interventions to address 




effectiveness of the program and their long-term impact on retaining health workers in 
rural and remote areas. Other financial incentive interventions, such as scholarship and 
loan forgiveness programs for medical students working in rural and remote areas, were 
implemented and evaluated. The results from some studies found that participants in the 
programs were more likely to work in rural areas (see, e.g., Jackson, 2003; Holmes, 
2005; Dunbabin, 2006; Matsumoto, 2008). In 2003, Jackson evaluated four financial 
incentive programs in West Virginia. The results showed that when comparing the 
obligated physicians who committed to serve in underserved areas and non-obligated 
physicians, the obligated physicians tended to be influenced by monetary factors in their 
practice decision of whether to deliver health services to uninsured patients. In 2005, 
Holmes examined the effectiveness of the National Health Service Corps (NHSC). The 
program was implemented by providing scholarship or loan repayment to medical 
students in exchange for agreement to practice in underserved areas. Holmes concluded 
that the program increased physicians in underserved areas, but he still had questions 
with the efficiency of the program which required more investigation. In 
2006, Dunbabin evaluated the Cadetship program which offered bonded scholarship for 
medical students in Australia in exchange for service in rural areas for two years. The 
study showed that 43% of enrolled physicians remain in rural areas after completing 
service. In 2008, Matsumoto studied graduated physicians from Jichi University, which a 
university provides free tuition for medical students in exchange for agreement to serve 
in rural areas. The study showed that obligated physicians were three times more likely to 




Overall, the findings showed the effectiveness of attracting health workers to 
practice in rural and underserved areas. However, most evidence studied was from 
developed countries and focused on medical students or physicians (Sempowski, 
2004; Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Dolea, 2010). In addition, most financial incentive 
programs analyzed in prior studies were scholarship or loan repayment programs 
providing educational support which had less flexibility for using money compared with 
direct payment program. Barnighausen and Bloom reviewed 43 financial incentives 
studies: 34(USA), 5(Japan), 2(Canada), 1(New Zealand), and 1(South Africa). Only five 
out of these 43 studies examined direct payment programs. More evidence from 
developing countries is required as well as evidence of financial incentives programs 
from other health professionals and evidence of direct payment programs evaluation. 
Such evidence can clarify the actual effectiveness of financial incentives programs. To 
create effective policies based on financial incentives, policymakers should have a deep 
understanding of the role of financial incentives in health workers location 
decision (Grobler, 2009; Dolea, 2010). This is the first study to analyze the effects of 
financial incentives for dentists in Thailand.  
Financial incentives have been used to address geographic disparities in 
the distribution of health workers in Thailand. The government has implemented the 
financial policy to encourage healthcare workers to locate in rural and remote areas for 
more than two decades. However, there is little evidence of the effectiveness of the 
financial incentive program in Thailand especially in the dentist group. The Hardship 
Allowance (HA) has been implemented since 1998. The HA is the direct payment 




dentists, pharmacists, and nurses who work in community hospitals under Ministry of 
Public Health (MoPH). The criteria and rate of payment is different among the health 
professionals. In this study we show the criteria and rate of HA payment for dentists only. 
The criteria and rate of HA payment have shown in Table 1 for HA rate before 2008, 
Table 2 for HA rate in 2008, and Table 3 for HA rate in 2013 and 2016. The 
program results have been described and analyzed the efficiency every 5 years since 2005 
but there is no the effectiveness evaluated study. However, the disparity distribution 
could not be solved, and the data showed the increasing number of resignation dentists 
from 71 in 1999 to 103 in 2003 (Dental Department, MoPH, 2007).   
The Thai government has implemented financial incentive strategies to retain 
qualified health professionals in rural public facilities. Hardship Allowance program is 
one of them that government implemented to reduce the income gap between private and 
public sectors. In 2008, the government started a huge revision of Hardship 
Allowance. The Hardship Allowance payment in Thailand in 2008 provided extra 
compensation to new physicians and dentists working in rural and remote 
areas representing about 100%-300% of their salary. This intervention made the income 
of new graduated dentists in rural and remote areas higher than new graduated dentists in 
urban areas (Pagaiya, 2015). The evaluated study of the effectiveness of Hardship 
Allowance program is required to provide the evidence to Thai government and other 
countries where have similar context.  
Thailand context  
Thailand is a lower-middle income country with 65.98 million people in 2010, 




is categorized into four regions: Northern, Northeastern, Central and South. According to 
local administrative functions, the country is composed of 76 provinces, 877 districts and 
7,255 sub-districts. Naturally, Thailand has three topographic regions: plain, highland, 
and mountainous areas. Most of the plain areas are in the Central regions, the highlands 
areas are in the Northeastern regions where the mountainous areas are in the Northern 
and the Southern regions.  
Thailand Healthcare System  
There are public and private health sectors providing healthcare service in 
Thailand. The government body responsible for the oversight of public health in Thailand 
is the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). The health system in Thailand is dominated by 
the public sector. The main providers in rural and remote areas are authorized by 
the MoPH. The rural health system consists of district hospitals and sub-district health 
centers. In 2010, there were 734 community hospitals serving 83.6% of all districts. 
Besides the public sector, the private sector providers are scattered across the country but 
are congregated in urban areas (Pagaiya and Noree, 2009).   
 Dentists in Thailand  
Distribution of Dentists  
The Thai Dental Council showed that nearly half of dentists in the country are 
practicing in Bangkok while the rest of them distributed into four regions. From 2009 to 
2010, statistics showed an increase in the number of dentists, but there is are disparities 
between Bangkok and other regions. This is a consequence of the government policy to 
increase the supply of health professionals especially in rural and remote areas in 2005. 




population, respectively. An unequal distribution of dentists has been shown. In Bangkok 
the density of dentists it was 0.86 per 1000 population. The density of dentists in Central, 
North, South and Northeastern regions excluding Bangkok was 0.11, 0.10, 0.09, and 0.06 
per 1000 population, respectively (Thailand HRH, Sirilak, 2010).    
Statistics showed the inequity distribution of dentists in Thailand. In 2013, the 
Dental Council of Thailand reported that there were 11,607 dentists for 64 million Thai 
citizens, creating a dentist to population ratio of 1:5,553 (Thai Dental Council, 
2013). Data showed that over half of all dentists were in Bangkok and other big cities 
(50.9%). The dentist-to-population ratio in Bangkok, Central, North, South, and 
Northeastern regions was 1:1,039, 1:8,499, 1:9,147, 1:9,300, and 1:13,783, 
respectively. These ratios demonstrate that disparities in the geographic allocation of 
dentists occurred in some rural and remote area in Northern, Northeastern and Southern 
regions of Thailand, whereas urban areas benefit from a greater supply of dentists relative 
to rural areas.  
To address the inequity in the geographic allocation of dentists, Thailand 
implemented three major strategies: educational, compulsory, and intensives 
strategies (Busarakamuha, 2016).    
1. Educational strategies  
The educational strategies include increasing dentists, special recruitment student from 
rural background origin, and curriculum reform. The first educational strategy was to 
admit more students into dental school to increase the number of trained dentists across 
the country. The shortage of dentists was reduced in the 1970s when the Ministry of 




implemented plans to increase the number of dentists (Lexomboon, 2000).  The second 
educational strategy was to recruit more rural background student through the special 
admission. The third educational strategy was developing clinical program to contain 
rural rotation curriculum. The dentist who attended clinical rotation curriculum were 
expected to have positive attitude for practicing in rural communities.  
2. Compulsory strategies  
The compulsory strategy was a policy required a compulsory service contract to 
assign newly graduated dentists to community hospitals, especially in rural and remote 
areas.  1989 was the first year that newly dentists had to serve in the community hospitals 
under MoPH for at least three years. Any newly graduated dentist who chose to opt out of 
the program had to pay a fine of $12,120.  
3. Motivation/Incentive strategies  
3.1 Financial Incentives    
The policy was to provide financial incentives to retain dentists practicing in 
community hospitals, especially in rural and remote areas (Busarakamuha, 2016).  The 
government implemented a direct payment program called the Hardship Allowance (HA) 
for dentists working in rural and remote areas. The HA payment has been implemented 
since 2001, but in 2008 the government increased the rate of payment. The rate and 
criteria of the HA payment were adjusted to be consistent with the economic growth of 
the country in both 2013 and 2016.   
3.2 Non-financial Incentives  
The non-financial incentives were composed of career development, specialist 




to increase attractiveness for health workers to decide practicing in rural areas. For 
example, district dentists start career at level 4 and they are promoted to level 7 after 
approximately 8 years of service. The specialist training and continuing 
education provide opportunity for education for rural dentist as well as dentists in 
regional or central hospitals. A minimum for one year of service in rural area is required 
for most training. Rural and remote dentists have a special place for special training on 
the condition that they commit to continue serve in rural hospital graduated. The social 
strategy was the policy to create network for rural dentists so they can provide moral and 
technical support and to motivate recognition within the field. These three strategies are 
still in effect today.  
Thailand Hardship Allowance Policy   
Before 2008, the HA policy to attract healthcare professionals to work in 
community hospitals in rural and remote areas across Thailand had a tiered allowance 
system as shown in Table 1.1. 
Hardship Allowance Policy change in 2008   
The number of dentists increased between 2001 and 2008; however, the unequal 
distribution of dentists persisted. The resignation rate of dentists was also increasing 
(Dental department, MoPH, 2008). Financial incentive is the strategy chosen to decrease 
the resignation rate of dentists. Therefore, in 2008 the government increased the HA 
significantly, giving the highest direct payment incentive to dentists working in rural and 
remote areas as show in Table 1.2.  
In 2008, the HA rate for dentists depended on years of service and practice area; 




Table 1.1 Hardship Allowance annually payment before 2008 by $US  
Year of Service Urban Rural Remote1 Remote2 
First year  0 720 3750 7500 
2 years up  0 938 3750 7500 
  
$3,750 per year, while their cohorts who serve in remote areas would receive $7,500-
$11,250 per year. The HA rate also increased for those who served longer in any 
community hospitals under MoPH; for example, dentists who served 4-10 years in urban 
and rural would receive $7500 and $11,250 per year, respectively. Compared with the 
HA rate before 2008, the HA rate for dentists located in rural areas after 2008 increased 
five times from the previous one.  
The definition of rural and remote areas  
At the present, there is no rural and remote definition which every country can 
apply (Matsumoto, 2008). There is no official definition of rural and remote areas in 
Thailand as well. The rural and remote areas, which are identified in this study, are 
applied from the MoPH identification (Appendix A). The classification of the MoPH for 
urban, suburban, rural and remote areas are used to determine the areas for the HA 
payment. The objective of the HA payment policy is to attract, and influence dentists to 
stay longer in the unattractive areas such as rural and remote areas. Therefore, the rural 
and remote areas which are identified by the MoPH, are the unpleasant areas compared  
with the urban and suburban areas. For example, the rural areas are further from the 
urban city and have less amenities such as commercial banks, convenience stores, private 
clinics, and so on, compared with the urban and suburban areas. In addition, many remote 




countries, which have the least amenities and have difficult and inconvenient 
transportation.  
Most of the rural and remote populations are lesser than the urban population. The 
distance between the remote areas and the city, in many provinces, are further than the 
distance between rural areas and the city as well. However, the classification of rural and 
remotes areas in this study do not comply with this common measure across Thailand. 
For example, the population in 2005, in some rural areas such as Chiangdao district, 
Chiangmai province is about 87,922 while in urban areas in Chiangrai or Loppburi 
provinces have lesser population at 68,198 (Wiangpapao district), and 77,005 (Banmi 
district), respectively. There is different distance among the urban, rural, and remote 
areas in each province as well. For example, the distance between Chiangdao district 
(rural areas) and Chiangmai city is about 86.5 km, while the distance between Pathumrat 
district (rural areas) and Amnartchareon province’s city is about 31 km. Furthermore, the 
distance between Maeai district (remote areas) and Chiangmai city is 189.4, while the 
distance between Chanuman district (remote areas) and Amnartchareon province’s city is 
about 65 km.  
In 2013, the government adjusted the criteria for paying the hardship allowance 
(annually, US$) as shown in Table 1.3.  
The hardship allowance payment structure has remained constant since 2013; 
however, in 2016, the government reclassified the rural/remote status of certain areas. 
Some rural hospitals became “suburban 1” or “suburban 2” and some hospitals in 





Table 1.2 Hardship Allowance annual payment in 2008 by $US  
Year of 
services 
Urban Suburban Rural Remote1 Remote2 
1-3 years  3750 3750 3750 7500 11250 
4-10 years  7500 9375 11250 15000 18750 
11-20 years  9375 11250 15000 18750 22500 
21 up  11250 15000 18750 22500 26250 
  
Table 1.3 Hardship Allowance annually payment in 2013 by $US  
Year of 
services  
Urban  Suburban1  Suburban2  Rural   Remote1   Remote2  
1-3 years  3750  3750  3750  3750  7500  11250  
4-10 years  4500  5625  7500  11250  15000  18750  
11 up  5625  7500  9375  15000  18750  22500  
  
payment remained the same as in Table 3. In other words, healthcare professionals 
working in some rural hospitals and suburban hospitals experienced a sudden drop in HA 
rates due to the reclassification of the rurality/urbanity of their hospital. Social and 
economic development caused the extension of urbanization in Thailand, so 
the MoPH must adjust the area to be consistent with the current economic situation. For 
example, in Chiangmai province 2016, 9 out of 13 rural hospitals became urban hospitals.   
According the rate on Table 3 if young dentists who serve in rural areas less than 
3 years when their practice place became suburban or urban areas their HA do not 
change. Then they may decide to stay. If the middle age dentists who serve in rural areas 
for 4-10 years when their practice place became suburban or urban areas, then they lost 




when their practice location became suburban or urban areas, then they lost $5,265-9,735 
per year. If the middle age or senior dentist preferred high income when they lost, they 
might decide to leave the areas.   
The adjusting HA areas categorization criteria followed the Notification 
of MoPH in December 2012. The Notification of MoPH identify that each provincial 
public health office has to reclassify the rural and remote areas in their province 
following the MoPH’s criteria and submit the new list of rural and remote areas to 
the Strategic and Policy Bureau, MoPH. The MoPH’s criteria for reclassification urban, 
rural, and remote areas in each province include transportation, urbanization, 
and health provider’s shortage. The transportation criteria include both the difficulty to 
travel and the long distance from the district of the hospital to the urban city within the 
province or to the nearest urban city in another urbanized province. The urbanized 
provinces are the top 25 high income provinces in 2013 (Appendix C). The urbanization 
in each district can be measured by the number of amenities and the revenue of the 
district’s government. The amenities in the district areas include commercial banks, 
private clinics, and convenient stores. The health providers’ shortage criteria are the 
areas where are in the dangerous zone such as the areas in the three Southernmost 
provinces and the high turn overate of health workers’ areas.  
After the new criteria for reclassification the HA areas were announced, each 
provincial office collected and analyzed data. Consequently, the lists of the new area 
categorizations were sent to the Strategy and Policy Bureau, MoPH. Then the new 
lists were reported officially through the Notification of MoPH Issue #11 in December 




The Thai population growth rate and the MoPH dentist's growth rate from 2003 to 2016  
According to the number of recruitments, resignations and overall dentists from 
2003 to 2016, the average growth rates of recruitment, resignation and overall dentists 
are 4.06, 11.93, and 6.06 respectively. The average of resignation rate shows that dentists 
are more likely to resign. To address this issue, the government implemented the HA 
policy to increase retention of dentists in rural and remote areas. The HA policy was 
implemented in 2001 and had a big change in 2008 by providing a huge amount of 
payment rate. The HA policy was adjusted some payment rate and criteria in 2013 and 
reclassified some rural areas to urban areas in December 2016.   
During the implementation of HA policy from 2003 to 2016, the educational and 
the compulsory service strategy are also implementing persistently. The educational 
strategy produces more graduated dentists and the compulsory 
service strategy recruits more graduated dentists to work in primary hospitals especially 
in rural and remote areas. As a result, the overall dentist's growth rate increase. The 
average growth rate from 2003 to 2016 is equal 6.06. At the same time the average Thai 
population growth rate is equal 0.24 (Official Statistics Registration System 2003 to 
2016). The statistic shows that the dentists' growth rate outweigh the population growth 
rate. Therefore, in general Thailand have no shortage of dentist. The government have 
to persistently evaluate and monitor all strategies used to address the disparity 
distribution of dentists to prevent the oversupply of dentists in Thailand.  
The Hardship Allowance Expenditure   
Table 1.4 shows the estimated annual HA expenditure in 2009 and in 2013, 




$24 million, respectively. Although, the annual HA rate was reduced in 2013, the 
increasing of dentists caused the total annual HA payment increased. In 2019, the 
highest percentage group is the dentist who were in very remote areas and served for 1-3 
years or were in rural areas and served for 4-10 years or who were in suburban areas and 
served for 11-20 years or who were in urban areas and served for over 21 years. In 2013, 
the high percentage group is the dentist who were in the rural, suburban, or urban areas 
who served 1-3 years.    
Aim of the Study  
Rigorous evidence is required to help policymakers understand the effectiveness 
of financial incentives on dentists’ decision to remain in rural areas (Barnighausen and 
Bloom,2009; Dolea, 2010). Barnighausen and Bloom suggested that most of the financial 
incentive evaluated studies were from developed countries, so evaluated studies from 
more developing countries are required. Dolea commented on the disparity between 
physicians/medical student and other health professional’s programs 
and how there should be a more diverse array of health professional studies.  
At present the information about the effectiveness of financial incentives to 
retain dentists in rural areas is limited, especially the effectiveness of financial incentives 
through direct payment method, when compared with the evaluation for the intervention 
involving educational programs (Dolea, 2010). More evidence of professional and 
personal support is also required (Dolea, 2010; Henderson, 2008).  In this manuscript, I 
propose a study to examine the effectiveness of the financial incentives program for 
retaining dentists in rural and remote areas in Thailand. Besides, I propose to analyze the 




Table 1.4 The estimated annual HA expenditure in 2009 and 2013 
Year Annual HA rate  Number of dentists  Percent  Total annual HA payment 
2009 $      3,750   496 26.7  $   1,860,000  
 $      7,500   84 4.5  $      630,000  
 $      9,375   243 13.1  $   2,278,125  
 $    11,250   570 30.6  $   6,412,500  
 $    13,125   10 0.5  $      131,250  
 $    15,000   307 16.5  $   4,605,000  
 $    16,875   14 0.8  $      236,250  
 $    18,750   119 6.4  $   2,231,250  
 $    22,500   16 0.9  $      360,000  
Total   1859 100  $ 18,744,375  
2013 $          3,750   783 29.7  $      2,936,250  
 $          4,500   102 3.9  $          459,000  
 $          5,625   104 3.9  $          585,000  
 $          7,500   255 9.7  $      1,912,500  
 $          9,375   159 6  $      1,490,625  
 $        11,250   655 24.8  $      7,368,750  
 $        15,000   465 17.6  $      6,975,000  
 $        18,750   81 3.1  $      1,518,750  
 $        22,500   34 1.3  $          765,000  
 Total   2638 100  $    24,010,875 
Note: the money exchange rate using the rate in August 2018: $US 1 = 32 THB  
reduction on dentists’ decisions to resign from rural and remote areas based on their age as 
well as the opportunity for continuing education.   
Evidence showed that age and opportunity for continuing education should impact 
the decision of dentist to resign from rural and remote areas when the HA decreased. Due 




payment rate in 2008, 2013 and 2016. As well as, the opportunity for continuing 
education has shown as the most common reason for dentists’ resignation when excluded 
the reason for getting a new job (resignation data, 2003-2017). In addition, the 
opportunity for continuing education is one of the strategies the MoPH implemented to 
retain dentists in the rural communities (Lexomboon, 2003). There has been no formal 
evaluation of this program in Thailand.   
The central hypothesis of this study is that direct payment financial 
incentives decrease the resignation rates of dentists in rural and remote areas, as indicated 
in Aims 1 and 2.  A secondary hypothesis in Aim 3 is that Thailand’s HA affected 
dentists working in rural and remote areas, based on their age, as well as the opportunity 
to continue their education.  
To attain the overall objectives, the following specific aims will be pursued:  
Aim1: To examine whether the HA payment in 2008 reduced resignation rates of dentists 
in rural and remote provinces relative to urban provinces.  
Hypothesis1: After the HA policy in 2008, dentists in rural and remote provinces are less  
likely to resign. The resignation rates in rural and remote provinces after 2008 are 
decreasing compared with the resignation rates in urban provinces.  
Aim2: To estimate the effect of the HA reduction, due to recategorization in HA areas 
from rural to urban in December 2016, on rural and remote dentists' resignation and 
relocation.  
Hypothesis2: Rural and remote dentists who located in the changed areas which HA was 
reduced in December 2016 are more likely to leave (resign and relocate) from their areas. 




Aim3: To examine the relationship between dentists’ age and dentists’ resignation and 
relocation in changed areas after the 2016 policy implementation. 
Hypothesis3: Based on the policy change in 2016, the HA area was recategorized. 
Consequently, the HA payment rate was decreased. Rural dentists who are older affected 
the HA reduction more than the younger dentists. Therefore, the older dentists are more 








LITERATURE REVIEW  
  
This literature is composed of four major parts as follows: first is the description 
of the theories and model of health care workers geographic location. This part 
contains the theory of decision-making, and how it applies to the factors 
associated with the dentists’ decision to leave or stay in rural and remote areas. The 
utility function of dentists’ location choice has been shown in this section based on 
financial factors and non-financial factors. The second section is other theory 
related to the behavior and motivation of healthcare workers. The third section is the 
strategies used for addressing the disparities distribution of healthcare workers and the 
evidence of the effectiveness of these strategies. This section discusses the previous and 
current evaluated studies. The last section is the gap in the literature. Based on literature 
reviews from the previous three sections, this information and discussion can contribute 
to the knowledge gap of the study.   
How Do Healthcare Providers Decide Where to Work: Theories and models of 
healthcare workers’ geographic location decisions.   
The Utility Theory: Theory of Decision Making   
In 2005, Dussault suggested approaches to understanding the geographic imbalance 
of health workers which included economic and normative views. For the economics  




When there is an unequal supply and demand for workers in a given geographic area then 
the imbalance happens. Regarding the economic perspective, if wages increase, more 
health workers want to be employed and more people will go to the health 
providers, ultimately to a new equilibrium and a more balanced distribution of health 
professionals. The normative view explains the disparities as the health worker 
distribution compared with a standard or social norm. This norm can be considered by 
professional institutions, by policy makers, or by comparing with a certain region. 
Normative approaches normally apply full-time equivalent (FTE) ratios of physicians, 
nurses, etc., to population.   
The normative and the economic perspectives complement one another. The 
description normative view focuses on the need and supply side, while the economic 
view approaches the demand and financial incentives. The study suggested approaching 
health worker geographic imbalance by combining these two perspectives, 
which is consistent with the utility concept. A previous study used utility theory to 
explain practice location preferences of health workers (Bolduc, 1996). The utility 
function assumes that a number of factors influence the providers’ decision to locate in 
attractive areas and play a part in health providers’ decision to locate their practice. The 
monetary factors are not only an essential part for health workers to choose practice 
location but other elements such as leisure time, proximity to family, and so on also relate 
to the preferences to choose the location of health workers.  
In 1954, Edwards described the reasons individuals make choices among 
advantageous options. These theories focus on the concept of the subjective value, or 




have rational behavior. Then they have transitive preference and that they select in such a 
way as to maximize utility or expected utility. Early utility maximization the 
economists held that the goal of human action is to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Every 
object or action may be considered from the point of view of pleasure- or pain-giving 
properties. These properties are called the utility of the object, and pleasure is given by 
positive utility and pain by negative utility. The goal of action, then, is to seek the 
maximum utility. This straightforward self-indulgence of the future is simply 
converted into a theory of choice.   
Economists measure a person’s preference in term of utility. In 
2009, Varians explained the utility model which economists can use for measuring the 
preference of an individual. Although utility mostly measures the consumer preference, 
healthcare worker preference can be measured by utility. The variation of geographic 
distribution of dentists in Thailand showed that dentists have different 
preferences in choosing their practice location. In this study, we apply utility theory 
to predict the effectiveness of the financial and non-financial preference of dentists on 
practice location choice.    
Several studies showed the evidence of financial and non-financial 
factors that influence the practice location choice of healthcare workers. The extent of 
financial incentive is more definite compared with non-financial incentives. Financial 
incentives are all things related to money and income such as salary, salary supplement, 
benefits, allowance, etc., while non-financial incentives can be improved working and 
living condition, continuing education, training and professional development, 




2008; Buykx, 2010).   Several evidences showed the effectiveness of financial incentive 
program in attract health workers in underserved areas (Sempowski,2004; 
Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Dolea, 2010). While Henderson referred to salary, 
benefit, and allowance for financial incentives in Pacific and Asian countries, the 
financial incentives in Sempowski and Barnighausen and Bloom studied mostly were 
scholarship and loan repayment programs. Many evidences from developing countries 
showed the important of financial and non-financial factors integration 
to influencing health worker ’s decision to practice in rural and remote areas (WHO, 
2010; Humphrey, 2009; Grobler, 2015). For example, Evidences from Ghana and 
Tanzania showed the results from the survey of the healthcare workers in remote 
areas and found that financial and non-financial factors influence the motivation and 
retention of health workers (Adzei, 2012; Mungo, 2013). These evidences support 
the utility concept of health worker’s preference for practice location choice especially in 
developing countries.  
In this study, we apply utility theory in explaining the location choice of dentists 
in Thailand. We can consider a dentist as an individual. When they make a choice as to 
maximize their utility that means they gain the optimal satisfaction. The variation of the 
geographic allocation of dentists across Thailand showed that individual dentists prefer 
choosing practice location. Some dentists chose to locate in rural areas when 
the Hardship Allowance (HA) ,the direct payment financial incentive from Thai 
government, increased while others chose to practice in urban areas with low HA but 




incidences can be explained by the utility maximization theory that the individual dentist 
chose the practice location to gain optimal satisfaction.  
According to the utility theory, we simply theorize that a dentist chooses to leave 
or stay in rural and remote areas to optimize their preferences based on financial and non-
financial factors. The simple utility function of dentists’ location choice can be denoted 
as function (1).  
U (π, x; β)   
     U = f (π, x; β) (1)  
Where  
U is the utility function of dentist choice   
π is the financial factors which in this study we estimate the effectiveness of the HA  
x is non-financial factors  
β is the vector of parameters  
We adopted the WHO framework of factors related to decision to leave or stay in 
rural areas to account for the non-financial factors. From the WHO 2010 framework all 
factors included financial aspect, mandatory service, personal origin and values, family 
and communities’ aspects, working and living conditions, and career related aspect. 
The 2010 WHO framework is shown in Figure 2.1.  
Based on the 2010 WHO framework, other factors besides the financial 
aspects are considered the non-financial factors: personal origin and values, family and 
community aspects, working and living condition, career related aspect, and mandatory 




with the 2010 WHO framework. The framework of Thai dentist’s location choice is 
shown in Figure 2.2   
  








Figure 2.2 The model of Thai dentist’s location choice   
In this study, we aim to measure the choice of dentists to leave or stay in rural 
areas. We assumed that dentists’ preferences, which affect the decision to leave or 
stay, included the financial and non-financial factors.   
Dentists’ decision to 
leave or stay in rural 
and remote areas 
Non-financial incentives 
-Personal origin and 
value 
-Family and community 
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2.1 Financial factors  
Financial incentive is a common factor among many factors listed in both 
developed and developing countries (Kruger, 2005; Danial, 2005; Henderson&Tulloch, 
2008; Humphrey, 2009; WHO, 2010).   The financial aspect of the WHO perspective 
includes benefits, allowances, salaries, and payment system. In 2009, Henderson showed 
that financial incentives for health workers in Pacific and Asian countries can be high 
salaries, salary supplements, benefits and allowances.   Humphrey listed remuneration 
and salary packaging and benefits as financial incentives 
(2009).   However, Barnighausen and Bloom categorized financial incentives in five 
groups based on programs’ implementation to attract and retain physicians and other 
health workers in rural and underserved areas. Five categories of financial incentive 
programs included service-requiring scholarship, education loans with service 
requirement, service-option educational loans, loan repayment programs, and direct 
payment. While, most of evaluated study for financial incentive programs from 
developed countries reported the effect of scholarship and loan repayment program, many 
survey studies from developing countries reported the significance of wages, benefit and 
other compensation as an important factor for recruiting and retaining health workers in 
rural and remote communities. (Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Henderson, 
2008; Dolea, 2010; Grobler, 2015).     
Financial factor in term of salary, benefit, allowance, and other compensation is 
very important in many developing countries. Finance and benefit are considered the 
most important factors affecting the location decision of health professional especially in 




expenses (Henderson, 2008; Lehmann, 2008).   The financial incentives are very 
important motivating factor for health workers in the countries where low salaries and 
benefits. For example, the survey of geographic location of physicians in Vietnam 
showed that most Vietnam physicians (53%) practiced in urban areas. The study showed 
that most physicians in Vietnam have second jobs for gaining satisfied income. It was 
suggested that to remain Vietnam physicians in rural areas, the government must recruit 
them to rural communities by providing high salaries and benefits in the first place 
(Vujicic, 2011). In addition, the questionnaire surveys of medical students from Congo, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda showed that 96% of participants answer the most 
important reason to leave Africa is the low salary (Burch, 2011).    
In this study, we model utility function to predict the dentists’ decision to leave or 
stay in rural and remote areas which influencing by direct payment method ‘Hardship 
Allowance’.  A model of financial factors based on dentist’s location choice utility 
function can be denoted as function (2)  
U(π)  is the utility function of financial factors  
U(π)  = f(HA, S, O;α)(2)  
o HA=hardship allowance  
o S = salary  
o O=other compensation, benefits  
o α is the vector of parameters  
2.2 Non-financial factors  
Based on the 2010 WHO framework, the non-financial factors include personal 




related, and mandatory service.  A model of non-financial factors based on dentist’s 
location choice utility function can be denoted as function (3)  
U(x) is the utility function of non-financial factors  
U(x) = f(P,F,W,C,M; ϒ)   (3)  
o P = personal origin and values  
o F=Family and community  
o W=working condition  
o C=career related  
o ϒ is the vector of parameters  
In term of non-financial factors in this study, we propose to measure how can age and 
opportunities to continuing education associated with the direct payment financial 
incentive ‘Hardship Allowance’ predict the location choice of the dentists in 
Thailand. So the utility function of our proposal model can be denoted as function (4).  
U(D) = f (HA, A, O; ƍ)(4)  
o D= Dentists decision to leave or stay in rural and remote areas  
o HA=Hardship Allowance  
o A=Age of dentists  
o O=Opportunities to continuing education  
2.2.1 Personal origin and values   
2.2.1.1 Rural background   
As shown in Figure1, personal factors include rural background (origin), values, 
and altruism. Many studies showed the effectiveness of selection rural background 




2005; Halass, 2008; Suphanchaimat, 2016). In 2009, Wilson showed the strong impact of 
geographic origin on retention of healthcare workers in rural and remote areas. The 
studies of rural clinical rotations programs for medical students at the University of 
Calgary and pharmacy students in New Zealand showed that rural origin students were 
more likely to choose rural practice than urban origin students (Wolschuk, 2002; 
Capstick 2008).     
2.2.1.2 Rural upbringing   
Evidence showed that physicians who graduated from schools that contained 
a clinical rotation curriculum were more likely to practice in rural and remote areas 
(Woloschuck, 2002; Capstick, 2002; Halass, 2008). In addition, graduated students from 
schools located in rural areas showed the same results (Mathew, 2008). Graduated 
students gained values and altruism to work in rural and remote areas from clinical 
rotation curriculum schools and school located in rural areas.     
Although the WHO framework did not clarify what is personal origin and value, 
based on Lexomboon in 2003, personal factors included age, year of service, educational 
level, gender, marital status and children, and other personal factors. In 2008, Lehmann 
explored the relationship between attraction and retention factors on healthcare worker 
decisions for practice areas. He presented that individual factors such as origin, age, 
gender and marital status may have an impact on health professional decisions.     
2.2.1.3 Age   
A differing connection between age and practicing location decisions was 
found (Lexomboon, 2003). Generally, relationships between the decision for 




level are indecisive (Lehman, 2008). In 1990, Easterbrook explored how factors 
influenced family medicine location decisions and found that age was no significant 
factor on physician decisions. However, the study of the impact of job satisfaction on 
worker turnover found that the higher the age of the workers the more likely they are 
to leave their present work (Lamber, 2001). In 2005, Richards showed there was a high 
percentage of older health workers (>50 years) practicing in rural areas, while another 
one reported the average ages of health workers in urban and rural areas were 36.1 and 
36.8, respectively (Richards, 2005; Ebuehi, 2011). In 2013, Antwi identified the impact of 
wages on the retention of health workers. The author stated that age was important and 
focused on young adults aged 20-35-years old (Antwi, 2013). These studies showed the 
various results regarding the relationship between age and health worker’s decision. 
Evidence is still required to show the actual association of age on practice location 
decisions of the healthcare workforce.    
2.2.1.4 Year of service   
A study examined the relationship between job satisfaction and intention to leave 
the practice areas and showed that the tenure had negative association with job 
satisfaction. When the tenure increased, the job satisfaction decreased (Lamber, 2001). 
However, the study evaluated a skills training program for rural retaining physicians in 
Alberta, and data showed that the more years of practice, the less likely the physicians are 
to leave rural locations (Gorsche, 2012).  As same as the age factor, to clarify 
the relationship between years of service and the health worker’s decision to leave rural 





2.2.1.5 gender   
The association between gender and retention of health workers in rural and 
remote areas is also inclusive (Lehman, 2008). In 2001, Lamber showed 
males had lower job satisfaction than females; however, there was no significant 
difference in decision to retain in rural areas between males and females. There was also 
no significant difference between male and female physicians working in rural areas from 
the national survey of retention of primary care physicians in rural health professional 
shortage areas, as well as male and female residents at a rural setting who were more 
likely to practice general surgery than specialists (Pathman, 2011; Deveney 2013). 
However, in 2005, the survey of primary healthcare workers in rural areas in Scotland 
reported that 81% of respondents were women (93% of nurses, 52% of doctors, 33% of 
dentists and dental nurses, and 91% of other health professionals) (Richards, 2005). In 
addition, the medical students participating in the Cadetship program which 
offers scholarships in exchange for serving at least 2 years in rural areas were mostly 
female (60%) (Dunbabin, 2006). Different results in the study examined the impact of 
wages on retention of health workers showed that more men, responded to the increasing 
wages than women (Antwi, 2013). Wilson reviewed the interventions to address the 
disparity distribution of healthcare workers, and also concluded that men are more likely 
to practice in rural and remote areas than women (Wilson, 2009).    
2.2.2 Family and community   
According to the WHO framework, provision of schooling for children, sense of 




Some articles included the family factor such as marital status to be classified in personal 
characteristics (Lexomboon, 2003).   
2.2.2.1 Marital status   
Many evidences showed the association of marital status and the decision to leave 
rural remote areas. For example, in 2003, Viscomi’s study in Australia showed that 
physicians were likely to practice in a rural area if they had a partner with a rural 
background. In 2009, Stagg identified influential factors for career choices of the South 
Australian Flinders University Parallel Rural Community Curriculum graduated students. 
The study found that graduated students who had a rural background spouse/partner 
were more likely to choose practicing in rural locations. In 2012, Royston surveyed new 
osteopathic medical students to examine the factors related to decision to practice rural 
areas. He found that besides rural upbringing factors, students who have a spouse or 
significant other who had lived in rural areas were more likely to intend to practice in 
rural areas.   
2.2.2.3 Provision of school for children   
In 2007, Serneel showed that access to education for children was the most 
significant factor that affected the location decision in rural areas of nursing and medical 
students in Ethiopia. In 2003, Viscomi summarized many reasons influencing family 
physicians to remain in rural areas, including childcare and provision of school for their 
children.   
2.2.2.4 Sense of community spirit  
In 2009, Christine reported that ‘rural upbringing’ was related to the tendency of 




childhood experience made the health workers familiar and resilient to integrate the 
community which drives them to their interest in rural community. Hancock tested 
whether the rural upbringing could be a predictive factor for recruiting and 
retaining physician practice in rural areas by using a qualitative method study. The results 
showed that rural exposure through recreation, education, long-term residence, or a 
mixture of these, contributes an early creation or familiarity, resilience, and 
community/place integration that bring attentiveness for graduated physicians practicing 
in rural areas (2009).     
2.2.3 Working and living condition   
2.2.3.1 Working environment: relationship in working place, work load,   
Work environment is one of the major non-financial factors influencing the 
decision to leave or stay in rural of health providers (WHO, 2010; Lexomboon, 2003). 
Many studies group this factor to non-financial incentive which related the retention of 
health worker practicing in rural communities (Henderson, 2008; Adzei, 
2012; Awofeso 2010). Working and living conditions are very important in many 
developing countries. Due to the budget constraint, the government in many developing 
countries strengthen their incentive policy by combining financial incentives with 
improving working and living conditions in rural and remote areas (Henderson, 
2008). For example, the financial and non-financial incentives have been used and 
evaluated in Ghana. The study showed that both incentives significantly influenced the 
location choice of healthcare workers (Adzei, 2012). The significant non-financial 
incentives in Ghana included leadership skills, opportunity for continuing education, and 




as limited access to electricity, primitive social amenities, poor quality educational or 
communication facilities and inadequacy of portable water are all barriers to deciding 
to practice in rural and remote areas of health workforces. Improving these difficulties 
can reduce the decision to leave rural areas of healthcare workers in Nigeria (Awofeso, 
2010).     
2.2.3.2 Job satisfaction  
In 2010, Delobelle explored the Southern African nurses whether job satisfaction 
related to their decision to leave or stay in rural areas. The survey study showed that job 
satisfaction significantly associated with retention in rural area. The survey of health 
worker in Ghana showed the same result as the study in Southern African nurses. The 
survey showed that job satisfaction significantly reduced the intention of health workers 
to leave the rural areas (Boneburger, 2014). The same scenario with the study in 
Thailand, in 2003, Lexomboon explored the factors causing Thai dentist leaving their 
practice location. The study showed that job satisfaction was one significant factors 
influence dentists decide to leave their location.   
2.2.4 Career related aspect  
The opportunity for continuing education or training was most common important 
motivated factor reported from health workers questionnaire survey (Grobler, 2015).  
The WHO framework showed some examples of career related factors including access to 
continuing education opportunities, supervision, professional development courses and 
workshops, and so on.  In 2007, Serneels explored the factors affecting location decision 
of nurses and medical students in rural areas in Ethiopia. The results showed that the 




choice, while having access to training was more significant to medical students’ location 
choice. The survey of medical students from six countries in Africa showed the reasons 
to stay in Africa most involved with career related aspect. Medical students from Congo, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda were choosing to stay in Africa because of good 
career options 92% and opportunity for further education 88% (Burch, 2011).  In 
2012, Adzei identified the opportunity for development as one significant influential 
factor for the health workforce in Ghana. The study showed that the opportunity 
for development could be a predictor for motivation and retention of health workers in 
rural areas.     
2.2.5 Bounding or mandatory service   
The bounding or mandatory service factor can be called several names for 
example, compulsory service, obligatory, mandatory, requisite and coercive programs. 
This program has occurred since the early 1900s (Frehywot). The mandatory 
service program has been implemented in many countries around the world for 
recruitment and retaining health workers in rural areas in their 
country. Frehywot represented that there are three different types of mandatory service 
programs in 70 countries. They are the condition of service program, the mandatory 
service with incentives program, and the mandatory service without incentives program. 
The mandatory service with incentives program is the program generally used in many 
countries. We can notice that the mandatory service program is associated with financial 
incentives used in many developed countries (Pathman, 2004; Jackson, 2003; Dunbabin, 
2006; Matsumoto, 2008). The evidences showed that obligated participants who 




more likely to practice in a committed location. The studies showed that some obligated 
health workers chose to stay in the original location after completing their commitment 
(Cullen, 1997; Jackson, 2003; Matsumoto, 2008).     
Other Theories Associate the Movement Behavior of Health Workers  
1.  Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation   
According to Judson’s study, the topic is “Harnessing the Right Combination of 
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation to Change Physician Behavior.” The study showed 
the effort of the policy makers to change physicians’ behavior. The policy makers 
implemented strategies to improve efficiency in the production of health with extrinsic 
and intrinsic motivations. Both extrinsic and intrinsic incentives were provided to 
improve provider behaviors. The problems were the difficulty to assess the achievement 
of these incentives in behavior change. Many arguments occurred among the policy 
makers about how and when extrinsic and intrinsic incentive should be implemented to 
optimize provider behavior (Judson, 2015).     
Judson suggested four types of extrinsic and intrinsic motivators. They are 
including successful extrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation “overpowered” by 
intrinsic motivation, successful intrinsic motivation, and intrinsic motivation “crowded 
out” by extrinsic motivation.    
1. Successful extrinsic motivation: the evidence showed that the behavior of 
physicians improved after changing the payment method. The salaried physicians who 
used to ignore clinical assignment and sometimes avoid taking care of patients 




service (FFS) payment system. This shows that the financial incentives affected the 
behavioral change of physicians.    
2. Extrinsic motivation “overpowered” by intrinsic motivation: the article 
showed one example: the chief of one medicine institute offered financial reward for 
faculty member who attend the medical grand round at least 50%. He expected to 
increase the round attendee. However, some mid-career physicians felt insulted and 
denied attending the medical grand rounds. This example showed that financial reward 
cannot overcome by intrinsic motivation. This situation can be used to explain how to 
attract healthcare workers practicing in rural and remote areas by using financial 
incentives and non-financial incentives.     
• Successful intrinsic motivation: the evidence showed many physicians 
volunteered to work in West Africa in 2014 to provide healthcare service for 
patients infected with Ebola.  These volunteer physicians risked themselves working in 
the dangerous areas to help other people because they believed the worthy and 
significance to saving people’s lives. They said they receive huge happiness for helping 
people’s lives with no compensation.     
• Intrinsic motivation “crowded out” by extrinsic motivation: the evidence 
showed the physician who used to sacrifice his time and effort for helping HIV/AIDs 
patients to have a better quality of life. However, after many years of his dedication, he 
learned that he received lower income compared with many new physicians. Ultimately, 
he stopped serving HIV/AIDs patients then worked in hospital medicine, which provided 




These models explained how both extrinsic and intrinsic motivators can be 
effective or ineffective, based on the context and expectations. For example, FFS 
physicians are more likely to increase the volume of care, while salary physicians feel 
adequately compensated, so financial incentive may insult their professionalism. Intrinsic 
motivation may be a proper way for changing behavior. This model provides a 
wide perspective in considering the behavioral changes of providers from the extrinsic 
and intrinsic incentives.       
        2. Motivation and Behavior Psychology Theories   
The behavior psychology approach is commonly used in the article of healthcare 
workforce geographic location from the management discipline. Basically, motivation 
theories are applied by management to change worker behavior. According to the 
conceptual model of this study besides the financial incentives such as Hardship 
Allowance, the non-financial incentives such as personal origin and value, family aspect, 
working and living condition, and career related are associated with the decision to leave 
or stay in rural areas of dentists. The non-financial incentives we focused in this study are 
personal age, and opportunity for continuing education whether they affect the decision 
of dentists to leave the practice communities.   
The Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs   
This is a classic theory which explained the needs of human being are categorized 
into five levels from lower to higher hierarchy (Dempsey, 1999).    
Level 1: Physical needs, such as the material need for food, drink and shelter                 
Level 2: Safety needs, such as protection from danger                                                      




Level 4: Esteem needs, for respect, reputation and autonomy                                           
Level 5: Self-actualization needs, expressed as the realization of one’s potential        
The theory shows that individuals have a hierarchy of psychological needs. The 
higher-level needs will not be important unless the lower-level needs are filled. Health 
provider is a human being which have need as same as other people. To cover the basic 
need in level 1, the health provider have to sufficient income and have financial security. 
After they are fulfilled the level 1 need then they increase their need in the next level.            
 The Herzberg’s Motivation Theory   
According the theory, motivators and work environmental factors are related to 
job satisfaction (Robbin, 2001). Job satisfaction is related to decision to leave the practice 
location (Lexomboon, 2003). Motivating factors can be achievement, recognition, type of 
work, responsibility, advancement, and opportunity for continuing education. Work 
environment factors can be primary hospitals policy and administration, supervision, 
relationship with supervisors, work condition, salary, relationship with co-worker, 
personal life, status, and security. The health worker will be dissatisfied with work if their 
hygiene factors do not meet their expectation.     
Human behavior theory    
Several theories such as intuitive theories, reinforcement theories, motivation 
theories, and theories of learning can be used to describe human behavior (Fincham and 
Rhodes, 1992). All these theories show that behavior is affected by stimulus. For 
example, family factors such as spouse’s job, children’s schooling, higher household 
income can influence the decision of healthcare worker leave or stay in rural and remote 




study is interested in how it relates to financial incentive for dentist working in rural and 
remote areas in Thailand.  
Addressing the Healthcare Worker Disparities Distribution: Strategies used and the 
effectiveness    
In 2010, WHO suggested intervention to improve attraction, recruitment, and 
retention of health workers in rural and remote areas. There are four major categories of 
interventions: education, regulatory, professional and personal support, and financial 
incentives.  
Educational strategies   
In 2010, Dolea reviewed the evaluated strategies to increase attraction and 
retention of health workers in remote and rural areas. She suggested that 
education strategies had influenced mainly on the attractiveness of rural and remote 
areas.   Therefore, it is necessary to choose desirable students, those who are probable to 
work in rural and remote areas. Those who will be trained in these locations with applied 
methods and programs that tend to convince them decide to work in rural areas. The 
example of intervention in the education category can be: students from rural 
backgrounds, health professional schools outside metropolitan areas, clinical rotations in 
rural areas during studies, curricula that reflect rural healthcare problems, and continuing 
professional development for rural health workers.   
a. Recruiting student from rural origin, underserved population   
Students with a rural origin are more likely to practice in a rural setting. 
Evidences show that students with a rural origin are more likely to practice in a rural 




most strongly associated with rural practice (Wilson, 2009; Dolea, 2010).  The 
survey of medical students who participate in Australian Rural Clinical Schools Program 
showed that rural background medical students were 10 times more likely to prefer 
working in rural areas compared with non-participants (Walker, 2012).  Thai government 
also applied the educational studies for addressing the inequitable distribution of 
physicians. The medical schools recruited rural background students by special admission 
(Wibulpolprasert, 2003). The geographic origin selection intervention is the most 
strongly related with rural location (Wilson, 2009).   
b. Clinical rural rotation curriculum   
In 1999, Rabinowitz investigated physicians who graduated from Jefferson 
Medical college which contained the Physician Shortage Area Program (PSAP). His 
longitudinal cohort study showed that PSAP graduates were four times more likely than 
non-PSAP graduates to locate in rural and underserved areas. The study which examined 
the Rural Medical Education Program (RMED) which started in 1989 by placing students 
in a rural community of New York, showed that about 25% of physicians from RMED 
working in underserved communities (Sumchy,  2005). In 2004, Tani evaluated the 
community-based medical education in medical students in Tokushima Prefecture Japan, 
the study clarified that the intensity of students’ attitudes about interest and a sense of 
fulfillment in community medicine and medicine in remote area was significantly 
increased after the community-based practice. The study of the impact of rural clinical 
division of the school of Medicine at the University of Queensland (UQ) found that UQ’s 
rural clinical division is having a positive impact on the intern workforce in the regional 




The Medical Education (RMED) Program from University of Illinois, which 
provides the long ambulatory training for medical students, showed the program 
achievement by 68% of program participants practicing in rural Illinois 
(Salafsky 2005).   In 2007, White evaluated how access to continuing medical education 
(CME) in Australia is important and impacts the retainment of physicians in rural 
communities. He found that the access to CME increased the confidence of physicians' 
remaining in rural areas. In 2008, Halaas examined the Rural Physician Associate 
Program in Minnesota. The nine months longitudinal experiences in 
rural communities induced more medical students to choose to practice in rural areas. The 
rural rotation experiences influenced health professional students to be more likely to 
choose locating in rural communities, especially rural background students (Wolschuk, 
2002; Capstick 2008). In 2014, Playford determined Rural Clinical School of Western 
Australia Program (RCSWA) which contain rural clinical program. The study showed 
that participant in RCSWA program strongly associated with greatly likelihood for 
working rural areas.   
c. School location in rural area   
The study showed that the new physicians who graduated from Memorial University 
Medical School, which is located in a rural area in Canada, were more likely to practice in 
rural communities, especially those who have a rural background (Mathew, 2008).  In 
2011, Rabitnowitz evaluated the Physician Shortage Area Program (PSAP) of Jefferson 
Medical College (JMC) to show the effective of program impact on female physicians. 
The study showed that female physicians who participated in PSAP were more likely to 




effectiveness of the medical school rural programs that have the potential to recruit more 
female physician practicing in rural areas.   
Regulatory strategies   
These strategies can be called several names including “compulsory service,” 
“obligatory,” “requisite,” and coercive” programs. These programs have been used 
worldwide since the early 20th century to recruit and retain health professional in rural 
areas in their countries (Frehywot, 2010).   The regulatory strategy has been implemented 
in many countries worldwide for recruitment and retaining health workers in rural areas 
in their country including Thailand. According to Frehywot article, the regulatory 
programs were classified three types using differently in 70 counties: 1) condition of 
service, 2) compulsory service with incentives, and 3) compulsory service without 
incentives. The common one is the mandatory service with incentives program, due to 
this program being associated with financial incentives used in many developed countries 
(Pathman, 2004; Jackson, 2003; Dunbabin, 2006; Matsumoto, 2008). These evidences 
showed that participants who received financial support in exchange for committed to 
serve in rural areas were more likely to retain in rural areas than the non-participants 
were.   
Dolea summarized that some evidences showed that mandatory strategies could 
recruit and retain health workers in rural and remote areas. In 2003, Jackson 
examined a West Virginia scholarship and loan repayment program, which required 
medical students to commit to serve in underserved areas after graduating. The study 
showed that committed physicians were more likely to stay in their started practice place 




of the Cadetship program in Australia, which has a bonding scheme for postgraduate 
training where 43% of participated physicians were locating in rural areas, compared to 
20% of all national physicians. The bonding scheme from the National Health Service 
Corps and Oklahoma’s physician loan repayment/incentive program in USA as well as 
the Jichi Medical University home prefecture compulsory scheme in Japan showed the 
influential retention (Cullen, 1997; Matsumoto, 2008). However, many bonding 
schemes or compulsory services as in the West Virginia program, Cadetship program, 
NHSC and Jichi Medcial University programs involved with scholarship and loan 
repayment required services which are considered financial incentives intervention also 
(Jackson, 2008; Dunbabin, 2006; Cullen, 1997; Matsumoto, 2008).    
Professional and personal strategies  
In 2010, Dolea suggested that professional and personal factors were the top 
choice and preference for work in rural areas. Questionaire-based surveys show that 
professional and personal support may affect health workers’ decision to practice in 
underserved areas (Grobler, 2015). In 2008, Lehmann showed that poor living condition 
and insufficient health care and education facilities were associated with the reluctant to 
practice in rural and remote areas.  
In 2006, Gardiner evaluated the impact of a rural doctor workforce program. The 
program involves social and psychological support and practical interventions, on the 
well-being and retention of general practice physicians in rural areas. The study showed 
that the enrolled physicians were less likely to leave rural communities in the short to 
medium term (from 30% to 25%) (Gardiner, 2006). In 2012, Adzei examined the 




financial incentive, non-financial incentives also significance influence motivation and 
retention to locate in rural. These non-financial incentives were leadership and 
supervision skill, continuing professional development, and infrastructure and resource.    
Financial strategies   
Evidences showed that financial incentives have influential attractiveness, 
recruitment and retention for health workers in rural and remote areas (Gibbon, 2006; 
Niger Ministry of Health, 2008; Dolea, 2008). Evidence of financial incentives programs 
were from developed and developing countries. Based on the literature review in part one 
about factor attracting and retaining health workers in rural areas, many articles were 
from developing countries report the important of financial factors. However, when 
review the literature about the effectiveness of financial incentive program to recruit and 
retain health workers in rural areas, many articles were from developed countries.  
 Financial incentives programs from developing countries mostly were direct 
payment program. The evidences showed that the financial programs and evaluation from 
developing countries was very rare compared with the evaluated program from developed 
countries (Dolea, 2010; Grobler, 2015). In 2007, Ross examined the Friends 
of Mosvold Scholarship Scheme from South Africa. The results found that 100% of 
participants completed their committed service in underserved areas. In 
2011, Ditlopo evaluated the rural allowance policy in North West Province, South Africa 
by interviewing 40 health workers from five rural hospitals. The results showed the rural 
allowance affected to the increasing of health workers in rural areas, but most staff 
showed program dissatisfaction. In 2013, Antwi investigated the effective of raising 




decrease 1.03% health worker rural leaving rate. Not only the number of studies 
from developing countries is lesser than studies from developed countries, but also the 
quality of the study that required more rigorous study from developing countries (Dolea, 
2010; Grobler, 2015).   
Financial incentives program from developed countries mostly were scholarship 
and loan repayment program. Most of previous and current financial incentive evaluated 
studies were from developed countries (WHO, 2010; Dolea, 2010; Humphrey, 2009; 
Grobler, 2015). For example, the review article of Barnighausen and Bloom showed that 
among 43 studies, most of them were from the US, five of them from Japan, two from 
Canada, one from New Zealand and another one from South Africa. Among 34 articles 
from the US, 24 articles examined the effectiveness of National Health Service Corps 
programs which provide scholarship for health professional students and loan repayment 
for young health professionals. The Jichi Medical University program from Japan was 
also the scholarship for medical student program. The Ontario Underserviced Area 
Program from Canada contained both scholarship for medical students and direct 
payment for physician. However, most of the financial incentives program from 
developed countries were scholarships and loan payment programs while program from 
developing countries were direct payment program.  
The evaluated program used utility theory explain the location choice of health 
workers. In 1996, Bolduc estimated the model of choice of location by general physicians 
for establishing their initial practice. The model used to assess the effect of various 
incentive measures introduced in Quebec to influence the geographical distribution of 




Quebec before and after the intervention and used autoregressive multinomial 
probit model analyses data.  Bolduc used utility theory explained the incentives policies 
to maximize utilization of physicians to practice in the areas. The results provided 
evidence that these policies had a significant effect on location choices.  
 The effectiveness of the financial incentive program was explained by program 
outcome. In 2004, Sempowski reviewed the effectiveness of financial incentives in 
exchange for rural and underserved areas. He summarized the effectiveness of financial 
programs from 10 articles. The results showed that the return-of-service programs to rural 
and underserviced areas have achieved their short-term recruitment goal while the long-
term retention has less achievement.  Barnighausen and Bloom reviewed the evaluated 
financial incentives studies conducted from earliest recorded date until January 
2009. They identified five different types of financial incentive programs as service-
requiring scholarship (41 studies), education loans with service requirements (2 studies), 
service-option educational loans (1 study), loan repayment programs (3 studies), and 
direct payment programs (5 studies). The study outcome was categorized in three groups: 
program results, program effects, and program impact.   
Most studies showed program results outcomes of recruitment, retention, and 
satisfaction of participants or families. For example, in 1975, Bass 
and Copeman measured the outcome of Ontario Underserved program and found that 
about 53% completed committed services and 74% remained in the original location. In 
1997 and 2007, Inoue evaluated the Jichi Medical University program, which provided 
medical students scholarships for exchange with serving at least nine years in rural 




67% remained in the original location. In 1994, Pathman et al. studied the outcome of 
National Health Service Corps (NHSC) programs. The finding showed that participants 
complete committed services less than non-participants do. The means satisfaction of 
participants (NHSC physicians) also were lower than the satisfaction of non-participants.  
The financial incentives programs effect outcome composed of provision of care, 
retention, and participant satisfaction. Evidences showed program effect outcomes, for 
instance, Rabinowitz evaluated the Physician Shortage Area Program from Jefferson 
Medical College in Philadelphia. In 2000, Rabinowitz found that participants’ physicians 
were two time more likely to provide care to the underserved people compared with non-
participants physicians. In 2001, Rabinowitz showed that 24% of NHSC physicians 
provided primary care in rural areas compared with 5% of non-NHSC physicians. In 
2003, Probst et al. evaluated the NHSC programs in South Carolina. The finding showed 
that 28% of NHSC alumni physicians served Medicaid patients more than 19% of non-
NHSC alumni.  
The financial incentives programs impact outcome composed of health system 
and health outcome. There were a few studies reported these outcomes. In 1990, 
Anderson and Rosenberg examined the impact of the Ontario Underservice Area 
Program. The study showed that physician density in the rural and remote areas in 
Ontario was increasing over the 30 years of the program. In 2005, Holmes evaluated the 
impact of NHSC physicians who graduated from 1976-1988. The study showed that the 
elimination of the program would affect 10% physicians decreasing in underserved 
locations. In 2006, Pathman et al. studied the impact of NHSC programs from physicians, 




(HPSA) in the US in 1984. The finding showed that having the NHSC program 
participants increased the non-participants in underserved communities by six percent.   
In 2004, Pathman et al. measured the outcome of financial incentives programs in 
40 US states. The programs consisted of state service requiring scholarship, state loan 
service-option, state loan repayment, direct financial incentive for residents, and 
direct financial incentive for health professionals. As a whole, the study showed that 
states support-for-service programs increased physicians in underserved small and rural 
communities. The study found that loan payment and direct financial incentives 
committed physicians after graduated and had minimal penalties. On the other hand, the 
scholarship program committed physician early in their training and had high penalties. 
The study showed the best response for completing service and longer retention among 
participants from loan payment and direct financial incentive programs.   
According to five financial incentives type described in Barnighausen and Bloom 
study in 2009. They can be categorized into two main groups: educational financial 
incentive support and multipurpose financial support. The educational financial support 
group included service-requiring scholarship, education loans with service requirements, 
service-option educational loans, and loan repayment programs. There is only direct 
payment program is the multipurpose financial support which provided flexibility 
compared with the educational financial support (Humphrey, 2009).  There is rarely study 
of the effectiveness of direct payment programs. Although, the study of Pathman et al. in 
2004 showed the study outcome of direct payment program outweighed the scholarship 




evidence is not enough to conclude the effectiveness between the direct payment 
financial incentive and other incentive programs.  
Gap in the Literature   
The literature review shows that there is inadequate evidence regarding (i) what 
is the effectiveness of direct payment financial incentives in middle-income countries, 
and (ii) how the dentist response to the direct payment financial incentives for retaining 
them practice in rural and remote areas.    
The research gap which have been found from the review literature and will be 
fulfilled from this study are including:    
1. Most current studies were from developed countries, there was a few 
studies from developing countries. Most evidences from developed countries evaluated 
the outcome of the financial incentives program such as NHSC programs from USA, 
Ontario Underserviced Area Program from Canada, Jichi Medical University program 
from Japan. Many evidences from developing countries explored and identified the 
important of financial factors without estimating the program outcome (Adzei, 
2012; Agey-Baffour, 2013; Awofeso, 2010)  
2. Most current studies target population were medical students and 
physicians, there was a few studies target population on other health professionals 
including dentists.  For example, among 24 NHSC evaluated programs, there is only 
study from Mofidi et al. in 2002 reported the retention rate of dentists who participated in 
NHSC programs.  
3. Currently financial incentives evaluation programs mostly examined 




were a few studies assess direct payment programs.  This is consistent with the majority 
of financial evaluated studies mostly conducted in developed countries. Most Developed 
countries implemented educational support programs such as scholarships and loan 
forgiveness program. For example, NHSC programs in US provide service-requiring 
scholarships for students and loan repayment program for physicians. Ontario 
Underservices Area Program in Canada provide Service-requiring scholarships for 
medical students and direct financial incentives for physicians. Jichi Medical University 
in Japan provide service-requiring scholarships for medical students.   
There is no evidence of study on a high direct payment incentive (provide 1-3 
times of salary) programs.    
The first gap is the current published evaluated strategies for recruiting and 
retaining healthcare workers in rural and remote areas mostly done in developed countries 
(Humphrey, 2008; Wilson, 2009; Dolea, 2010; Grobler, 2015; Verma, 2016).  The 
financial incentives programs were also mainly conducted in developed countries. Several 
reviewed articles showed that most of the effectiveness financial incentive programs for 
attracting and retaining health professional in rural and remote areas were evaluated and 
published by many developed countries. For example, in 2004, Sempowski reviewed 10 
articles: 6 articles from US, 3 articles from Canada, 1 article from New Zealand and 1 
article from South Africa. In 2009, Barnighausen and Bloom reviewed 43 articles: 34 
articles from US, 5 articles from Japan, 2 articles from Canada, 1 article from Australia, 
and 1 article from South Africa.     
Most studies of human resources for health in low-and-middle income countries explored 




Awofeso,2010). Although, many countries have adopted the strategies recommended by 
WHO, there is less studies evaluating the effectiveness of the programs (Lehmann, 2008; 
Henderson, 2008; Buchan, 2013; Dolea, 2010). Evidence for the effectiveness of 
addressing strategies is highly required especially the effectiveness of financial incentives 
which commonly used in low-and middle-income countries (Dolea, 2010; Grobler, 
2015). The reviewed articles showed that the programs affected decision to leave or stay 
in rural and remote areas diversely due to the program implementation in different 
environments and contexts such as different occupations, different countries. These 
finding suggest that there is required for a study of the effectiveness of financial 
incentives for retaining healthcare workers in rural and remote areas in more developing 
countries.    
The second gap is many published articles of the effectiveness of financial 
programs focusing on the behavior of medical students and physicians. For example, 
among 43 articles which were reviewed by Barnighausen and Bloom, there were 3 
articles: Bradbury in 1963; Mofidi et al. in 2002; and Porterfield in 2003 that showed 
study outcome of dentists. In addition, among the studies examined the effectiveness of 
the National Health Service Corps (NHSC) programs mostly showed the results of 
medical students or physicians, despite students who enrolled in the NHSC programs 
involved family nurses, midwives, physician assistants, and dentist (Barnighhausen and 
Bloom, 2009).   In 2003, Porterfield reported that alumni NHSC dentists were less likely 
to work in underserved areas compared with alumni NHSC physicians. However, 
this evidence is insufficient to explain the different or similar location choice behavior 




In Thailand, public/private organization distribution of dentists different from 
physicians, pharmacists, and nurses as shown in Table 3.8. Data showed that dentists 
mostly practice in private sectors compared with others health professional which 
dominated in public sectors. Therefore, the study of the effectiveness of financial 
incentives on dentists is required to test whether the dentist’s location choice behavior is 
different from other health professionals.     
Table 2.1 Public/Private organization distribution of health workers      






Doctors    21,550 (82.1)   4,694 (17.9)   26,244   
Dentists*    4,725 (47.4)   5,221 (52.6)   9,926   
Dental nurses*    4,313(100)   -   4,313   
Pharmacists    7,173 (82.4)   1,527 (17.6)   8,700   
Nurses    122,460 (89.7)   13,987 (10.3)   136,447   
Public sector: Includes all government owned/funded health facilities under health 
ministry and other related ministries.    
Sources: MoPH, 2010    
* Dental council, 2009     
The third gap is most of studies evaluated financial incentives which supported    
education such as service-requirement scholarship or loan repayment programs. 
For example, among 43 articles Barnighausen and Bloom found 5 direct payment 
financial incentives programs from 4 articles: Bass and Copeman in 1975; Anderson and 
Rosenberg in 1990; Jackson in 2003; and Pathman in 2000 and 2004. The scholarship and 
loan repayment programs are benefit for healthcare students and professionals in some 
countries such as the United Stated where the educational cost is very high. However, in 




be less attractive than direct payment incentives. Therefore, there should be more 
studies evaluated the effectiveness the direct payment incentives program.    
The fourth gap is no published evidence on the high direct payment incentive 
program. The study of Voluntary Bonding Scheme New Zealand Ministry of Health in 
2012 showed the proportion of direct payment incentives to the physicians was about 10 
percent of physician’s salary. The direct payment program in West Virginia showed 
maximum incentive was US$ 20,000 to 40,000 per year for physicians working in 
underserved areas in 2001 (Jackson, 2003). In Thailand, the Hardship Allowance for 
dentists working in rural and remote areas in 2008 were US$ 3,750 – 11,250 per year. 
Although the payment was lower compared with incentive payment in New Zealand and 
US, the Hardship Allowance in 2008 was 100-200% of new dentist’s salary in Thailand. 
This study will show the effectiveness of the high direct payment incentive for retaining 
dentists in rural and remote areas.     
Conceptual Framework 
Based on the utility theory, this study apply to create the model of Thai dentist’s 
location choice which shown in Figure 2.2. We assumed that the Thai dentists’ decision 
to leave or stay in rural and remote areas depend on two major factors including financial 
and non-financial factors.   
The conceptual framework of the study is showed in Figure 2.3.  This framework 
shows all factors related to the dentists’s decision to leave or stay in rural and remote 
areas following the model of dentist’s location choice. The framework shows two major 





















Figure 2.3 Conceptual Framework  
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the effectiveness of the Hardship Allowance, which is the direct payment financial 
incentives for dentists working in primary hospitals under the MoPH. Another box of 
financial incentives, which might show in the econometric model for data analysis. 
However, other financial incentive such as the pay for overtime which is various in each 
hospital may be confounding factor that related to the location choice of dentists.  For 
non-financial incentives in this study, we examine the relationship between age (personal 
factor) and the location choice. Although, we assumed other factors have relationship 
with the dentists’ location choice such as the opportunity to continuing education, the 
limitation of data set causes the missing of this variable in the econometric model. In 
addition, other non-financial incentives such as the Hospitals’ administration and 
relationship in workplace, which vary in any office, is another unobserved factor may 
influence the dentists’ location choice (Lexomboon, 2003). The community or the district 
and province environment may be another confounding factor associated with the 
decision of dentists’ to leave or stay in rural or remote areas. For instance, the remote 
areas in the attractive provinces (such as Chiang Mai in the North region) may be 
favorable place for dentists compared with rural areas in unattractive provinces (such as 







This chapter describes the purposes and the methodology for the study. Section 
3.1 outlines the Aims and the hypotheses of the study. The theoretical models which 
consist of the utility model of Thai dentists’ location choice are shown in Section 3.2. 
Section 3.3 describes the methodology of the study which consists of specific aims, 
hypotheses, study designs, sources of data, study population, unit of analyses, dependent 
variables, independent variables, explanatory variables, econometric models, and data 
analyses.  
The objectives of the study  
There are three objectives to this study. The first objective of the study is 
to investigate the effectiveness of direct payment financial incentives, the ‘Hardship 
Allowance’ (HA), in 2008 for reducing the resignation rates of dentists in rural and 
remote areas relative to urban areas. The second objectives is to investigate the effect of 
decreasing HA , due to the 2016 policy changing of practice location status from rural to 
urban area and remote to rural area, on rural and remote dentist’s resignation. The last 
objective is to determine the relationship between dentist’s resignation and dentist’s age 
after the decreasing HA, due to the 2016 policy changing of practice location status from 
rural to urban area and remote to rural area.  





Aim1: To examine whether the HA payment in 2008 reduced resignation rates of dentists 
in rural and remote provinces relative to urban provinces.  
Hypothesis1: Dentists who received higher HA after 2008 are less likely to resign 
in rural areas. The resignation rates of dentists in rural and remote provinces after 2008 
are decreasing compared with the resignation rates of dentists in urban provinces.  
Aim2: To estimate the effect of the HA reduction, due to recategorization in HA areas 
from rural to urban in December 2016, on rural and remote dentists' resignation and 
relocation.  
Hypothesis2: Rural and remote dentists who located in the changed areas which HA was 
reduced in December 2016 are more likely to leave (resign and relocate) from their areas. 
Therefore, after 2016, the resignation and relocation of dentists in changed areas increase. 
Aim3: To examine the relationship between dentists’ age and dentists’ resignation and 
relocation in changed areas after the 2016 policy implementation. 
Hypothesis3: Based on the policy change in 2016, the HA area was recategorized. 
Consequently, the HA payment rate was decreased. Rural dentists who are older affected 
the HA reduction more than the younger dentists. Therefore, the older dentists are more 
likely to resign or relocate from their areas due to the HA reduction compared with the 
younger dentists. 
Methodology for Specific Aim 1  
Aim1: To examine whether the HA payment in 2008 reduced resignation rates of dentists 
in rural and remote provinces relative to urban provinces.  
Hypothesis1: After the HA policy in 2008, dentists in rural and remote provinces are less 




decreasing compared with the resignation rates in urban provinces.  
Research Design  
The study design for Aim1 is a longitudinal retrospective cohort study using an 
observational database. This study is based on the natural intervention. The intervention 
is the implementation of financial incentive direct payment called “Hardship Allowance” 
(HA) in Thailand in 2008. The Hardship Allowance is the direct payment financial 
incentive for physicians, dentists, pharmacists and other health providers working in 
primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public Health especially in rural and remote 
areas. However, in this study we examine the effectiveness of the financial incentive HA 
on retaining dentists in rural and remote areas. The treatment group in this study is only 
the dentist group so there is no control group. To minimize the possibilities of selection 
bias, we used the retrospective observational data of dentists’ location from 2003 to 2016 
to examine the change of location choice before and after policy implementation. The 
observational data of dentists’ location before and after policy implementation in 2008 
contains variation in Hardship Allowance program. This variation which occurred from 
the independent or exogenous changes in event across time can identify the effects of 
Hardship Allowance on the dentists’ decision to stay or leave rural and remote areas.   
In this study we measure the retention rate of dentists in urban, rural and remote 
areas by using the resignation rate of dentists by areas and by province. The resignation 
rates by areas are estimated by the number of dentists who resigned divided by all exist 
dentists in each area: urban, rural and remote areas. In this study, the area is identified by 
urban, rural and remote areas. There is no official definition of rural and remote areas in 




the MoPH identification (Appendix A). The classification of the MoPH for urban, 
suburban, rural and remote areas are used to determine the areas for the HA payment.  
The classification of rural and remotes areas in this study do not comply with this 
common measure which based on population or distance between working place to the 
city. The characteristics of hospitals in urban, rural and remote areas under the Ministry 
of Public Health Notification Issue 4, shows that urban areas are the capital city in each 
province. The urban areas in some big provinces include the capital city and other big 
cities which have highly density population. The rural areas are most other districts 
beside the capital city, in many provinces most districts are considered the rural areas 
which have lower density population compared with the urban city. The remote areas are 
found in some provinces mostly near the border provinces. The remote areas are located 
the furthest from the urban city compared with rural city and have the lowest density of 
population. However, the density population and the distance between hospitals and 
urban city in rural and remote areas are various in each province.  
The number of urban, rural and remote areas in each province is different 
depending on the size and the urbanization. In this study, the rural and urban provinces 
are classified by using the percentage of urban hospitals in each province. The urban 
hospitals are calculated by the number of hospitals in urban areas divided by all hospitals 
in all areas in the provinces. The percentage of urban hospitals are categorized in 4 
quartiles (Q1-4). The province in quartile 1 (Q1) have 7.7-16.7% urban hospitals, in 
quartile 2 (Q2) have 17.6-25% urban hospitals, in quartile 3 (Q3) have 26.7-33.3% urban 
hospitals, in quartile 4 (Q4) have 35.3-100% urban hospitals. The provinces in Q1 




compared with the province in Q1. The provinces in Q4 are considered the most 
urbanized areas.   
The overall resignation rate of dentists is calculated by the number of resignation 
dentists divided by the number of all public dentists under the MoPH in each province. 
The number of resignation dentists from 2003 to 2016 are obtained from the Human 
Resource Management Department, MoPH. However, there is no data of individual 
dentists from 2003 to 2012. The updated data of individual dentists which obtained from 
the annual report of Policy and Strategy Bureau MoPH, are available from 2013. 
Therefore, the number of all dentists in each province each year since 2003 to 2012 must 
be retrieved from the individual dentist's data in 2013. The number of all dentists in each 
province from 2003 to 2012 are estimated by using the recruiting year and resigning year 
from individual dentist's data in 2013. The condition used to estimate active dentists is 
that “if dentists were active in a given year the recruiting date was before, and resignation 
rate was after the given year. For example, the number of active dentists in 2003 are 
calculated by counting all dentists who recruited before 2003 and resigned after 2003  
Source of data  
Our data sources for addressing the specific Aim 1 include the resignation data of 
public dentists under MoPH from 2003 to 2016, individual dentists’ data 
under MoPH from 2013 to 2016, and the urban, rural and remote areas data in 2008. The 
resignation data are obtained from the Human Resource Management Division, 
Permanent Secretary Bureau, MoPH.  Individual dentists’ data are obtained from the 
Policy and Strategy Bureau, which adjusted from annual reported data of Human 




and remote areas data in each province are obtained from the notification of 
the MoPH issue # 4 of Policy and Strategy Bureau, MoPH (Appendix A). Due to the 
resignation data contained only the individual dentist who resigned from primary 
hospitals under MoPH from 2003 to 2016. The updated individual dentists’ data which 
obtain from the Policy and Strategy Bureau, MoPH contained exist individual dentists’ 
data since 2013. Therefore, the existed individual dentists’ data from 2003 to 2012 could 
be extracted from the individual dentists’ data in 2013 by using recruiting year and 
resigning year of individual dentists as describing above.  
Study population   
The study population in this Aim 1 is all dentists who are the government 
employee working in health facilities under the MoPH. The total 3,132 resignation 
dentists in this study are the dentists who worked in health facilities under the MoPH and 
resigned from the health facilities under the MoPH from 2003 to 2016.  In 2016, the total 
dentists who work in health facilities under the MoPH were 5,247. The study population 
in this aim is measured by province. The dentists’ data from 75 provinces except 
Bangkok are used. We excluded Bangkok due to Bangkok has the special administrative 
jurisdiction which differently from other 75 provinces. The most important reason is no 
community hospitals in Bangkok which means no HA payment.  Based on the reason of 
resignation, the dentists who retired, died or fired from any reason are excluded from the 
study. The dentist who work in administrative facilities such as provincial public health 
office and dentists who work in dental college (dental hygiene's school) are also excluded 





Unit of analysis   
The unit of analysis in this Aim is the province-year in Thailand. Seventy-five 
provinces are reported in the study excluding Bangkok.   
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable for Aim 1 is the resignation rate of dentists who worked 
in the health facilities under the Ministry of Public Health during 2003 to 2016. The 
dentists’ resignation rate is calculated from the number of resigned dentists divided by 
the number of active dentists in each province in each year from 2003 to 2016. In the 
econometric model 1.1, the outcome variables are the resignation rate in urban, the 
resignation rate in rural and the resignation rate in remote areas. The rural resignation rate 
is calculated from the number of rural dentists who resigned from MoPH divided by the 
rural active dentists by province by year from 2003 to 2016. The remote resignation rate 
is calculated from the number of remote dentists who resigned from MoPH divided by 
the remote active dentists by province by year from 2003 to 2016. The urban resignation 
rate is calculated from the number of urban dentists who resigned from MoPH divided by 
the urban active dentists by province by year from 2003 to 2016.   
In the econometric model 1.2, the outcome variable is the overall resignation rate 
in each province each year. The overall resignation rate in this model measure the effect 
of policy implementation of dentists' resignation in rural and remote areas compared with 
in urban areas.   
Key explanatory variable  
The key explanatory variable for Aim 1 is the HA payment policy implementation 




incentives which the government provide to the healthcare provider including dentists 
working in community hospitals under the MoPH. The objective of the HA payment in 
2008 is to attract dentists practicing in community hospitals especially in rural and 
remote areas by providing about 5 times of previous rate. The HA payment criteria is 
based on areas and year of service as shown in Table 1.1 and 1.2 for HA payment before 
and after 2008, respectively. The major variables in the Econometric model for Aim 1 are 
composed of:  
Rural1 is the province in Q1 which has the urban hospital 7.7-16.7% which mean about 
92.3-83.8% of the areas in the province are rural and remote hospitals.  
Rural2 is the province in Q2 which has the urban hospital 17.6-25% which mean about 
82.4-75% of the area in this province are rural and remote hospitals.  
Urban1 is the province in Q3 which has the urban hospital 26.3-33.3% which mean 
about 73.7-66.7% of the area in this province are rural and remote hospitals.  
Urban2 is the province in Q4 which has the urban hospital 35.3-100% which did not 
show in the model because being used as a reference.  
Post is the HA policy implementation, post is equal 1 if in a year after 2008, otherwise 
post is equal zero  
Post * Rural1 is the interaction of HA policy and the province in Q1, before 2008 
post*rural1 is equal zero  
Post * Rural2 is the interaction of HA policy and the province in Q2, before 2008 
post*rural2 is equal zero  
Post * Urban1 is the interaction of HA policy and the province in Q3, before 2008 




Analysis Method  
To achieve the first Aim, a univariate analysis provides estimates of the 
demographic characteristics of the study population. A bivariate analysis is conducted to 
determine if there is any difference in these characteristics between the rural and remote, 
and urban population. As well as the difference in these characteristics between before 
and after 2008. Mantel-Haenszel chi square test is used to determine if there are any 
differences between two population of rural and remote, and urban areas, and between 
populations before and after 2008. The analysis is conducted at a 95% confidence interval 
(alpha = .05) A difference in difference regression analysis is then used to estimate the 
differences in resignation rate in rural and remote areas relative to urban areas before and 
after the 2008 implemented policy. Due to data set in this study is a longitudinal data 
(cross-sectional time-series data) so the fixed effect for panel data analysis is used to 
examine the model. The model in this analysis is:  
Econometric Model: Regression model using fixed effect estimation 
Rita = α0 + α1postit +µi+ɤit                                                                                                   (1)  
where  
Rita is the resignation rate of dentists locate in province ‘i’ in year ‘t’ in areas ‘a’ (urban, 
rural, remote areas)  
post is the HA implemented policy, post = 1 if year >= 2008, otherwise post = 0   
µi is the province i to n. 
ɤit is the random error term 
The percentage of urban hospitals is classified into 4. The 2nd model can provide 




The first econometric model measured the difference of the resignation rate of 
dentists in each area: urban, rural, and remote areas. Based on the data set using in this 
model is the panel data set, therefore the regression for panel data analysis is used.  The 
outcomes of the model regression in each area will be compared and discussed. Besides 
the first model, we measured the outcome of the overall resignation rate of dentists in 
different areas before and after the policy implementation by using the econometric 
model equation #2. In this model the major predictors are the post (HA implementation 
policy) and the percentage of urban hospitals in each province. The urban hospitals are 
calculated and divided with all hospitals under the MoPH in each province. The 
percentage of urban hospitals is classified into 4 quartiles (Q1-4). The provinces in Q1 
which have 7.7-16.7% urban hospitals are indicated the most rural province while the 
provinces in Q4 which have 35.3-100% urban hospitals are indicated the most urbanized 
province. The 2nd model can provide the outcome of overall resignation rate in both rural 
and urban provinces after the policy in 2008.   
Yit = β0 + β1Rural1it + β2Rural2it + β3Urban1it + β4postit + β5post. Rural1it + β6post. 
Rural2it + β7post.Urban1it + Ɛit     (2)  
where   
 Yit is the overall resignation rate of dentists in province‘i’ in year ‘t’   
Rural1 is the province in Q1 with the lowest percentage of urban hospitals, Rural1= 1 if 
urban hospital = 7.7-16.7%, otherwise Rural1=0  
Rural2 is the province in Q2 with the lower percentage urban hospitals, Rural2= 1 if 




Urban1 is the province Q3 with the moderate percentage of urban hospitals, Urban1= 1 
if urban hospital = 73.7-66.7%, otherwise Urban1=0  
Urban2 is the province in Q4 with the highest urban hospital which did not show in the 
model because being used as a reference.  
post is the HA implemented policy, post = 1 if year >= 2008, otherwise post = 0   
Ɛit  is random error 
Methodology for Specific Aim 2  
Aim2: To estimate the effect of the HA reduction, due to recategorization in HA areas 
from rural to urban in December 2016, on rural and remote dentists' resignation and 
relocation.  
Hypothesis2: Rural and remote dentists who located in the changed areas which HA was 
reduced in December 2016 are more likely to leave (resign and relocate) from their areas. 
Therefore, after 2016, the resignation and relocation of dentists in changed areas increase. 
Research design   
The study design for Aim 2 is a longitudinal retrospective cohort study using an 
observational data. The study is based on the natural intervention. The intervention is the 
implementation of reducing the Hardship Allowance rate by changing the dentist’s 
working location categorization for allocating HA in Thailand in December 2016. The 
Hardship Allowance is the direct payment financial incentive for physicians, dentists, 
pharmacists and other health providers working in primary hospitals under the Ministry 
of Public Health especially in rural and remote areas. In 2008, Thai government have 
launched a policy for attracting healthcare providers stay longer in rural and remote areas 




In 2008, the HA in rural areas was about 100% of new graduated dentists’ salary and in 
remote areas at 200-300%. After the economic growth and urbanized expansion, in 
December 2016 the government adjusted the HA area categorization. Some rural areas 
became urban areas causing the reduction of the HA rate on the changed areas. The 
adjusted HA areas categorization criteria are followed the Notification of MoPH on 
December 2012. It was identified that all area in each province were reclassified the 
urban, rural or remote areas based on these criteria. First criteria is the difficulty of 
transportation from the working location to the urban city within province and to another 
big provinces nearby. Second one is the urbanization within the working area’s district 
such as number of commercial banks, number of medical and dental private clinics, 
number of convenient stores, annual revenue of local government in district level, etc. 
Third one is the dentist shortage situation in that area. And the last one is the areas are in 
the risk zone which are the three provinces in southern border of Thailand.   
The adjusted working areas are collected and distributed by the Ministry of Public 
Health Notification Issue #11 and the list of new areas after changing in December 2016 
are shown in Appendix B. In this study we examine the effect of the financial incentive 
HA reduction due to the adjusting HA area categorization in some rural areas on dentists’ 
retention in rural and remote areas. The policy affects all dentist population in the study. 
The treatment group in this study is only the dentist group so there is no control group. 
To minimize the possibilities of selection bias, we used the retrospective observational 
data of dentists’ location from 2013 to 2018 to examine the change of location choice 
before and after policy implementation in December 2016. The observational data of 




variation in Hardship Allowance reduction program. This variation which occurred from 
the independent or exogenous changes in event across time can identify the effects of 
Hardship Allowance reduction on the dentists’ decision to leave or stay in rural and 
remote areas.  
In this study we measure the retention rate of rural and remote dentists who stay 
or leave from their practice location after the recategorized HA areas from rural areas to 
urban areas by using the resignation and relocation of rural and remote dentists. We 
compared the resignation and relocation of dentists between the changed areas and 
unchanged areas to show the characteristics of dentists in these two areas. Due to the data 
set we obtained is the longitudinal data of individual dentists from 2013 to 2018 so we 
can do the panel data analysis. We estimate the resignation and relocation of rural and 
remote dentists in the changed areas and unchanged areas after the policy implementation 
in December 2016 by using difference in difference regression with fixed effect 
estimation for panel data analysis.  
Sources of data   
Data sources used for addressing this specific Aim 2 included the dentists’ data 
from 2013 to 2018, and the rural and remote areas data adjusted in December 2016. The 
dentist data obtained from the Policy and Strategy Bureau, which is revised from annual 
reported data of Human Resource Management Division, Permanent Secretary 
Bureau, MoPH from 2013 to 2018. The data contained of individual dentist's data in each 
year from 2013 to 2018. Initially, data of dentists in 2013 was selected only dentists 
located in rural and remote areas. The new recruited dentists in 2014, 2015, and 2016 




characteristics for example gender, age, year of service, current salary, and specialty and 
geographic location of each dentists by year. The changed status of rural to urban areas 
data is obtained from the notification of the MoPH issue # 11,12 by the Policy and 
Strategy Bureau, MoPH in December 2016 (Appendix B).   
Study population   
The study population in this Aim 2 is all dentists who work as a government 
employee in rural and remote primary hospitals under MoPH across the country during 
2013 to 2018.   In this study we excluded data of rural and remote dentist who is 
identified that died or retired or was fired from any reason.   
Unit of analysis   
The unit of analysis in this study is the individual dentist-year working in rural and 
remote primary hospitals under MoPH from 2013 to 2018.   
Dependent variable  
To achieve Aim 2, the dependent variable is whether an individual dentist who working 
in rural and remote primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public Health resign or 
relocate (to urban areas) from their location during 2013 to 2018.   
Key explanatory variable  
The key explanatory variable for Aim 2 are the time that changed HA areas 
implementation in December 2016 and the changed areas.  The changed HA 
areas policy in December 2016 is implemented in some rural areas. These rural areas 
became urban areas in December 2016, as a result the HA payment rate reduced. The 
objective of the HA areas recategorization in December 2016 is to adjust the areas to 




December 2016 is as same as in 2013 as shown in Table 3. The major variables in the 
Econometric model for Aim 2 are composed of:  
RuraltoUrban is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban 
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0  
Post in the econometric model identified when the time of policy implementation 
in December 2016, after December 2016 post = 1, otherwise = 0.  
Post * RuraltoUrban is the interaction of the policy implementation in December 2016 
and the changed area, if after December 2016 and in the changed 
area, post*ruraltourban is = 1, otherwise = 0  
Covariate variables  
The covariate variables use to accomplish Aim 2 are following these variables:  
Age is recorded in number in data set. Age of dentists’ data set is the current age at the 
time data was record. Age will be categorized in 4 groups: 1 = age 23-28 years, 2 = age 
29-35 years, 3 = age 36-45 years, 4 = 46-60 years  
Gender of rural and remote dentists is recorded in text in data set. Two value of dentists’ 
gender is recorded for male and female.  
Year of service is recorded in number in data set. Year of services is the duration that 
dentists working in any rural and remote primary hospitals under the MoPH. It is 
calculated from the different of recruitment date which is a date when dentist start 
working in MoPH and resignation date which is a date when dentist quit working 
in MoPH.  
Region is the geographic area. In Thailand is divided into 4 regions: 1=Northern region, 




Distance is the distance from the dentist’s practice location (primary hospital) to the 
urban city in each province. The distance in this study is measured in kilometer (1 
kilometer = 0.62 mile). In the econometric model for Aim 2 the distance is categorized in 
4 groups: 1=0-20km., 2=21-40km.,3=41-60km., and 4=61km.ups  
Analysis method  
To describe and understand the overview of data in Aim 2, a univariate analysis is 
computed to summarize the characteristics of the study population. A bivariate analysis is 
used to demonstrate whether there is any difference between before and after December 
2016. Mantel-Haenszel chi square test is conducted to measure if there are any 
differences in these characteristics between before and after December 2016. The 
analysis is conducted at a 95% confidence interval (alpha =.05). The objective of a 
bivariate analysis is to control for the unbiased selection. This can show the variation 
among the population in these two group to identify the effects of the recategorizing HA 
areas policy on the rural and remote dentist’s decision to resign or relocate to urban.  
A difference in difference regression analysis with fixed effect estimation for 
panel data is then used to estimate the differences in rural and remote dentist’s 
resignation and relocation in changed areas after December 2016 implemented policy.  
Econometric Model: Difference in difference regression model using fixed effect 
estimation 
Yit = β0 + β1ruraltourbanit + β2postit + β3postit.ruraltourbanit + βm Xit + Ɛit  
Where  




1) Yit is whether dentist ‘i’ resigned in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’ resigned in ‘t’, 
otherwise Yit = 0 ;  
2) Yit is whether dentist ‘i’ relocate to urban in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’ relocate 
to urban in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 ;  
3) Yit is whether dentist ‘i’ resigned &relocate in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’ 
resigned and relocate in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 t 
Ruraltourbanit is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban 
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0  
Postt is the policy implementation, post = 1 if year >= 2017, otherwise post = 0  
Post.ruraltourbanit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the 
changing area status areas in year ‘t’  
Xit is covariate variables  
β0 is the intercept  
β1 is the slope coefficient for ruraltourban, if β1 is positive, means where the area is 
changed, the dentist is more likely to resign from the area. If β1 is negative, means 
that where the area is changed, the dentist is less likely to resign from the area, holding 
other variable constant.  
β2 is the slope coefficient for policy implementation in 2017, if β2 is positive, means that 
when the policy implemented in 2017, the dentist is more likely to resign from the area. If 
β2 is negative means that when the policy implemented in 2017, the dentist is less likely 
to resign from the area, holding other variable constant.  
β3 is the slope coefficient for interaction of policy implementation and the changed area, 




If β3 is positive, it means that after December 2016 at the changed area the dentist is more 
likely to resign. If β3 is negative, it means that after December 2016 at the changed area 
the dentist is less likely to resign, holding other variables constant.  
βm is the slope coefficient for covariate variables and the probability of dentist’s 
resignation by covariate variables, holding other variables constant.  
Methodology for Specific Aim 3  
Aim3: To examine the relationship between dentists’ age and dentists’ resignation and 
relocation in changed areas after the 2016 policy implementation. 
Hypothesis3: Based on the policy change in 2016, the HA area was recategorized. 
Consequently, the HA payment rate was decreased. Rural dentists who are older affected 
the HA reduction more than the younger dentists. Therefore, the older dentists are more 
likely to resign or relocate from their areas due to the HA reduction compared with the 
younger dentists. 
Research design  
The study design for Aim 3 is also a longitudinal retrospective cohort study using 
an observational data. The study is based on the natural intervention. The intervention is 
the implementation of reducing the Hardship Allowance rate by changing the dentist’s 
working location categorization for allocating HA in Thailand in December 2016. The 
Hardship Allowance is the direct payment financial incentive for physicians, dentists, 
pharmacists and other health providers working in primary hospitals under the Ministry 
of Public Health especially in rural and remote areas. In 2008, Thai government have 
launched a policy for attracting healthcare providers stay longer in rural and remote areas 




In 2008, the HA in rural areas was about 100% of new graduated dentists’ salary and 
200-300% in remote areas. After the economic growth and urbanized expansion, in 
December 2016 the government adjusting the HA area categorization. Some rural areas 
became urban areas causing the reduction of the HA rate on that area. The adjusting HA 
area categorization criteria are followed the Notification of MoPH on December 2012. It 
was identified that all area in each province were reclassification for the urban, rural or 
remote areas based on several criteria following these. First is the difficulty of 
transportation from the working location to the urban city within province and to another 
big province nearby. Second is the urbanization within the working area’s district such as 
number of commercial banks, number of medical and dental private clinic, number of 
convenient stores, annual revenue of local government in district level, etc. Third is the 
dentist shortage situation in that area. The last one is the areas are in the risk zone which 
are the three provinces in southern border of Thailand.   
The adjusting working areas are collected and distributed by the Ministry of 
Public Health Notification Issue 11 and the list of new areas after changing in December 
2016 is shown in Appendix B. In this study, we investigate the relationship between 
dentists’ retention and dentists’ age after influencing by the financial incentive HA 
reduction due to the adjusting HA area categorization in some rural areas. The policy 
affects all dentist population in the study. The treatment group in this study is only the 
dentist group so there is no control group. To minimize the possibilities of selection bias, 
we used the retrospective observational data of dentists’ location from 2013 to 2018 to 
examine the change of location choice before and after policy implementation in 2017. 




2017 contains variation in Hardship Allowance reduction program. This variation, which 
occurred from the independent or exogenous changes in event across time, can identify 
the effects of Hardship Allowance reduction on the dentists’ resignation in relation to the 
dentists’ age.  
In this study, we measure the relationship of the age and the resignation rate of 
rural and remote dentists after the adjusting areas policy from rural areas to urban areas in 
December 2016. We compared the resignation dentists in each age group (22-28, 29-35, 
36-45, 46-60) between the changing areas and unchanging areas to show the 
characteristics of dentists in these two areas. Due to the data set we obtained is the 
longitudinal data of individual dentists from 2013 to 2018 so we can do the panel data 
analysis. We estimate the resignation rural and remote dentists in each age group in the 
changing areas and unchanging areas after the policy implementation in December 2016 
by using segmented regression for panel data analyzation.  
Sources of data   
Data sources used for addressing this specific Aim 3 is as same as data used in 
Aim2, which included the data of dentists from 2013 to 2018, and the rural and remote 
areas data adjusted in December 2016. The data of dentist obtained from the Policy and 
Strategy Bureau, which is revised from annual reported data of Human Resource 
Management Division, Permanent Secretary Bureau, MoPH from 2013 to 2018. The data 
contained of data of individual dentists in each year from 2013 to 2018. The individual 
dentist data include dentists' characteristics for example gender, age, year of service, 
current salary, and specialty and geographic location of each dentists by year. The 




the MoPH issue # 11,12 by the Policy and Strategy 
Bureau, MoPH in December 2016 (Appendix B).   
Study population   
The study population in this Aim 3 is all dentists who work as a government 
employee in rural and remote healthcare facilities under MoPH across the country during 
2013 to 2018.   In this study we exclude data of rural and remote dentist who is identified 
in the resignation reason that died or retired or was fired from any reason.  
Unit of analysis   
The unit of analysis in this study is the individual dentist-year working in 
healthcare facilities under MoPH from 2013 to 2018.   
Dependent variable  
To achieve Aim 3, the dependent variable is whether an individual dentist who 
working in rural and remote primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public Health 
resign from their location from 2013 to 2018.  
Key explanatory variable  
The key explanatory variable for Aim 3 are the implementation of the changing 
practice location categorization in December 2016, the changing areas and dentists 
age. In this study, we aim to measure the relationship of dentists’ resignation and age in 
changing areas after the policy implementation. The HA areas changing policy in 
December 2016 is implemented in some rural areas which become urbanized. Some rural 
areas became urban areas in December 2016 as a result the HA payment rate reduced. 
The objective of the HA areas change implementation in December 2016 is to adjust the 




December 2016 is as same as the payment criteria in 2013 as shown in Table 3. The 
major variables in the Econometric model for Aim 2 are composed of:   
The major variables in the Econometric model for Aim 2 are composed of:  
RuraltoUrban is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban 
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0  
Post in the econometric model identified when the implementation of the changing 
practice location status in December 2016, after December 2016 post = 1, otherwise = 0 
Age is recorded in number in data set. Age of dentists data is the current age at the time 
data recorded the MoPH. Age will be categorized in 4 groups: 1 = age 23-28 years, 2 = 
age 29-35 years, 3 = age 36-45 years, 4 = 46-60 years.   
Post * RuraltoUrban is the interaction of the policy implementation in December 2016 
and the changed area, if after December 2016 and in the changed area, 
post*ruraltourban is = 1, otherwise = 0   
RuraltoUrban*Age is the interaction of the changing area status from rural to urban 
areas and dentists’ age  
Post *RuraltoUrban*Age is the interaction term of the time implementation of the 
changing practice location status in 2016, the changed area and age, we can see how age 
affect the dentist’s resignation and relocation in changed areas after the time of the HA 
areas recategorization implementation in December 2016 .  
Covariate variables  
The covariate variables use to accomplish Aim 2 are following these variables:  
Gender of rural and remote dentists is record in text in data set. Two value of dentists’ 




Year of service is recorded in number in data set. Year of services is the duration that 
dentists working in any rural and remote primary hospitals under the MoPH. It is 
calculated from the different of recruitment date which is a date when dentist start 
working in MoPH and resignation date which is a date when dentist quit working 
in MoPH.  
Region is the geographic area. In Thailand is divided into 4 regions: 1=Northern region, 
2=Central region, 3=Northeastern region, and 4=Southern region.   
Distance is the distance from the dentist’s practice location (primary hospital) to the 
urban city in each province. The distance in this study is measured in kilometer (1 
kilometer = 0.62 mile). In the econometric model for Aim 2 the distance is categorized in 
4 groups: 1=0-20km., 2=21-40km.,3=41-60km., and 4=61km.ups   
Analysis method  
To describe and understand the overview of data in Aim 3, a univariate analysis is 
computed to summarize the characteristics of the study population. A bivariate analysis is 
used to demonstrate whether there is any difference between the rural and remote 
population by age. In addition, the difference in these characteristics between before and 
after 2016 by age. Mantel-Haenszel chi square test is conducted to measure if there are 
any differences between the rural population and remote population as well as the 
differences in these characteristics between before and after 2016 by age. The analysis is 
conducted at a 95% confidence interval (alpha =.05). The objective of a bivariate analysis 
is to control for the unbiased selection. This can show the variation among the population 
in these two group to identify the effects of the changing policy and age on the dentist’s 




A triple differences regression analysis with random effect estimation for panel 
data is then used to estimate the differences in rural and remote dentist’s resignation and 
relocation in relation to dentists’ age where the area is changed after the December 2016 
policy implementation.  
Econometric Model: triple differences regression model using random effect estimation 
Yit = β0+β1ruraltourbanit + β2ageit+ β3postit+ β4post.ruraltourbanit + β5 post.ageit+ 
β6ruraltourbanit.ageit + β7 post.ruraltourbanit.ageit +βmXit + Ɛit  
Where Yit is the outcome variables including: 
1) Yit is whether dentist ‘i’ resigned in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’ resigned in ‘t’, 
otherwise Yit = 0 ;  
2) Yit is whether dentist ‘i’ relocate to urban in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’ relocate 
to urban in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 ;  
3) Yit is whether dentist ‘i’ resigned &relocate in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’ 
resigned and relocate in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 t 
Ruraltourbanit is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban 
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0  
Ageit is the dentist ‘i’ age in year‘t’, age is categorized in 4 groups: 1 = age 23-28 years, 2 
= age 29-35    years, 3 = age 36-45 years, 4 = 46-60 years  
Postit is the areas changing implemented policy, post = 1 if year >= 2017, otherwise post 
= 0  
Post.ruraltourbanit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the changing 




Post.ageit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the age of dentist ‘i’ in 
year ‘t’  
ruraltourbanit.age is the changed areas in year ‘t’interaction with the age of dentist ‘i’ in 
year ‘t’  
Post.ruraltourbanit.ageit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the 
changing status areas in year ‘t’ interact with the age of dentis ‘i’ in year ‘t’  
Xit is covariate variables  
β0 is the intercept  
β1 is the slope coefficient for ruraltourban, if β1 is positive, means that where the area is 
changed, the dentist is more likely to resign from the area. If β1 is negative, means 
that where area is changed, the dentist is less likely to resign from the area, holding other 
variable constant.  
β2 is the slope coefficient for age group. It is the percent of change in dentist’s ‘i’ 
resignation among age group.  
β3 is the slope coefficient for the time implementation in December 2016, if β3 is positive, 
means that when the policy implemented in December 2016, the dentist is more likely to 
resign from the area. If β3 is negative, means the dentist is less likely to resign from the 
area, holding other variable constant.  
β4 is the slope coefficient for interaction of the time policy implementation in December 
2016 and the changed area, β4 is the probability of dentist’s resignation and relocation 




β5 is the slope coefficient for interaction of the time policy implementation and age, β5 is 
the probability of dentist’s resignation and relocation after the time policy 
implementation in December 2016 among age groups, holding other variables constant.  
β6 is the slope coefficient for interaction of changed area status and age group, β6 is the 
probability of dentist’s resignation and relocation where the area is changed among age 
groups, holding other variables constant.  
Β7 is the slope coefficient for interaction of the time policy implementation in December 
2016, the changed area, and age group, β7 is the probability of dentist’s resignation and 
relocation after the time policy implementation in December 2016 where the area is 
changed among age groups, holding other variables constant.  
βm is the slope coefficient for covariate variables. βm is the probability of dentist’s 
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Financial incentive is one of the common strategies used to attract healthcare 
workers to and retain them in rural and remote areas by many policy makers in developed 
and developing countries. Current studies show that most of the financial incentives 
supported education such as scholarships and loan repayment programs are effective. 
Few studies assessed the effectiveness of direct payment incentive programs, especially 
in low-middle income countries. This study aims to examine the effectiveness of direct 
payment (Hardship Allowance) on retaining dentists in rural and remote areas using data 
from Thailand. A retrospective observational study was conducted. Data on the 
resignation of dentists from 2003 to 2016 and an annual report on dentist’s location were 
obtained from the Human Resource Management and the Policy and Strategy Bureau, 
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in Thailand. The difference in difference regression 
and the fixed effect estimation were used to analyze the effectiveness of Hardship 
Allowance implemented in 2008. Data from 2003 to 2016 showed that 2,351 dentists 
who resigned from the hospital under the MoPH. Over 60% of resigned dentists were 
between 22-28 years old. The resignation rate from 2003 to 2016 showed that dentists 
who were located in rural areas had the highest rate compared with dentists in urban and 
remote areas. The highest resignation rate in rural areas in 2004 was at 29.4%. When the 
Hardship Allowance policy was implemented in 2008, the resignation rate started 
decreasing dramatically in all areas, but especially in rural areas. Additionally, the 
regression analysis showed that the resignation rate of dentists in rural areas significantly 
decreased after 2008 by 9.94% (p-value <0.001), while in urban areas after 2008 the 




In conclusion, the study showed that after the policy implementation the 
resignation rate of dentists decreased in all areas. When comparing the resignation rate in 
rural and urban areas, the resignation rate in rural areas decreased higher than in urban 
areas after 2008. Therefore, the Hardship Allowance programs could retain dentists in 
rural and remote areas in Thailand. 
Introduction 
The uneven distribution of the healthcare workforce between urban and rural 
areas is a global issue (WHO, 2010). The statistics showed that 24% of health providers 
are in rural areas, while 50% of the world population live in rural areas (WHO, 2010). 
This maldistribution of healthcare workers happens both in developed and developing 
countries. For example, in the United States, 20% of the population lives in rural areas, 
but only 9% of physicians are located there (Hancock et al., 2009). In the urban areas of 
Canada and Australia, there are approximately 2.6 and 4.0 physicians per 1000 people, 
respectively, while in rural areas of both countries, there are 0.9 physicians per 1000 
people (Viscomi, 2013).  Evidence showed the maldistribution of health workers in 
developing countries is much more severe. For example, in Vietnam at least 53% of 
physicians are located in urban areas while 72% of Vietnamese people live in rural areas. 
Moreover, data showed that only 67% of rural health centers in Vietnam have a physician 
(Vujicic, 2011). Similarly, in Cambodia, approximately 54% of physicians served in the 
capital city, even though only 9.6% of Cambodians reside in Phnom Penh. In 2005, the 
physician density in the urban areas was about 0.41 per 1000 Cambodian population, 
while in the most remote areas the density of physicians was only 0.06 per 1000 




confronts the maldistribution of healthcare workers in urban and rural areas 
(Wibunpolprasert, 2003).  
Dental care is a part of healthcare that experiences short supply in rural and 
remote areas as well as the issues described above. The maldistribution between urban 
and rural dentists also exists, and there are a few studies that report the unequal dental 
supply. Research showed that about 20% of California communities have a shortage of 
dentists. Approximately 70% of communities with dental supply shortages are rural. 
Areas with a lower supply of dentists have higher percentages of minorities, children, and 
low-income populations (Mertz, 2001).  In Australia, a study showed that dentists in a 
major city were 59.1 per 100,000 population, while in rural and remote areas dentists 
were 28.3 and 16.0 per 100000 population (Teusner, 2005). In Thailand, dentists are also 
inequitably distributed, with shortages in some rural and remote areas. Data from the 
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) reported in 2013 shows 50.9% of dentists are in 
Bangkok and other big cities, while 49.1% of dentists served population in all countries 
in four regions: in North, Central, Northeast, and South region (Dental department 
MoPH, 2005). 
Oral healthcare is an important aspect of overall healthcare. Evidence showed the 
uneven distribution of dental supply related with the disparity in dentalcare access among 
people in Bangkok and other regions (Lapying & Puttasri, 2013; 2014). The statistics 
showed the dentist per population ratio in Bangkok in 2005 and 2013 was 1:1,305 and 
1:1,039, respectively. In 2013, it was 1:9,147, 1:8,499, 1:9,300, and 1:13,783, 
respectively in the North, Central, South, and Northeast regions. Data showed that 




For example, in 2003, 2007, and 2011 the dental service utilization rate was at 0.28, 0.21, 
and 0.27 visit/person/year, respectively. In contrast, in the Northeastern region, which has 
the lowest supply of dental care, the dental care utilization rate was at 0.12 in 2003, 2007, 
and 2011. 
Nevertheless, this type of disparity distribution is problematic, attempts have been 
made to address it. Several interventions were recommended by World Health 
Organization (WHO) in 2010 to lessen the inequitable distribution of healthcare workers. 
WHO (2010) established the framework of factors related to healthcare workers’ decision 
to leaving or staying in rural and remote areas. The factors include financial aspect, 
personal and family factors, working and living conditions, career aspects and mandatory 
service factors. To simplify all related factors in our study, we consider other factors 
besides financial factors as non-financial factors.  
The non-financial incentives can include educational support or general support, 
and they are generally used to solve the shortage of healthcare workers in rural and 
remote areas in developed and developing countries (Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; 
Dolea, 2010). Non-financial incentives include educational strategies, mandatory service 
strategies, and professional and personal support strategies (WHO, 2010). Several studies 
support using both financial and non-financial incentives to recruit and retain healthcare 
workers in rural and remote areas (Wibulpolprasert, 2003; Henderson, 2008; Dolea,2010; 
Grobler, 2015). Nevertheless, financial incentives intervention is more likely to be used 
by many policy makers when facing a shortage of healthcare workers despite having 
insufficient evidence of the effectiveness of financial incentives (Dolea, 2010). In fact, 




(Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Hamphrey, 2009). The financial incentive strategies are 
still used by many countries, and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the programs is 
still needed (Dolea, 2010; Globler,2015). 
Financial incentives strategy is the common approach that many countries used to 
reduce the healthcare providers maldistribution (WHO,2010; Dolea, 2010).  
Barnighausen and Bloom (2009) reviewed articles which reported the effectiveness of the 
financial incentives’ programs. Most studies have been done in developed countries. 
Among the 43 reviewed articles in Barnighausen and Bloom (2009), 34 studies were 
from the US, 5 were from Japan, 2 were from Canada, 1 was from Australia, and 1 was 
from South Africa. Financial incentives can be categorized into 5 programs: service-
requiring scholar, education loans with service requirements, service option educational 
loans, loan repayment, and direct-payment program (Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009). 
Moreover, the financial incentives could be classified into 2 groups: educational-support 
and the general-support based on the purpose of payment. All 43 articles reported the 
effectiveness of health workers’ recruitment, while only 18 articles reported the 
effectiveness of the health workers retention in rural and remote areas. Most studies 
evaluated the educational support programs. For example, among the 34 articles from the 
US, 24 studies reported the effectiveness of National Health Service Corps (NHSC) 
program, which provides scholarships and loan repayment for healthcare students and 
young healthcare professionals in exchange for working in underserved areas. 
Although, the NHSC participants included physicians, nurses, dentists, 
pharmacists, and other health providers, most studies measured the recruitment and 




Mofidi (2002) measured the effectiveness of financial incentives for NHSC dentists. In 
addition, all study’s participants from Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Africa were 
also only medical students and physicians. Furthermore, these articles examined the 
outcome of the educational support programs. A few articles measured the outcomes of 
the direct-payment programs, for examples, the Ontario Under Serviced Area Program 
from Canada, the US programs studied by Jackson (2003), other US focused-studies in 
Pathman (2000 and 2004), and the Friend of Mosvold Scholarship Scheme in South 
Africa.  Pathman et al.(2004) compared the effectiveness and outcomes of financial 
incentive programs from 40 states in the US. They found that loan repayment and direct 
payment programs have something in common. For instance, these two programs 
intensely committed medical students after their graduation and the penalties for 
incomplete obligatory service was lower than the scholarship program where committed 
students earlier. The results also showed that the retention rate of participants in loan 
repayment and direct payment programs were longer compared with the scholarship 
programs. To conclude, all evaluated articles showed the effectiveness of recruitment at 
about 33-100% while less than half of evaluated articles showed the effectiveness of 
retention with a range between 18-90%.  
Based on the literature review, there are a few research gaps in the study of the 
effectiveness of the financial incentive programs: 
1. Most studies were from developed countries, and only a few studies were from 
low-middle income countries (B&B, 2009; Dolea, 2010; Henderson, 2008). 
2. Most studies’ populations were medical students and physicians (Dolea, 2010). 




3. The financial incentive programs that were evaluated in the studies mostly were 
educational support programs, e.g. scholarships, loan forgiveness. A few studies 
assessed direct payment programs (B&B,2009).  
4. There is no study of a high direct payment incentive program (1-3 times of 
salary). 
Thailand as a place of study provides an opportunity to address all these gaps. 
There is no evidence to show the effectiveness of financial incentive programs for 
dentists retaining in rural and remote areas in Thailand. 
Therefore, in this study, we aim to examine the effectiveness of direct payment 
financial incentives on decreasing the resignation rate of dentists in rural and remote 
areas relative to urban areas. We hypothesized that dentists who received higher Hardship 
Allowance (HA) after 2008 are less likely to resign from rural areas. The resignation 
rates of dentists in rural areas after 2008 decreased compared with those dentists in urban 
areas.  
Background 
The Thai Government has implemented financial policies for retaining healthcare 
providers in rural and remote areas for over two decades. The Hardship Allowance 
program is a financial incentive that government implemented to reduce the income gap 
between the private and public sectors. In 2008, the government started a huge revision of 
Hardship Allowance program. The Hardship Allowance payment in Thailand in 2008 
provided extra compensation to new physicians and dentists working in rural and remote 
areas representing about 100%-300% of their salary. This intervention made the income 




urban areas (Pagaiya, 2015). The evaluated study of the Hardship Allowance program is 
required to provide evidence about the effectiveness of this financial incentive program to 
the Thai Government and other countries with similar contexts. 
Thailand Hardship Allowance Policy Before 2008  
Before 2008, the HA policy to attract healthcare professionals to work in 
community hospitals in rural and remote areas across Thailand had a tiered allowance 
system as shown in Table 1.1. Since 1989, every new graduated dentist from public 
school have mandatory service in any community hospitals (urban, rural, remote areas) 
for three years. After completing three years they can choose to leave or stay in public 
hospitals. The hardship allowance policy provided direct payment for every public dentist 
working in hospitals under the MoPH. There is no condition beyond serving in the public 
hospitals for at least 15 days a month. There is no penalty for leaving the public hospitals 
in any areas.  
At the present, there is no rural and remote definition which every country can 
applied (Matsumoto, 2008). There is no official definition of rural and remote areas in 
Thailand as well. The classification of the MoPH for urban, suburban, rural and remote 
areas are used to determine the areas for the HA payment. The objective of the HA 
payment policy is to attract, and influence dentists stay longer in the unattractive areas 
such as rural and remote areas. Before 2008, most areas outside urban city in downtown 
have been considered rural areas. The remote areas are in some provinces, especially the 
border provinces. In Thailand has an urban district where city hall and provincial public 
health office are located. The population density in urban district is approximately more 




according to MoPH in 2001. The population density in rural district is approximately less 
than 500 per square mile. The remote districts were mostly the furthest from the urban 
district, which have difficulty transportation. The population density in remote district is 
approximately less than 100 per square mile. However, the classification of rural and 
remotes areas in this study do not comply with this common measure across Thailand. In 
this study, the rural and remote areas are defined following the MoPH identification 
(http://bps.moph.go.th/new_bps/node/52). 
Table 1.1 shows the Hardship Allowance rate for dentists working in rural and 
remote areas for 1 year to over than 3 years before 2008. However, the number of dentists 
who resigned from the hospitals under the MoPH, especially in rural areas, still increased. 
Therefore, the government decided to increase the Hardship Allowance payment to 
remain dentists in public hospitals under the MoPH. 
Hardship Allowance Policy change in 2008   
The number of dentists increased between 2001 and 2008; however, the unequal 
distribution of dentists persisted. The resignation rate of dentists was also increasing 
(Dental Department, MoPH, 2008). Financial incentive was the strategy chosen to decrease 
the resignation rate of dentists. Therefore, in 2008, the government increased the HA 
significantly, giving the highest direct-payment incentive to dentists working in rural and 
remote areas as show in Table 1.2.  In 2008, the HA rate for dentists depended on years of 
service and the practice area; for example, dentists who serve in urban and rural areas for 
1-3 years would receive $3,750 per year, while their cohorts who serve in remote areas 
would receive $7,500-$11,250 per year. The HA rate also increased for those who served 




years in urban and rural areas would receive $7500 and $11,250 per year, respectively. 
Compared with the HA rate before 2008, the HA rate for dentists located in rural areas 
after 2008 increased five times from the previous one.  
Table 4.1 The comparison of Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita with 
new graduated dentist’s annual salary and annual Hardship Allowance 
 
Year GDP per 
Capita 




2007      US$ 3,978  US$ 3,671  US$ 720-938        US$ 3750-7500  
2008      US$ 4,380  US$ 3,821  US$ 3,750   US$ 7500-11250  
2009      US$ 4,208  US$ 3,821  US$ 3,750  US$ 7500-11250  
Before 2008, the hardship allowance in rural areas was about 20-25% of new 
graduated dentists’ salary and 100-200% in remote areas. In 2008, the hardship allowance 
in rural areas was about 100% of new graduated dentists’ salary and 200-300% in remote 
areas. This table demonstrates the high-powered incentives of the HA policy. New 
graduated salary was a little bit lower than GDP per capita. But when added with 
Hardship allowance, dentist work in rural and remote areas would earn higher than GDP. 
Theoretical model 
In this study we used the utility theory to explain the decision to stay or leave 
rural and remote areas of dentists. We assumed that dentists have different preference to 
stay or leave rural and remote areas. They have chosen to locate in the areas that provide 
them the maximum utilization based on financial and non-financial factors. The simple 
utility function of dentists’ location choice can be denoted as function (1). 
U (π, x; β)  




Where U is the utility function of dentist choice  
π is the financial factors which in this study we estimate the effectiveness of the HA 
x is non-financial factors 
β is the vector of parameters 
We adopted the WHO framework of factors related to the decision to leave or stay 
in rural areas to account for the non-financial factors. From the WHO 2010 framework, 
all factors included financial aspect, mandatory service, personal origin and values, 
family and communities’ aspects, working and living conditions, and career related 
aspect. The 2010 WHO framework is shown in Figure 1.1. 
Based on the 2010 WHO framework, besides the financial aspects are non-
financial factors. They include personal origin and values, family and community aspects, 
working and living condition, career related aspect, and mandatory service.  The 
framework of Thai dentist’s location choice is established to comply with the 2010 WHO 
framework, and it is shown in Figure 1.2.  
In this study, we aim to measure the choice of dentists to resign from the MoPH 
in rural areas. We assumed that dentists’ preferences, which affect the decision to resign 
or stay, included both financial and non-financial factors.  
Method 
Research design and data sources 
The study design for Aim1 is a longitudinal retrospective cohort study using an 
observational database. This study is based on the natural intervention. The Thai 
government implemented the financial incentive direct payment called “Hardship 




financial incentive for physicians, dentists, pharmacists and other health providers 
working in primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public Health especially in rural and 
remote areas. However, in this study we examine the effectiveness of the financial 
incentive HA on retaining dentists in rural and remote areas. The intervention group in 
this study is only the dentist group so there is no control group. We used the retrospective 
observational data of dentists’ location from 2003 to 2016 to examine the resignation rate 
before and after policy implementation. The variation which occurred from the 
independent or exogenous changes in event across time can identify the effects of 
Hardship Allowance on the dentists’ decision to resign from the MoPH in rural and 
remote areas.  
In this study we measure the resignation rate of dentists by areas and by province. 
The resignation rates by areas are calculated by the number of dentists who resigned 
divided by all exist dentists in each area: urban, rural and remote areas. In this study, the 
area is identified by urban, rural and remote areas as categorized by the Ministry of 
Public Health Notification Issue 4 (appendix A). The resignation rate of dentists in urban, 
rural and remote areas before and after the policy implementation are analyzed following 
the econometric model 1.1.  
The number of urban, rural and remote areas in each province is various 
depending on the size and the urbanization. In this study, the rural and urban provinces 
are classified by using the percentage of urban hospitals in each province. The urban 
hospitals are calculated by the number of hospitals in urban areas divided by all hospitals 
in all areas in the provinces. The percentage of urban hospitals are categorized into 4 




26.7-33.3% urban hospitals, and 4) 35.3-100% urban hospitals. The provinces have 7.7-
16.7% urban hospitals are indicated the most rural areas and the provinces have 35.3-
100% urban hospitals are indicated the most urbanized areas.  
The overall resignation rate of dentists is calculated by the number of resignation 
dentists divided by the number of all public dentists under the MoPH in each province. 
The number of resignation dentists from 2003 to 2016 are obtained from the Human 
Resource Management Department, MoPH. However, there is no data of individual 
dentists from 2003 to 2012. The updated data of individual dentists which obtained from 
the annual report of Policy and Strategy Bureau MoPH, are available from 2013. 
Therefore, the number of all dentists in each province each year since 2003 to 2012 must 
be retrieved from the individual dentist's data in 2013. The number of all dentists in each 
province from 2003 to 2012 are calculated by using the recruiting year and resigning year 
from individual dentist's data in 2013. For example, the number of active dentists in 2003 
are calculated by counting all dentists who recruited before 2003 and resigned after 2003 
Study population 
The dentist’s population in this study were all the government employees under 
the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). Our data contained all public dentist population 
under the MoPH in Thailand. The resigned dentists’ data and the annual report with 
dentist location data contained information on public dentists who work in community, 
provincial, and regional hospitals in 76 provinces in Thailand. There was no resigned 
dentists’ data and annual report with dentist location data for public dentists in Bangkok. 




department in provincial public health office, and the dental department in MoPH were 
excluded from the study.  
 The location areas which provided the hardship allowance in 2008 were classified 
into 5 areas for government documents: urban, suburban, rural, remote1, and remote2 
(see Table 1.2). To simplify our model and analyses, we reclassified the areas into 3 
areas, including urban, rural and remote. We grouped urban and suburban into urban 
areas and remote1 and remote2 into remote areas.  
The resignation data we obtained, lack of information of active dentists from 2003 
to 2012. Therefore, we estimated active dentists during 2003 to 2012 from the annual 
report dentist location data in 2013. The active dentist is determined to have existed in a 
given year (2003 to 2012) when their recruitment year is before the given year and their 
resignation year is after the given year. 
Variable used 
The dependent variable used in this study is the resignation rate of dentists. We 
measured the resignation rate of dentists before the policy implementation in 2008 
compared with the resignation rate after the policy.  
The independent variable is the HA payment policy implementation in 2008 as 
well as the percent of urban hospitals in each province, each year. The HA payment 
policy implementation in 2008 is the direct payment financial incentive, which the 
government provided to the dentists working in hospitals under the MoPH. The urban 
hospitals were the hospitals under the MoPH which located in urban and suburban areas 
corresponded with the HA areas in Table 1.2. The urban hospitals were categorized in 4 




considered the most rural province while the provinces in Q4, which contained 35.3-
100% urban hospitals, are considered the most urbanized province. The province in Q2 
and Q3 contained urban hospitals between 17.6-25% and 26.7-33.3%, respectively. 
Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics were calculated to describe the characteristics of the study 
population. A bivariate analysis was used to show whether there is any difference 
between populations, before and after the implementation of financial incentive program. 
The analysis was conducted at a 95% confidence interval (alpha= .05).  A difference in 
difference regression with fixed effect analysis was then used to estimate the differences 
in resignation rate in rural areas relative to urban areas before and after the 2008 
Hardship Allowance policy implementation. 
Econometric Model: Regression model using fixed effect estimation 
Rita = α0 + α1postit +µi+ɤit                                                                                                   (1)  
where  
Rita is the resignation rate of dentists locate in province ‘i’ in year ‘t’ in areas ‘a’ (urban, 
rural, remote areas)  
post is the HA implemented policy, post = 1 if year >= 2008, otherwise post = 0   
µi is the province i to n. 
ɤit is the random error term 
The first econometric model measured the difference of the resignation rate of 
dentists in each area: urban, rural, and remote areas. Based on the data set using in this 
model is the panel data set, therefore xtreg is used to regress this model.  The outcomes 




model, we measured the outcome of the overall resignation rate of dentists in different 
areas before and after the policy implementation by using the econometric model 
equation #2. In this model the major predictors are the post (HA implementation policy) 
and the percentage of urban hospitals in each province. The urban hospitals are counted 
and divided with all hospitals under the MoPH in each province. The percentage of urban 
hospitals is classified into 4 groups: 0-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, 76-100%. The provinces 
which contained 0-25% urban hospitals are considered the most rural province while the 
provinces which contained 75-100% urban hospitals are considered the urbanized 
province. The 2nd model can provide the outcome of overall resignation rate in both rural 
and urban areas after the policy in 2008. 
Yit = β0 + β1Rural1it + β2Rural2it + β3Urban1it + β4postit + β5post.Rural1it + 
β6post.Rural2it + β7post.Urban1it + βmXit  + Ɛ it                                                           (2) 
where  
•  Yit is the overall resignation rate of dentists in province‘i’ in year ‘t’  
• Rural1 is the province in Q1, Rural1= 1 if urban hospital = 7.7-16.7%, otherwise 
Rural1=0 
• Rural2 is the province in Q2,  Rural2= 1 if urban hospital = 17.6-25%, 
otherwiseRural2=0 
• Urban1 is the province in Q3, Urban1= 1 if urban hospital = 26.7-33.3%, otherwise 
Urban1=0 
• Urban2 is the province in Q4, Urban2 is a reference among all areas. 
• post is the HA implemented policy, post = 1 if year >= 2008, otherwise post = 0  






Data from Table 4.2 showed that 2,351 dentists resigned from the public health 
sectors under the MoPH from 2003 to 2016. The resignation dentist is approximately 
43.04% of all existed dentists in MoPH. The age groups of dentists in this study were 
classified into 4 groups: 22-28, 29-35, 36-45, and 46-60 years old. The results in Table 4 
clearly show that the 44-60 group has the lower proportion of number of dentists as well 
as the lower resignation percentage. The 22-28 group has the highest resignation 
percentage compared with the other age groups. Gender characteristic of Thai dentists 
showed that most of public Thai dentist are women. The resignation number of female 
dentists was higher because the overall number was higher, but the percentage of male 
dentists’ resignation was higher than those of female resignation. However, there is no 
significant different of dentists’ resignation rate among gender.   Considering resignation 
by area, it was found that urban and rural dentists resignation percentage was nearly 
equal at 49.6% and 43.9% respectively, while resignation percentage of remote dentists 
was the lowest at 6.4%. The resignation percentage by the year of service was consistent 
with the age. Data showed that dentists who served for 1-3 years was the highest group at 
54.7 and the dentists who served more than 21 years was the lowest group at 5.1%. The 
resignation dentists were much more obvious in the early year of service group. The 
dentists who served for 1-3 years showed the highest resignation percentage which was at 
60.22% followed by the dentists who served for 4-10 years group was at 30.06%, the 
dentists who served for 11-20 years was at 7.82%, and the dentists who served over than 




Table 4.2 Dentist characteristics by resignation status during 2003-2016, n (column%)  
characteristics Resignation 2003-2016 P-value 
Yes (2351) No (5462) 
Age    
22-28 1,531(66.13) 2,794(51.15) P < 0.001 
29-35 603(26.05) 1,412(25.85) 
36-45 138(5.96) 927(16.97) 
46-60 43(1.86) 329(6.02) 
Gender    
Male 722(31.19) 1,632(29.88) P=0.251 
Female 1,593(68.81) 3,830(70.12) 
Area     
Urban 6,418(49.59) 1,205(52.79) P < 0.001 
Rural 4,666(43.99) 1,029 (38.38) 
Remote 1,029 (6.42) 156(8.46) 
Year of service    
1-3 1,394(60.22) 2,862(52.39)      P < 0.001 
4-10 696(30.06) 1,409(25.79) 
11-20 181(7.82) 840(15.38) 
21 up 44(1.90) 352(6.44)          
Region    
North 542(23.41) 1,172(21.45) P < 0.001 
Central 699(30.19) 1,399(25.61) 
Northeast 722(31.19) 1,909(34.94) 
South 352(15.21) 983(17.99) 




0-20km 418(18.06) 1,135(20.83) P < 0.001 
21-40km 278(12.01) 278(14.77) 
41-60km 266(11.49) 773(14.15) 
61km ups 1,353(58.44) 2,745(50.25) 
 
Thailand geography is categorized by 4 regions including North, Central, 
Northeast, and South regions. The dentists’ resignation rate by regions showed that 
dentists located in the Northeast region had the highest resignation the rate of 31.19%, 
which is close to the resignation rate 30.19% in central region. Dentists working in the 
Southern region had the less resignation rate of 15.21%. The distance of hospitals from 
the urban city or Mueang district, where the downtown of each province is located, is 
measured. Generally, Provincial Public Health Offices and all government offices are in 
Mueang(urban) district. The distance between the hospital to Mueang district is classified 
into 4 groups including 0-20km, 21-40km, 41-60km, and 61km up. It was found that 
dentist, who located in the hospitals more than 61km away from urban district have the 
highest resignation rate at 58.44%. 
The resignation trend from 2003 to 2016 
The line graph in figure 4.3 shows the trend of resignation rate of dentists by areas 
by years. It is found that the highest resignation rate is in rural areas. The highest rate is 
29.6% in 2004. The lowest resignation rate is in remote areas. The resignation trend 
among urban, rural and remote areas shows that the resignation rate before and after 2008 
in urban and remote areas quite not differ. The line graph of resignation rate in urban and 
remote areas seem straight compared with the line of resignation rate in rural areas. In 




shows that the resignation trend in all areas is decreasing after 2008 especially in rural 
areas. 
The average of dentist resignation rates by urban hospitals within each province 
Table 4.3 compared the average of overall resignation by urban hospitals in each 
province compared before and after the policy implementation in 2008. Data show that 
the average dentist resignation rate before 2008 higher than the average after 2008. In this 
 
Figure 4.1 Unadjusted trends in resignation rates from 2003 to 2017 by service location 
(urban, rural, remote)  
 
result table, the urban hospitals are used to represent the rural or urban areas in provincial 
level. For example, the provinces in Q1 which have the urban hospital 7.7-16.7% 
represents the rural provinces.  The provinces in Q4 which have the urban hospital 33.3-
100% represents the urbanized provinces. These rural and urbanized provinces were 
consistent with the regions shown in Table 4.6. This table showed that most urbanized 
areas are in province in Central region which is close to Bangkok the capital city.  The 

















































which close to the border of the country. The comparison of the average resignation rate 
between before and after 2008 showed that in the rural provinces (which urban hospital 
7.7-16.7%) has the most difference compared with the average in the urban provinces.  
The estimated percentage point changes from fixed effect estimation in resignation 
rates among rural and remote areas. 
Table 4.3 The average of dentist resignation rates by urban hospitals within each province 
 
Table 4.4 showed the results from the econometric model (1.1) fixed effect 
estimation analysis by areas. It was found that before 2008, dentists were more likely to 
resign from the hospital under the MoPH in all areas. The highest resignation rate was 
shown in rural areas. It was found that the estimate predicted resignation rate of dentist in 
rural areas before 2008 was at 17.45%. The resignation rate in remote areas is the lowest 
rate among three areas. After 2008, data showed that the resignation rate in all areas 
decreased. The highest reduction rate is in rural areas. It was shown that after 2008 the 
dentist resignation rate reduced by 10.08% per year. The comparison of the resignation 
rate of dentists in rural and remote areas with urban areas, has shown that the resignation 
rate in rural areas declined higher rate compared with the resignation rate in urban areas. 
The reduction of resignation rate in urban and rural areas significantly decreased while in 
Areas (%of urban 
hospitals) (N=1063) 
Dentist Resignation rate  
Means Before 2008 Means After 2008 Difference before 
and after 2008 
0-25% 12.98 6.20 -6.78 
26%-50% 9.28 5.46 -3.82 
51-75% 12.31 6.98 -5.33 




remote areas the reduction rate insignificantly decreased. Table 4.5 showed the results 
from the regression analysis from the econometric model (1.2). In this model we also 
used the percentage of urban hospitals to represent the rural or urban provinces as same 
as the results shown in Table 4.3. It was found that the overall resignation rate before  
Table 4.4 Estimated percentage point by fixed effect estimation in resignation rates 
among urban rural and remote dentists by province after the 2008 HA policy. 
 
 Urban Rural Remote 












R2 .009 .047 .000 
No of Observation  1,064 1,064 1,064 
No of groups 76 76 76 
Sigma_u 5.42 10.32 5.66 
Sigma_e 10.59 22.25 15.87 
rho .207 .117 .113 
Note: standard errors are reported in parenthesis  
          ** indicates significance at 95% level 
 
2008 in all areas increased each year. In this model we used urbanized province as a 
reference. Before 2008, overall resignation rate was increasing every year in all areas. It 
was found that after 2008, the overall resignation rate decreased at 3.01%. Our finding 
shows that the overall resignation rate after 2008, declined in all areas. The resignation 
rate in rural provinces (7.7-16.7 %urban hospitals) after 2008, significantly decreased at 





Table 4.5 Estimated percentage point by difference in difference regression on overall 
resignation rates among province contained urban hospitals7.7-16.7%,17.6-25%, 26.7-
33.3%, and35.3-100%, respectively. 
 Overall resignation rate 
Intercept  7.95**(1.31) 
Post(after2008) -3.01**(1.09) 
Rural1(7.7-16.7%urban hospitals province) 5.09**(1.83) 
Rural2(17.6-25%urban hospitals province) 1.27(1.81) 




R-sq within/R-sq between .0779/.0005 




Note: standard errors are reported in parenthesis  
          ** indicates significance at 95% level 
Discussion 
 The aim of the study is to examine the effectiveness of the financial incentive 
program Hardship Allowance program. We used the resignation rate before and after the 
policy implementation to examine whether the resignation rate has changed. The results 
in the difference in difference regression analysis, showed that the resignation rate 
decreased in all areas-urban, rural, and remote-, after the policy implementation. The 




Table 4.6 the group of provinces by region and the percentage of urban hospitals 
Region  Provinces in Q1 Provinces in Q2 Provinces in Q3 Provinces in Q4 
North chainat chiangmai chiangrai nakhonsawan 
lampun kamphaengphet phichit phetchabun 
maehongson lampang   
nan payao   
phitsanulok prae   
uthaithani sukhothai   
uttaradit tak   
 uttaradit   
 
Central 
ayutthaya nakhonnayok angthong chacheangsao 
chantaburi pathumtani kanchanaburi chonburi 
trad phetburi prachinburi lopburi 
 ranong singburi nakhonpathom 
   nonthaburi 
   prachuapkirikhan 
   rayong 
   ratchaburi 
   samutprakan 
   samutsakhon 
   samutsongkhram 
   suphanburi 
Northeast amnatcharoen nakhonpanom burirum nakonratchasima 
buengkan roiet chaiyaphum sakonnakhon 
loei ubonratchatani kalasin surin 
mukdahan yasothon khonkan  
nongbualamphu  mahasarakam  




  sakao  
  sisaket  
  udonthani  
South 
krabi chumphon satun 
Nakhonsirtham 
marat 
narathiwat pattalung surattani phuket 
pattani songkla   
phangnga trang   
 yala   
 
significantly after the policy implementation although only the resignation rate in remote 
areas insignificantly decreased. These results clearly show that the direct payment 
financial incentives have affected the dentists’ decision to resign from the rural and 
remote areas. This outcome is consistent with several studies, which examined the 
financial incentives strategies (Sempowski, 2004; Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Dolea, 
2010; Grobler, 2015). 
The outcome of the study is consistent with the study’s hypothesis. We assumed 
that the HA direct payment is influential factor for dentist remain in rural and remote 
areas. The finding shows that after 2008, dentists in rural, urban and remote areas are less 
likely to resign from their practice location. The study did not have control groups (non-
program participants) to compare with the treatment groups (program participants). 
Nevertheless, we used fixed effect estimation for panel data analyzation to show the 
causal effect of the policy on the resignation rate of each areas (urban, rural, and remote 
areas) before and after 2008. The results evidently show that the resignation rate in rural 




resignation rate in urban areas significantly also decreased but the resignation rate 
reduction in urban areas is lesser than in rural areas.  
In urban areas, data showed that the resignation rate from 2003 to 2016 was lower 
than in rural areas. This result is consistent with many studies (Lexomboon, 2003; 
Nilnate, 2009). There are several reasons could explain the reason of the results of the 
resignation rate between before and after. First, most Thai dentists have original 
background in urban areas (Lexomboon, 2003; Nilnate, 2009; Pagaiya, 2015). Based on 
the factors related to health workers decision to leave or stay in rural and remote areas, 
original background is one of the strong influences of health workers decision (Wilson, 
2009; Dolea, 2010; WHO, 2010).  Most urban dentists who have original background in 
urban areas are more likely to stay in urban areas. Then some rural dentists who have 
urban original background are more likely to resign the rural areas and some urban 
dentists who have urban original background are more likely to stay in the current 
location. Another reason is the HA payments may affect the urban dentists less than rural 
dentists because the urban dentists can do dual practice (Wibulpolprasert, 2003; 
Henderson, 2008). Dentists in urban have more opportunities to earn extra money for 
working in private clinic in the evening or on weekend.  The income from private sectors 
may be equal or higher than the HA rate. Therefore, in urban areas the HA payments 
have the less influences for dentists to decide to resign or stay in the practice location 
compared with rural dentists. 
The resignation rate of dentists in remote areas decreased with no significant 
difference. In the unadjusted trend graph also showed that the resignation rate in remote 




include the probability that the dentists in remote areas choose to relocate instead resign 
when they decide to resign their practice location. However, our data is insufficient to 
justify this assumption. Data set from 2003 to 2016 shows only the resignation rate of 
dentists. Second reason is the dentists in remote areas required higher incentives to 
increase the difference between before and after the HA policy implementation. This 
current HA rate may not be sufficient to motivate remote dentists to remain in their 
workplace. The last one is the possibility that the financial incentive is not the only factor 
influence the dentists and other health workers remain in remote areas. Previous studies 
reported the effectiveness of the integration of financial and non-financial incentives to 
increase the long retention of health workforce in remote areas ( Henderson, 2008; 
Lehman,2008) 
These showed that the HA payment affected the decision of dentists to resign 
from their practice location especially in rural areas. Although, our data could not provide 
how long the dentists remain in the rural and remote areas, the data could show that the 
dentists are less likely to resign from rural areas after the policy implementation. This 
study is different from other current studies in many ways. For example, most previous 
studies showed the effectiveness of financial incentive which support education such as 
scholarship and loan repayment programs (Sempowski, 2004; Baunighausen and Bloom, 
2009; Humphrey, 2008; Grobler, 2015). Some studies show the effectiveness of 
recruiting and retaining at maximum to 100% and 90% respectively (Barnighausen and 
Bloom, 2009). However, all studies which show high percentage of program’s 
accomplishment used descriptive analysis and there is no control group in the study (Bass 




explanation of the program and the retention rate of the participants ( Barnighausen and 
Bloom, 2009; Dolea, 2010; Grobler, 2015).  
The difference in difference regression with fixed effect estimation is used in this 
study to minimize the time-invariant variables which the results could show the causal 
effect of the HA program and the reduction of dentists’ resignation rate. The study can 
show the effectiveness of the HA on retaining dentists in rural areas. Our finding can 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the direct payment program to stay longer in rural areas. 
Although, our study has insufficient data to present the period of year that dentists stay 
longer in rural areas, the finding could show the causal effect of the direct payment 
program using fixed effect estimation to justify. The study employs pre and post 
intervention to measure the effectiveness of direct financial payment on resignation of 
dentists. The method is rigorous evidence to demonstrate the direct payment financial 
incentive which is the requirement from several current review articles (Humphrey, 2009; 
Leman, 2007; Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009 ). 
The resignation trend of rural dentist after 2008 was decreasing for a couple of 
year then it rebound up again. Although the resignation rate did not rise as high as in 
2004-2005, the rising of resignation rate after receiving high amount of hardship 
allowance showed that financial incentives might not be the only factors influencing the 
decision to resign or stay in practice location of dentists. This outcome is consistent with 
several studies showed the motivational factors for retaining healthcare provider in rural 
and remote areas (Henderson, 2008; Lehman, 2008; Humphrey, 2009; Grobler, 2015). 
Many evidences reported that only financial incentives are not enough to retain health 




working and living environment, the provision to school for health worker’s children, the 
opportunity to continuing education all affected the decision of health workers leaving or 
staying in practice location. These can explain by the utility maximization theory, which 
dentists decide to resign or stay in rural and remote areas to optimize their utility (Bolduc, 
1997).  
Evidence support using the financial and non-financial incentives to motivate 
healthcare workers remain in rural and remote areas (Lexomboon, 2003; Henderson and 
Tulloch, 2008; Lehman, 2008). Studies show factor related to healthcare workers 
decision to resign or stay in rural and remote areas include financial factors such as salary 
supplement, benefit, hardship allowance and non-financial factors such as personal and 
family factors, working and living conditions, career aspects (WHO, 2010; Dolea, 2010). 
The results from the study show the variation of the public dentists in MoPH. They are all 
receive the HA after the policy implementation. Although, most dentists in rural areas 
who received higher HA rate were less likely to resign compare with the dentists in urban 
areas who received lower HA rate, there were resigned dentists in rural areas. This 
various response of dentists demonstrated that higher HA rate is not the only factor for 
dentists decide to resign or stay in rural and remote areas.  
In addition, the mapping graph showed the low resignation rate in rural areas were 
in the most Northern region and the most Southern regions. Before policy 
implementation in 2008 the resignation rate of rural dentists was high in Northeastern 
region and upper part of Central region which far from Bangkok. The resignation rate of 
rural dentists after 2008 was reducing especially in Northern and Southern region, there 




Northeastern still had resignation rate between over than 5% to 15%. This could be 
supported the important of non-financial incentives for decision to resign or stay of 
dentists in Northeastern areas. These variation of the resignation rate among regions 
showed that dentists have different preference to decide the practice location. However, 
the constraint of the data set causes our study has not enough evidence to support the 
influence of non-financial incentives. We expected to have future study contain complete 
data and can explain comprehensively the relationship between financial and non-
financial factors on health providers decision to resign or stay in rural areas. 
Conclusion 
The study showed that after the policy implementation in 2008 the overall 
resignation rate of dentists decreased especially in rural areas. These showed that the 
Hardship Allowance payments affected the decision to resign rural areas of dentists. 
Although, there is insufficient data to explain how long the direct payment HA could 
decrease the resignation rate of the dentists, we can conclude that the Hardship 
Allowance programs could retain dentists in rural and remote areas. 
Limitation 
The resignation data set was incomplete. There is no active dentists contained in 
the resignation data set. To show the resignation rate, which we choose to be an outcome 
for answer our research questions, we must estimate active dentists from the annual 
report data set in 2013-2016. Although this method provides number of active dentists, it 





The most important limitation in this study is lack of the true rural-urban 
measurement. The unit of analysis of the study is the province-year. However, we could 
not comprehensively define the rural-urban provinces. In the study, we measured the 
rural-urban provinces by estimating from the number of the urban hospitals in each 
province. Consequently, the results show some rural provinces, which estimated from the 
urban hospitals, are the attractive province and have low resignation rate. This indicate 
the inconsistent areas using the urban hospitals estimation. 
Furthermore, the data source of this study is obtained from the annual report of 
Human resource management which contained a few variables. There are some variables 
unavailable from the data set. For examples, variables which related with the non-
financial incentives is not included in the annual report. Based on the conceptual 
framework showed the factor related to the decision of dentists to leave or stay in rural 
and remote areas involved with financial and non-financial factors. However, the 
observational data is contained mostly the financial factor variables and some personal 
characteristics of dentists. Therefore, the outcome shows the restricted evidence to 
analyses and discuss to complete to theoretical concept.  
This study we used the resignation rate to measure the effectiveness of the 
hardship allowance. We assumed that the resignation rate decreased mean the dentist 
retained in rural areas however in our study did not show whether they are still in the 
rural areas. They may be move from rural to urban areas which our data are restricted to 
answer whether they move from rural to urban or stay in rural.  
Another limitation is this study we used the resignation rate to measure the 




rate reduced after the HA program implementation, we do not know the long-term effect 
of the program. Our data we obtained have no retention rate to show the true retention 





















THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVE REDUCTION ON LOCATION 











                                                           







Both developed and developing countries generally use financial incentives to 
tackle the disparity distribution of healthcare workers. Previous studies showed the 
effectiveness of financial incentives on recruitment and retention of healthcare workers. 
However, most studies were conducted in developed countries and assessed positive 
incentives programs. Few studies evaluated the effect of financial incentive reduction on 
the health workers’ decision to stay or leave their practice location in low-middle income 
countries. This study aims to examine the impact of financial incentive reduction, due to 
the changed HA areas categorization, on rural and remote healthcare workers. A 
retrospective observational study was conducted. Data on the rural and remote dentist's 
location annual report, including the relocation and resignation from 2013 to 2018, were 
obtained from the Human Resource Management Department and the Policy and Strategy 
Bureau at the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in Thailand. Segmented regression was 
used to analyze the effect of Hardship Allowance reduction on dentists’ decision to stay 
or leave their location. Data of 2,384 rural and remote dentists is examined to determine 
the location choice between the changed and unchanged areas categorization after the 
policy implementation in December 2016. The outcome shows that the resignation of 
dentists in unchanged and changed areas is not significantly different. However, the 
relocation of dentists from rural to urban in changed areas after the policy 
implementation is more likely to increase significantly. 
In conclusion, the direct payment reduction does not affect the number of 
resignations, but the relocation of dentists. The dentists decide to leave their location after 




financial incentives could deteriorate the retention of health workers in rural and remote 
areas.  
Introduction 
The disparities distribution of the healthcare workforce between urban and rural 
areas is a global issue (WHO, 2010). WHO (2010) showed that the proportion of 
healthcare providers per population was higher in urban areas compared to rural areas. 
Many studies showed that healthcare workers prefer to work in urban areas (Dussault, 
2005; Henderson, 2008;).  Statistics showed that about 50% of world population live in 
rural areas while approximately 38% of nurse and 25% of physicians provided health 
care in rural areas. Both developed and developing countries have experienced this 
uneven distribution of healthcare workers (Dolea, 2010; WHO, 2010).  
The consequence of this uneven health workers is the restricted access to 
healthcare of people in areas that have a low density of health workers. The disparity of 
health service in rural and remote areas is related to the lack of healthcare providers in 
these areas (Dussault, 2005; Henderson, 2008; WHO, 2010).  Evidence shows that the 
shortage of a healthcare workforce is associated with the population’s health outcome 
(Chen, 2004; Henderson, 2008). For instance, data from WHO reported that the five-year 
children mortality rate is high in countries that have a low density of healthcare workers 
(Henderson, 2008). 
The lack of oral healthcare professionals in rural and remote areas is also part of 
the same global health issues (Kruger 2005). For example, Kruger showed that in some 
parts of Western Australia the dentists per 100,000-population ratio was 5.9, while it was 




Thailand, too. For example, in 2013, dentist per 100,000-population ratios was 96 in 
Bangkok, while it was 7 in the Northeastern region (Lapying & Puttasri, 2013). As a 
result, the areas with the higher dental supply showed the higher dental care services. For 
example, the dental care utilization of Bangkok citizens in 2011 was 0.27 
visit/person/year, but the dental care utilization of Northeastern region people was 0.12 
visit/person/year. 
To improve health outcomes and increase equitable access to healthcare for the 
rural population, WHO recommended strategies to recruit and retain qualified healthcare 
providers in rural and remote areas. These strategies include educational, mandatory 
services, professional and personal support, and financial incentives interventions (WHO, 
2010; Dolea, 2010). Among those recommended strategies, financial incentives are the 
strategy which is selected the most to address the healthcare worker issues, both in 
developed and developing countries where confront with the shortage of healthcare 
workers especially in rural and remote areas  (Humphrey, 2009; Dolea, 2009; Grobler, 
2015).  
Evidences show the effectiveness of financial incentives for recruiting and 
retaining healthcare workers in rural and underserved areas (Dolea, 2010; 
Sempowski,2004; Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Grobler, 2015). Most studies 
evaluated and reporting the effectiveness of financial incentives program were from 
developed countries, for examples the USA, Japan, Australia, Canada, etc. The financial 
incentives program from these countries was mostly the scholarship and loan repayment 




There are few studies that include study population in dentists and other health 
professionals (Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009). 
Background 
Thailand is also one developing country using financial incentives strategies to 
address the inequitably distributed healthcare providers in urban and rural areas. The Thai 
government implemented direct payment financial incentives called Hardship Allowance 
(HA) to motivate health profession stay in primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public 
Health (MoPH). Since 2001, the HA are provided to healthcare providers including 
physicians, dentists, pharmacists, nurses, etc., to retain them in rural and remote areas.  
The highest rate HA policy was launched in 2008. The government implemented 
the Hardship Allowance policy, which provides 100% of salary to rural dentists and 
200% to 300% of salary to remote dentists. The evaluated study showed that the HA 
policy could reduce the resignation rate of dentists in rural areas significantly.  
However, in 2013, the government adjusted the rate and criteria of payment which 
reduced the HA rate of Dentists who located near the city and Dentists who served over 4 
years. This significant change happened again in December 2016 when the government 
adjusted the HA areas. Some rural areas became urban areas which reduced the HA rate. 
Table 1 shows the criteria and rate of HA payment in 2008 and 2016, and the reduction of 
HA payment when rural areas became urban areas. 
Many studies examined the effectiveness of the financial incentive on recruitment 
and the retention of healthcare workers. However, few studies evaluate the impact of 




Table 5.1 Hardship Allowance annual payment in 2008, 2016 and the reduction after the 





Urban Suburban Rural Remote 1 Remote 2 
1-3 years $3,750 $3,750 $3,750 $7,500 $11,250 
4-10 years $7,500 $9,375 $11,250 $15,000 $18,750 
11-20 years $9,375 $11,250 $15,000 $18,750 $22,500 
21 years up $11,250 $15,000 $18,750 $22,500 $26,250 
In 2016 until the present 
1-3 years $3750  $3750  $3750  $3750  $7500  
4-10 years $4500  $5625  $7500  $11250  $15000  
11 years up $5625  $7500  $9375  $15000  $18750  
The difference if rural areas become urban areas 
1-3 years  $3750 -$3750 =$0 
4-10 years $4500 -$7500 =-
3000(40%) 
$5625-$7500 = -875(25%) 
11 years up $5625-$7500 = -
3750(50%) 
$7500 -$9375 =-1875(20%) 
resources and economics in the country. This study aims to examine the effect of 
financial incentive reduction on rural and remote healthcare workers. In this study, we 
used rural and remote dentist data in Thailand to represent the healthcare workers in rural 






In this study, we used the utility theory to explain the decision to stay or leave 
rural and remote areas of dentists. We assumed that dentists have different preference to 
stay or leave rural and remote areas. They have chosen to locate in the areas that provide 
them the maximum utilization based on financial and non-financial factors. The simple 
utility function of dentists’ location choice can be denoted as function (1). 
U (π, x; β)  
     U = f (π, x; β)                         (1)                                                                
Where  
U is the utility function of dentist choice  
π is the financial factors which in this study we estimate the effectiveness of the HA 
x is non-financial factors 
β is the vector of parameters 
We adopted the WHO framework of factors related to the decision to leave or stay 
in rural areas to account for the non-financial factors. From the WHO 2010 framework, 
all factors included financial aspect, mandatory service, personal origin and values, 
family and communities’ aspects, working and living conditions, and career related 
aspect.  
Based on the 2010 WHO framework, besides the financial aspects are non-
financial factors. They include personal origin and values, family and community aspects, 
working and living condition, career related aspect, and mandatory service.  The 
framework of Thai dentist’s location choice is established to comply with the 2010 WHO 




In this study, we aim to measure the effect of the HA reduction, due to 
recategorization in HA areas from rural to urban in December 2016, on rural and remote 
dentists' resignation and relocation. We assumed that Rural and remote dentists who 
located in the changed areas which HA was reduced in December 2016 are more likely to 
leave (resign and relocate) from their areas. Therefore, after 2016, the resignation and 
relocation of dentists in changed areas increase. 
Method 
This is a longitudinal retrospective cohort study using an observational data. The 
study is based on the natural intervention of the policy implementation of reducing the 
Hardship Allowance rate by reclassifying the rural and urban areas for allocating HA in 
Thailand in December 2016. The Hardship Allowance is the direct payment financial 
incentive for physicians, dentists, pharmacists and other health providers working in 
primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public Health especially in rural and remote 
areas. In 2008, the Thai government launched a policy for attracting healthcare providers 
to stay longer in rural and remote areas by providing a direct payment financial incentive 
called “Hardship Allowance”.   
In 2008, the HA in rural areas was about 100% of new graduated dentists’ salary 
and 200-300% in remote areas. After the economic growth and urbanized expansion, in 
December 2016 the government adjusted the HA area categorization. Some rural areas 
became urban areas causing the reduction of the HA rate in those areas. The adjusting 
HA area categorization criteria followed the Notification of MoPH on December 2012. It 
was identified that all areas in each province were reclassified to urban, rural or remote 




location to the urban city within the province, and to another big province nearby. 
Second, it is the urbanization within the working area’s district, such as the number of 
commercial banks, the number of medical and dental private clinic, the number of 
convenient stores, the annual revenue of local government in district level, etc. Third, it is 
the dentist shortage situation in that area. The last criteria, it is whether or not the areas 
are in the risk zone, which are the three provinces on the southern border of Thailand.   
After the announcement of new criteria for the reclassification of the HA areas, 
each provincial public health office has to collect and analyze data and send the list of 
new area categorizations to the MoPH. Then the Policy and Strategy Bureau, in the 
MoPH collected all the reports from every provincial public health office and distributed 
them throughout the MoPH Notification Issue#11. The list of new areas reclassified and 
distributed in December 2016 has shown in Appendix B. 
In this study, we examine the effect on dentists’ decision to leave or stay in rural 
and remote areas, from the financial incentive HA reduction, due to the adjusting HA 
area categorization in some rural areas. The policy affects all the dentist populations in 
the study. The intervention group in this study is only the dentist group so there is no 
control group. Therefore, we used the retrospective observational data of dentists’ 
location from 2013 to 2018 to examine the dentists’ resignation and relocation before and 
after policy implementation in 2017. The observational data of dentists’ location before 
and after policy implementation in 2017 contains variation due to HA reduction program. 
This variation, which occurred from the independent or exogenous changes in events 
across time, can identify the effects of the Hardship Allowance reduction on the dentists’ 




The effect of dentists’ resignation and relocation after policy implementation in 
the areas that changed from rural areas to urban areas was measured. We compared the 
resignation and relocation of dentists between the changed areas and unchanged areas to 
show the characteristics of dentists in these two areas. Because the data set, we obtained 
is the longitudinal data of individual dentists from 2013 to 2018, we can do the panel data 
analysis. We estimated the resignation and relocation of rural and remote dentists in the 
changed areas and unchanged areas after the policy implementation in December 2016 by 
using interrupted time series regression for panel data analyzation.  
Sources of data   
Data sources used for addressing this study’s aim included the dentists’ data from 
2013 to 2018, and the rural and remote areas data adjusted in December 2016. The dentist 
data was obtained from the Policy and Strategy Bureau, which is revised from the annual 
reported data of Human Resource Management Division, Permanent Secretary 
Bureau, MoPH from 2013 to 2018. The data contained individual dentist's data in each 
year from 2013 to 2018. The individual dentist data includes dentists' characteristics, for 
example, gender, age, year of service, and geographic location of each dentist by year. 
The changed status of rural to urban is obtained from the notification of the MoPH issue 
# 11,12 by the Policy and Strategy Bureau, MoPH in December 2016.   
Study population   
The study population in this study is rural and remote dentists who work in 
primary hospital under MoPH across the country during 2013 to 2018.   We 





Unit of analysis   
The unit of analysis in this study is the individual dentist-year working in rural 
and remote primary hospitals under MoPH from 2013 to 2018.   
Dependent variable  
To achieve the study’s aim, the dependent variable is whether an individual 
dentist who was working in rural and remote primary hospitals under the Ministry of 
Public Health resigned or relocated (to urban areas) from their location from 2013 to 
2018.   
Key explanatory variable  
The key explanatory variables are the time during the implementation policy in 
December 2016 and the changed areas.  The recategorized HA areas policy in December 
2016 is implemented in some rural areas which become urbanized areas. Some rural areas 
became urban areas in December 2016, and as a result the HA payment rate reduced. The 
objective of the recategorized HA areas’ implementation in December 2016 is to adjust 
the areas to comply with the economics and urban expansion.  The HA payment criteria 
in December 2016 is the same as the payment criteria in 2013 as shown in Table 1.        
The major variables in the Econometric model for the study are composed of:  
RuraltoUrban is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban 
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0  
Post in the econometric model identified when is the time that policy implementation, 
after December 2016 post = 1, otherwise = 0.  




the changed area status from rural to urban areas, if after December 2016 and in the 
changed areas, post*ruraltourban is = 1, otherwise = 0  
Covariate variables  
The covariate variables use to accomplish the study are following these variables:  
Age is recorded in number in data set. Age of dentists in resignation and relocation data 
is the current age at the time they leave from the MoPH. Age will be categorized in 4 
groups: 1 = age 23-28 years, 2 = age 29-35    years, 3 = age 36-45 years, 4 = 46-60 years  
Gender of rural and remote dentists is record in text in data set. Two value of dentists’ 
gender is recorded for male and female.  
Year of service is recorded in number in data set. Year of services is the duration that 
dentists working in any rural and remote primary hospitals under the MoPH. It is 
calculated from the different of recruitment date which is a date when dentist start 
working in MoPH and resignation date which is a date when dentist quit working 
in MoPH.  
Region is the geographic area. In Thailand is divided into 4 regions: 1=Northern region, 
2=Central region, 3=Northeastern region, and 4=Southern region.   
Distance is the distance from the dentist’s practice location (primary hospital) to the 
urban city in each province. The distance in this study is measured in kilometer (1 
kilometer = 0.62 mile). In the econometric model for Aim 2 the distance is categorized in 
4 groups: 1=0-20km., 2=21-40km.,3=41-60km., and 4=61km.ups  
Data analysis 
Descriptive statistics are calculated to describe the characteristics of the study 




between before and after December 2016. Mantel-Haenszel chi square test is conducted 
to measure if there are any differences in these characteristics between, before, and after 
December 2016. The analysis is conducted at a 95% confidence interval (alpha =.05). A 
segmented regression analysis for panel data is then used to estimate the differences in 
rural and remote dentist’s resignation and relocation where the area is changed after the 
2017 implemented policy.  
Econometric Model  
Difference in difference regression with fixed effect estimation: 
Yit = β0 + β1ruraltourbanit + β2postit + β3postit.ruraltourbanit + Ɛit  
From this model we applied into 3 models, where Yit  are the resigned dentists, the 
relocated to urban dentists, and the resign and the relocated to urban dentists following 
these:  
1) Yit is whether rural and remote dentist ‘i’ resigned in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’ 
resigned in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 ;  
2) Yit is whether rural and remote dentist ‘i’ relocate to urban in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist 
‘i’ relocate to urban in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 ;  
3)  Yit is whether rural and remote dentist ‘i’ resigned in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist ‘i’ 
resigned in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 t 
Ruraltourbanit is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban 
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0  
Postt is the policy implementation, post = 1 if year >= 2017, otherwise post = 0  
Post.ruraltourbanit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the 




Xit is covariate variables  
Results  
Dentist Characteristics 
The characteristics of rural and remote dentists locating in unchanged areas and 
changed areas from 2013 to 2016 show in Table 5.2.  The unit of the dentists’ number in 
this table is dentist-year. Unchanged area is the location, which is identified rural area 
before and after December 2016. On the other hand, changed area is the location which is 
identified rural area before December 2016 but after that it became urban area. The age of 
dentists is categorized into 4 groups. There are 22-28-year-old, 29-35-year-old, 36-45-
year-old, and 46-60-year-old. Data shows that rural and remote dentists in this study 
mostly are age between 29-35 years both in unchanged and changed areas. The number 
of the youngest group age 22-28-year-old are the second and mostly located in 
unchanged areas. About 30% of rural dentists are in middle age group 36-45-year-old and 
most of them locating in changed areas. The oldest group which age 46-60-year-old are 
less than 10% of all rural dentists. Most of the oldest group are in the changed areas as 
same as the middle age group.  
Data show the majority of dentists in Ministry of Public Health in Thailand are 
female. In this study, about 70% are female dentists. Even though, the number of female 
dentists showed that they are in unchanged areas. The proportion of male in unchanged 
and changed areas is 1.6 while the proportion of female in unchanged and changed areas 
is 1.1.  
According to the HA rate and criteria in 2013 and 2016 by MoPH, the year of 




Table 5.2 Dentist characteristics by rural to urban policy status during 2013-2018, n 
(person-year) (column %)  
 
characteristics Rural to urban policy P-value 





Age       
22-28  2, 276 (36.46)         908 (18.27) P < 0.001 
29-35 2,566 (41.11) 2,194 (44.14)  
36-45 1,174 (18.81) 1,491 (29.99)  
46-60 226   (3.62) 378   (7.60)  
Gender       
Male 2,247(36.00) 1,359(27.34) P < 0.001 
Female 3,995(64.00) 3,612(72.66)  
Year of service       
1-3 2,259(36.19) 877(17.64) P < 0.001 
4-10 2,760(44.22) 2,372(47.72)  
11 ups 1,223(19.59) 1,722(34.64)  
Region       
North 1,526(24.45)  1,402(28.20) P < 0.001 
Central 723(11.58) 2,136(42.97)  
Northeast 2,345(37.57) 925(18.61)  
South 1,648(26.40) 508(10.22)  
Distance from hospital to the urban city in each province. 




21-40km 946(15.16) 2,488(50.05)  
41-60km 1,896(30.37) 1,009(20.30)  
61km ups 3,000(48.06) 537(10.80)  
 
Nearly half of them have been working under the MoPH for 4-10 years. Among 
these 3 groups, the proportion of the smallest experience group (1-3 years) are the highest 
group which locating in the unchanged areas. Thailand geography have been classified in 
4 regions: North, Central, Northeast, South regions. The unchanged areas mostly are in 
Northeastern region. About 40% of changed areas are in Central regions. This is 
consistent with the distance from the practice location areas to the urban city in each 
province. Due to unchanged areas mostly are further the urban city in each province than 
changed areas, and most of unchanged areas are in the Northeastern region. In this study, 
the distance to the city are categorized in 4 groups: 0-20km.,21-40km., 41-60km., and 
60km ups. Data shows that nearly 50% of the furthest locations (60km ups) are the 
unchanged areas. Another 30% of the further location which has a distance about 41-60 
km. from the city also are the unchanged areas. Contrarily, about 50% of location which 
has a distance 21-40 km. from the city are in the changed areas. In addition, the nearly 
20% of location which less than 20 km from the city are in the changed areas. 
The results in Table 5.3 shows the number of rural and remote dentists who stay 
or leave from the rural areas between the dentists in unchanged and changed areas from 
2013 to 2018. However, the unit of dentists’ number is a dentist because we count the 
resignation, relocation of dentists each year. In 2013 to 2014, dentists in unchanged areas 
resigned more than dentists in changed areas about 0.4%, while all dentists who relocated 




Table 5.3 Dentist location status by rural to urban policy during 2013-2018, n (column 
%)  
 
Year  Location status Rural to urban policy P-value 










Resign  84(7.4) 63(7.0) P=0.016 
Relocated to urban 17(1.5) 0(0)  
Relocated to rural areas 6(0.5) 5(0.6)  
Stay  1,032(90.6) 836(92.5)  






Resign  115(10.5) 71(8.2) P < 0.001 
Relocated to urban 73(6.7) 2(0.2)  
Relocated to rural areas 34(3.1) 42(4.9)  
Stay  872(79.7) 747(86.7)  






Resign  84(8.1) 42(5.2) P=0.001 
Relocated to urban 29(2.8) 1(0.1)  
Relocated to rural areas 6(0.6) 11(1.4)  
Stay  912(88.5) 753(93.3)  





Resign  124(11.8) 59(7.5) P=0.002 
Relocated to urban 21(2.0) 12(1.5)  
Relocated to rural areas 8(0.8) 0(0)  
Stay  902(85.5) 714(91.0)  








Resign  64(6.8) 34(4.7) P < 0.001 
Relocated to urban 47(5.0) 16(2.2)  
Relocated to rural areas 21(2.2) 18(2.5)  
Stay  812(86.0) 658(90.6)  
  944(100) 726(100)  
 
from the unchanged areas are higher than the resigned dentists from the changed areas 
during 2015 to 2018. In addition, the number of dentists in the unchanged areas who 
relocated to urban areas are also higher than the number of dentists in the changed areas 
significantly during 2015 to 2018.  
Mapping of the percentage of changed areas by province 
The map graph in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 shows the mapping of percentage of urban 
areas before and after the policy implemented in December 2016 by province on Thai 
maps. This showed how the areas changed from rural areas to urban areas. The dark blue 
is stand for the highest rate and the light blue is stand for the lowest rate of changed 
areas. The map demonstrates that most of the changed areas located in the province in 
central region. Most provinces in northeastern region and provinces near the border of the 
country contain the lower percentage of changed areas. In this study, the changed areas 
are the areas which were identified rural after the policy implemented in December 2016, 
these areas became urban areas. This map can be explained that most rural areas in the 
central regions became urban areas which is understandable. Because most provinces in 
central regions are close to Bangkok the capital city which easy to urbanization. Figure 





Figure 5.1 Mapping graph of percent of urban areas by province in 2013  
 





Figure 5.3 Mapping graph of resigned dentists by province  
 




graph in Figure 5.2 and 5.3, it is found that the high average resignation is not in the 
central region where located most changed areas but the border in northeastern region 
where located most unchanged areas. Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of relocation to 
urban of dentists. The map graph showed that provinces which contain high percentage of 
changed areas have more relocation percentage.  
The resignation trend by area changed from 2013 to 2018 
The trend graph (Figure 5.5) shows the resignation rate of dentists from 2013 to 2018 in 
unchanged and changed areas. The graph shows that both resignation trend between 
unchanged and changed areas are similar pattern. However, the resignation rate in 
unchanged areas is higher than in changed areas.  After policy implementation in 2017 
and 2018 the unchanged areas still rural areas, but the changed areas became urban areas. 
This shows that dentists in unchanged areas (close to rural areas) are more likely to resign 
from their location, while dentists in changed areas (close to urban areas) are less likely 
to resign from their location.  Figure 5.6 shows the pattern of relocation rate of rural 
dentists in unchanged and changed areas from 2013 to 2018. The trend shows that the 
relocation rate of dentists in unchanged areas increased since 2013 continuously until 
dropping in 2017. After 2017, the relocation trend in unchanged areas is more likely to 
grow up. The relocation trend of changed areas quite stable since 2013 but after the 
policy implementation in December 2016, the trend is rising persistently.  
The estimated percentage point from difference in difference regression on 
resignation and relocation rates among rural and remote areas.  
We applied the regression analysis for panel data to analyze the effect of the HA 






Figure 5.5 unadjusted trend graph of dentists resignation rate by years from 2013 to 2018  
resignation and relocation rate of dentists in rural and remote areas. The results table 
shows that the resignation dentist in changed area increase insignificantly compared with 
unchanged areas. However, comparing the resignation rate before and after policy 
implementation in December 2016, the resignation of dentists increases significantly. 
Nevertheless, the regression results show that the resignation of dentists in changed areas 
after the policy implementation is no difference from the resignation in changed area 
before 2017. 
Table 5.4 show the results of the regression analysis for panel data to analyze the 
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Figure 5.6 unadjusted trend graph of dentists’ relocation rate by years from 2013 to 2018  
relocation of dentists. The results table shows that the relocation of dentist in changed 
area decreases significantly, while from 2017 which is the year after the policy 
implementation the relocation of dentists insignificantly decreases. Nonetheless, it is 
found that the relocation of dentists in changed areas after the policy implementation, 
increases significantly. 
Table 5.5 show the results of the regression analysis for panel data to analyze the 
effect of recategorized HA area policy in December 2016, on resignation and relocation 
of dentists in rural and remote areas. The results table shows that the resignation and 
relocation of dentist in changed area decreases significantly. On the other hand, after the 
policy implementation the resignation and relocation of dentist significantly increases. In 




changed areas after policy implementation increases significantly (at significant level 
0.1). 
Discussion 
This study aims to assess the effect of HA payment reduction, due to the changed 
HA areas from rural to urban, on the decision to leave or stay in rural areas. The finding 
shows that dentist resignation was not significantly different between the changed and 
unchanged areas after the policy implementation in December 2016. However, the rural 
and remote dentists who relocated to urban areas were more likely to increase in changed 
areas after the policy implementation. This finding demonstrates that HA reduction 
influences dentists to leave rural areas although they do not resign. Based on the payment 
rate in Table 1, the HA payment reduced from 20 to 50%. Therefore, we could imply that 
the HA reduction could minimize the retention of dentists in rural areas.  This finding 
corresponds to the results of the study of job motivation in North Viet Nam, which 
showed that the low salary and allowances discouraged rural health care workers 
(Dieleman, 2003).  
The study of evaluating the effect of financial incentive reduction, as well as our 
study, is rarely found. Most of the evaluated program financial incentives studies show 
the results after implementing financial incentives. For example, the scholarship and loan 
repayment program in many developed countries (Sempowski, 2004; Barnighausen and 
Bloom, 2009) examined the retention of health workers after providing financial support. 
However, there are some studies that showed the effect of reducing financial support for 






Table 5.4 Regression analysis on resignation of dentists between changed and unchanged 
areas after the policy implementation  
 
 
Resignation Relocation  Resignation&relocation 
Intercept  .54**(.003) .077**(.013) .128**(.013) 
Post(after2016) .054**(.005) -.001(.005) .052**(.007) 
Ruraltourban .008(.006) -.132**(.029) -.120**(.028) 
Post.ruraltourban -.006(.008) .025**(.006) .018(.010) 
R-sq within .020 .017 .022 
R-sq between .031 .021 .003 
No. of observation 11,213 10,381 11,213 
No. of groups 2,384 1,975 2,384 
Sigma_u .374 .076 .368 
Sigma_e .181 .144 .228 
rho .810 .220 .722 
 
the study of the National Health Service Corps program, and the relation with the access 
and service of people in underserved areas in the US, showed that reduced support from 
the NHSC affected the reduction of physicians in underserved areas (Stone et al. 1991; 
Brown et al. 1990). In 1994, Pathman et al. findings also revealed that poor financial 
incentives programs caused the retention in underserved areas of NHSC physicians less 




finding. The outcomes of our study, which show the effect of the reduction of direct 
payment financial incentives, will be further evidence to benefit the policy makers. 
Our finding that the resignation of dentists in changed areas is insignificantly 
different with the unchanged areas after the policy implementation, but the relocation of 
dentists in changed areas is significantly higher than in the unchanged areas after the 
policy implementation, which could be explained by several reasons. First, the increasing 
of the number of dentists across countries due to the government policy in 2005 affected 
the decision to resign as government employees under the MoPH. The increasing dentists 
make the highly competitive in dental service market especially in urban city. Some 
public dentists may be reluctant to resign to compete with other private dentists, which 
increase every year. Second, the social norm of most Thai people provides a high value 
and respect for the government employee. Many dentists accepted the low income by 
working with the MoPH because they can be the government employee. Therefore, the 
reduction of HA payment may reduce their income, but it cannot influence them resign 
from the MoPH. This reason can explain by utility theory when dentists preferred non-
financial incentives. Third, the increasing of HA payments in 2008 combined with other 
financial supplements (non-private fee (1995); professional fee (2005)) secure the 
financial status of these government employee’s dentists. Generally, if we do not 
compare the income of MoPH’s dentists with the income of private dentists, the average 
income of MoPH’s dentists is higher than Thailand’s GDP per capita.  
In addition, the increasing of the relocation of dentists in changed areas after the 
policy implementation in December 2016 could be clarified by these reasons. First, the 




service strategy affect the decision to resign or relocate of dentists in rural and remote 
areas. In Thailand, the public dentists who have at least 2 years of services can get 
permission to relocate. Dentists in changed areas mostly have more experience than most 
dentists in unchanged areas which make changed areas dentist are more likely to be 
eligible to relocate. These dentists choose to move before the favorable positions are 
occupied. Second, relocation to urban areas for most dentists means relocating near their 
home. Many dentists have original backgrounds in urban areas (Lexomboon, 2003). 
Therefore, relocating near hometowns reduces the cost and time of commuting. This 
commuting reduction may compensate with the HA reduction. Third, relocating near the 
urban city increases more opportunity to get extra income from working extra hours in 
either public sectors or private sectors (Wibulpolprasert, 2003; 2008). The suburban or 
urban areas mostly have higher density populations, which mean these areas require more 
oral health service than in the rural areas. Besides, the suburban or urban population 
mostly have more potential to afford the cost of dental care treatment compared with 
rural people. Fourth, relocating to urban areas in many places provides more opportunity 
to continue education. For example, the big city such as Chiang Mai, Khon Kan, Song 
Kla, there are the universities in the urban city. Relocating near the urban city makes it 
easy to attend the conference or use the library of the university or contact the professor, 
etc. Fifth, the urban cities have many amenities that can make life more convenient and 
comfortable. These can attract some dentists who prefer lifestyles in a big city to relocate 
to near an urban city because of this reason (Henderson, 2008). 
The resignation trend graph of dentists in unchanged and changed areas showed 




changed areas due to the characteristic of the unchanged areas. Because unchanged areas 
are rural areas before and after the policy implementation, and most of them are further 
from the urban city. This characteristic make unchanged areas are unattractive compared 
with changed areas. This finding demonstrates that the resignation of dentists in rural 
areas which is unattractive areas is higher than in urban or suburban areas. Even though 
there is HA payment in changed areas decreased, the resignation of dentists in changed 
areas did not increase significantly. This finding shows that we have not enough evidence 
to prove our hypothesis that financial incentive reduction increase resignation rate of 
dentists. This outcome shows that the financial incentive is not the only factor that 
motivates health workers’ decision to leave or stay in their practice location, but non-
financial factors are also influential (Dieleman, 2003; Henderson, 2008).   
Based on the study’s conceptual frameworks, it shows that the decision of dentists 
to stay or leave rural areas depends on financial and non-financial incentives. In this 
study, the financial incentive that we focus on is the HA. The outcomes of the study show 
that the financial incentive in our model cannot comprehensively explain the resignation 
of dentists in changed and unchanged areas. There are non-financial incentive variables 
missing from our model. To make accurate clarification on all factors that influence 
dentists’ decisions, more study is required. The finding that only financial incentives are 
insufficient to motivate dentists working in rural and remote areas corresponds with the 
review article by Henderson. He found that the significance of financial incentive in 
terms of salaries, benefits and allowances affect the healthcare workers in most 
developing countries (Henderson, 2008). In countries with low salaries, mostly in 




to relocate to rural and remote areas. Only financial incentives are not enough for 
motivating health workers to remain in rural and remote areas, but non-financial 
incentives, such as good working and living conditions, the opportunity for continuing 
education, the professional and personal support programs, are also significant motivation 
(WHO, 2004; Stilwell B, 2004; Vujici, 2004; Humphreys,2009).  
Conclusion 
The results of the study show that the reduction of HA payment affect the 
decision of dentists to stay or leave their location practice. As a result, the disparity 
distribution of dentists still exists. Besides, a new problem may take place as new dentists 
recruit to replace the rural and remote areas for 1 or 2 years, and then they relocate to 
urban or suburban areas.  
Consequently, the rural and remote areas must recruit new dentists every year or 
every two years. It will establish a cycle of recruit and relocate in the rural and remote 
areas. Moreover, these can create another issue. For example, the increasing dentist’s 
policy combined with the reduction of HA might cause the congestion of dentists in 
urban areas, and rural areas would still have a dental supply shortage. 
Limitation  
 Data source of the study is obtained from the annual report of Human resource 
management which contained a few variables. There are some variables unavailable from 
the data set. For examples, variables which related with the non-financial incentives is 
not included in the annual report. Based on the conceptual framework showed the factor 
related to the decision of dentists to leave or stay in rural and remote areas involved with 




the financial factor variables and some personal characteristics of dentists. Therefore, the 
























CHAPTER 6  
MANUSCRIPT 3 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF DENTISTS’ AGE AND DENTISTS’ LOCATION 















                                                           







Financial strategy extensively used to address the inequitable distribution of 
health workers worldwide either in high-income or low-income countries. Several studies 
showed the effectiveness of financial incentive in recruiting and retaining health 
providers in rural and remote areas. However, few studies have investigated the 
relationship between the health providers’ age and their location choice when the 
financial incentive is reduced. This study aims to examine the relationship between 
dentists’ age and dentists’ location choice on financial incentive reduction, due to 
the recategorization of Hardship Allowance (HA) areas in Thailand. A retrospective 
observational study was conducted. Data on the rural and remote dentists’ location annual 
report, including the relocation and resignation of dentists from 2013 to 2018, were 
obtained from the Human Resource Management Department and the Policy and Strategy 
Bureau at the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in Thailand. Triple differences 
regression with random effect estimation was used to analyze the panel data of dentists’ 
resignation and relocation by age groups, in changed areas after the policy 
implementation. Data of 2,384 rural and remote dentists from 2013 to 2018 were 
used. The percentage of dentists by age groups 22-28, 29-35, 36-45, and 46-60-year-
old is 28%, 42%, 23%, and 5.4%, respectively. About 70% of 22-28-year-olds, and 29-
35-year-olds are in rural areas, while approximately 60% of the other two groups are in 
urban areas. The regression analysis of dentists’ resignation and relocation on dentists’ 
age in changed areas after the policy implementation shows that the oldest group in 
changed areas is the less likely to resign significantly from their location after the policy 




In conclusion, dentists’ age is related with the dentists’ decision to leave or stay in 
rural and remote areas when the HA was reduced. Although, the policy implementation 
caused the reduction of financial incentives, most of the oldest group decided to stay in 
their practice location. Besides financial incentive, age is another factor that influences 
that the dentists’ decision to leave or stay in rural and remote areas. 
Introduction  
The shortage of health professional especially in rural and remote areas is a global 
issue (WHO, 2010). Statistics show that health workers worldwide are mostly located in 
urban areas while most of the population are in rural areas (WHO, 2010). Most healthcare 
providers prefer living in urban cities than in rural and remote communities (Dussault, 
2005; Henderson, 2008). For example, in the US, about 20% of people are in rural areas, 
while there is only 9% of physician service there (Hancock et al., 2009). In Australia 
approximately 2.6 physicians per 1000 population are in urban cities, while there is only 
0.9 physician per 1000 people in rural communities (Viscomi, 2013). Many countries in 
Southeast Asian, including Thailand, also are challenged with the same problem. For 
example, in Vietnam, 70% of the population live in rural areas, but about 1/3 of rural 
health centers have no physician (Vujicic, 2011). In Cambodia, physician density in 
urban city is 0.41 per 1000 population, while in some remote areas the physician density 
is 0.06 per population (Chhea, 2010).   
In addition, statistics shows the shortage of dental supply in rural and remote 
areas affected the utilization of oral healthcare service (Lapying & Puttasri, 2013; 
2014). Although, a few studies report the shortage of oral health care workers, there is a 




shortages are rural. Areas with a lower supply of dentists have higher percentages of 
minorities, children, and low-income populations (Mertz, 2001).  A study found that 
dentists in a major city in Australia were 0.59 per 1,000 population, but in rural and 
remote areas there were 0.28 and 0.16 per 1,000 population (Teusner, 2005).  In Thailand 
in 2013, the statistics from the Thai dental council shows that in Bangkok dentists were 
0.96 per 1,000 population, while in Northeastern region dentists were 0.07 per 1,000 
population.   
The disparity distribution of health workers is related with health outcomes 
(Chen, 2004; Henderson, 2008). The insufficiency of qualified health providers in rural 
and remote areas minimizes the access to health care service for the population in those 
areas (Dussault, 2005; Henderson, 2008). Data shows the association of the child 
mortality rate and low density of healthcare workers (Henderson, 2008). In other words, 
with lower health worker density comes higher child mortality rates. Oral health service 
also has a similar problem. For example, in 2011, the dental care service of people in 
Bangkok was 0.27 visit/person/year, while it was 0.12 visit/person/year in the 
Northeastern region.    
The current evidence shows that financial incentives are significant factors in 
motivating health workers to locate in rural and remote areas (Sempowski, 
2004; Barnighausen and Bloom, 2009; Dolea, 2010). Several studies conducting 
surveys on the significant factors motivating health workers who serve rural and remote 
people showed that the financial incentives or monetary factors are the most important 
for healthcare providers to decide whether to leave or stay their location (Adzei, 




are insufficient to attract health workforce in the rural communities especially in the low-
middle income countries (Lehman, 2008; Henderson, 2008; Humphrey, 2009).   
Several studies suggest that financial incentive is not the only significant factor 
motivating health providers to locate in rural and remote areas. Non-financial factors are 
also important in attracting health workforce. Studies show the achievement of 
integrating financial and non-financial strategies to address the shortage of health 
workforce in unfavorable areas (Henderson, 2008; Humphrey, 2009). Based on the WHO 
(2010) framework showing the factors related to health workers’ decision to leave or stay 
in rural and remote areas, besides financial incentives, non-financial factors included: 
personal and family factors, working and living conditions, career aspects, and 
professional and personal support.   
This study examines the relationship of personal factors (age) and health 
worker’s choice of location when the financial incentive is reduced. Based on the 
Hardship Allowance (the direct payment financial incentive from the Thai government) 
criteria, the payment rate depends on the area and the year of service. This relationship 
implies that the dentists’ age is associated with the HA rate payment. The evidence of the 
relationship between health worker’s age and their location choice is required, because at 
the present, this relationship is still inconclusive.  
 A different connection between age and practicing location decisions was 
found (Lexomboon, 2003). Generally, relationships between the decision for 
leaving a practice location and demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, 
education level are indecisive (Lehman, 2008). In 1990, Easterbrook 




was no significant factor on physician decisions. However, the study of the impact of job 
satisfaction on worker turnover found that the higher the age of the workers, the more 
likely they are to leave their present work (Lamber, 2001).  
In 2005, Richards showed there was a high percentage of older health workers 
(>50 years) practicing in rural areas, while another study reported the average ages of 
health workers in urban and rural areas were 36.1 and 36.8, respectively (Richards, 
2005; Ebuehi, 2011). In 2013, Antwi identified the impact of wages on the retention of 
health workers. The author stated that age was important and focused on young adults 
aged 20-35-years old (Antwi, 2013). These studies showed the various results regarding 
the relationship between age and health worker’s decision. Evidence is still required to 
show the actual association of age on practice location decisions of the healthcare 
workforce.    
Background  
Thailand is a low-middle income country using financial incentive strategies to 
address the inequitably distributed healthcare providers in urban and rural areas. The Thai 
government implemented direct payment financial incentives, called Hardship Allowance 
(HA), to motivate health professionals to stay in primary hospitals under the Ministry of 
Public Health (MoPH), especially in rural and remote communities. Since 2001, the HA 
are provided to healthcare providers, including physicians, dentists, pharmacists, nurses, 
etc., to retain them in primary hospitals principally in rural and remote areas.   
The highest rate HA policy was launched in 2008. The Hardship Allowance 
policy was implemented by the government provides 100% of new graduated dentists’ 




very remote dentists. The evaluated study showed that the HA policy could reduce the 
resignation rate of dentists in rural areas significantly.   
However, in 2013, the government adjusted the rate and criteria of payment which 
reduced the HA rate of dentists who were located near the city and dentists who served 
over 4 years. This significant change happened again in December 2016 when the 
government adjusted the HA areas categorization. Some rural areas became urban areas, 
which reduced the HA payment rate. Table 5.1 shows the criteria and rate of HA payment 
in 2008 and 2016, and the reduction percentage of HA payment when rural areas became 
urban areas.  
From Table 5.1, the HA payment rate reduction from the changed policy 
implementation shows that there is different of reduction rate among the dentists’ year of 
service and dentists’ location practice. For dentists who serve 1 to 3 years, the changed 
areas did not affect their HA payment. For either rural or urban locations, there is no HA 
payment rate different for the dentists with 1-3 year of experience. For dentists who serve 
4 to 10 years, the difference of rural and suburban areas and the difference of rural and 
urban areas are 25% and 40%, respectively. In addition, for dentists who serve over 11 
years, the difference of rural and suburban areas and the difference of rural and urban 
areas are 20% and 50%, respectively.   
Based on the literature review, there are a few research gaps in the study of the 
relationship of health providers’ age and health providers’ location choice on the 
financial incentive for the retainment of health providers in rural areas, especially in low-
middle income countries. This research uses Thailand as a place of study and provides an 




show the effect of financial incentive reduction on rural and remote dentists’ choice to 
leave or stay their practice location and how this decision relates with dentists’ age in 
Thailand.  
This study we aim to determine the relationship between dentists’ resignation and 
dentists’ age after the decrease in HA due to the 2016 policy change of practice location 
area categorization.  We hypothesized that rural and remote dentists who affect the most 
from the HA reduction are more likely to leave their practice location compared with the 
group that has little or no effect from the decreased payment. Based on our hypothesis, 
the older group who affected more from the reduction of HA are more likely to resign and 
relocate from the rural areas compared with the younger dentists.    
Theoretical model  
In this study, we used the utility theory to explain the decision to stay or leave 
rural and remote areas of dentists. We assumed that dentists have different preference to 
stay or leave rural and remote areas. They have chosen to locate in the areas that provide 
them the maximum utilization based on financial and non-financial factors. The simple 
utility function of dentists’ location choice can be denoted as function (1).  
U (π, x; β)   
     U = f (π, x; β)                   (1)                                                                        
Where  
U is the utility function of dentist choice   
π is the financial factors which in this study we estimate the effectiveness of the HA  
x is non-financial factors  




We adopted the WHO framework of factors related to the decision to leave or stay 
in rural areas to account for the non-financial factors. From the WHO 2010 framework, 
all factors included financial aspect, mandatory service, personal origin and values, 
family and communities’ aspects, working and living conditions, and career related 
aspect.   
Based on the 2010 WHO framework, besides the financial aspects are non-
financial factors. They include personal origin and values, family and community aspects, 
working and living condition, career related aspect, and mandatory service.  The 
conceptual framework of Thai dentist’s location choice is established to comply with the 
2010 WHO framework, and it is shown in Figure 1.3.   
Method  
Research design  
Our study design is a longitudinal retrospective cohort study using an 
observational data. The study is based on natural intervention of the policy change. 
The Thai government implemented the policy reducing the Hardship Allowance rate by 
changing the categorization of dentist’s working location used for allocating HA in 
Thailand in December 2016. Since 2000, the Thai government has launched a policy for 
attracting healthcare providers to stay longer in rural and remote areas by providing a 
direct payment financial incentive called “Hardship Allowance”. The Hardship 
Allowance is the direct payment incentive for physicians, dentists, pharmacists and other 
health providers working in primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public Health, 




In 2008, the HA in rural areas was about 100% of newly graduated dentists’ 
salary and it was 200-300% in remote areas. After the economic growth and urbanized 
expansion, the government adjusted the HA area categorization in December 2016. Some 
rural areas became urban areas causing the reduction of the HA payment rate. The 
adjustment of the HA area categorization criteria plans has been issued since December 
2012 through the Notification of MoPH. It was identified that all areas in each 
province had to reclassification for the urban, rural or remote areas based on several 
criteria following these criteria. The first criteria is the difficulty of transportation from 
the working location to the urban city within the province and to another big province 
nearby. Second is the urbanization within the working area’s district, such as number of 
commercial banks, number of medical and dental private clinic, number of convenient 
stores, annual revenue of local government in district level, etc. Third is the dentist 
shortage situation in that area. And the last one is the areas that are in the risk zone, 
which are the three provinces at the southern border of Thailand. After that, 
the MoPH mailed the criteria to recategorize the rural and remote areas to every 
provincial public health office to consider and adjust the area in their province. 
Subsequently, the provincial public health office reported the new categorization to 
the MoPH to reconsider before launching the policy in December 2016.   
The adjusted working areas are collected and distributed through the Ministry of 
Public Health Notification Issue #11 and the list of new areas after the change in 
December 2016 are shown in Appendix B. In this study, we investigate the relationship 
between dentists’ retention and dentists’ age after influence by the financial incentive HA 




affects all dentist populations in the study. The intervention group in this study is only the 
dentist group, so there is no control group. Therefore, we used the retrospective 
observational data of dentists’ location from 2013 to 2018 to examine the change of 
location choice before and after policy implementation. The observational data of 
dentists’ location before and after the policy implementation in December 2016 contains 
variation in the Hardship Allowance reduction program. This variation, which occurred 
from the independent or exogenous changes in events across time, can identify the effects 
of Hardship Allowance reduction on the dentists’ resignation in relation to the dentists’ 
age.  
In this study, we measure the relationship of the age with the resignation and 
relocation rate of rural and remote dentists after the adjusted areas policy in December 
2016. We compared the resignation and relocation of dentists in each age group (22-28, 
29-35, 36-45, 46-60) between the changed areas and unchanged areas to show the 
characteristics of dentists in these areas. Due to data set that we obtained is longitudinal 
data of individual dentists from 2013 to 2018, we can conduct the panel data analysis. We 
estimate the resignation and relocation of dentists in each age group in the changed areas 
after the policy implementation by using segmented regression for panel data 
analyzation.  
Sources of data   
The data sources used for addressing the research question in this study is the data 
of dentists from 2013 to 2018, and the rural and remote areas data adjusted report in 
December 2016. The data of dentists obtained from the Policy and Strategy Bureau, 




Division under the Permanent Secretary Bureau in the MoPH from 2013 to 2018. The set 
is contained data of individual dentists in each year from 2013 to 2018. The individual 
dentist data include their characteristics for example gender, age, year of service, and 
geographic location of each dentist by year. The changed areas data that some rural areas 
became urban areas is obtained from the notification of the MoPH issue # 11,12 by the 
Policy and Strategy Bureau, MoPH in December 2016 (Appendix B).   
Study population   
The study population is all dentists who worked as a government employee in 
rural and remote primary hospitals under MoPH across the country during 2013 to 2018.   
In this study we excluded data of rural and remote dentists who is identified the 
resignation reason as death or retirement or termination from the job for any reason. 
Unit of analysis   
The unit of analysis in this study is the individual dentist-year working in 
healthcare facilities in rural and remote areas under MoPH from 2013 to 2018.   
Dependent variable  
To achieve the aim of the study, the dependent variable is whether an individual 
dentist working in rural and remote primary hospitals under the Ministry of Public 
Health resigns or relocates to urban areas from 2013 to 2018.  
Key explanatory variables  
The key explanatory variables for this study are the time of the policy 
implementation in December 2016, the changed or unchanged areas, and the dentists’ 
age. In this study, we aim to measure the relationship of dentists’ leaving from rural and 




areas changed policy in December 2016 is implemented in some rural areas which 
became urbanized. Some rural areas became urban areas in December 2016, causing the 
HA payment rate to be reduced. The objective of the recategorized HA areas 
implementation in December 2016 is to adjust the areas to comply with the economics 
and urban expansion.  The HA payment criteria in December 2016 is the same as the 
payment criteria in 2013, as shown in Table 1.2. The major variables in the Econometric 
model for this study are composed of:   
RuraltoUrban is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban 
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0  
Post in the econometric model identified when the time implementation of the 
changed area status in December 2016, after December 2016 post = 1, otherwise = 0.  
Age is recorded in number in data set. Age of dentists in the data set is the current age at 
the time they quit from the MoPH or relocate to urban areas. Age will be categorized in 4 
groups: 1 = age 23-28 years, 2 = age 29-35    years, 3 = age 36-45 years, 4 = 46-60 
years.   
Post * RuraltoUrban is the interaction of the time of the policy implementation in 
December 2016 and the changed area status from rural to urban areas, if after December 
2016 and in the changed area, post*ruraltourban is = 1, otherwise = 0   
RuraltoUrban*Age is the interaction of the changed area status from rural to urban areas 
and the dentists’ age  
Post *RuraltoUrban*Age is the interaction term of the time of the 




we can see how age affect the dentist’s resignation and relocation to urban areas when 
practice location status changed after the policy implementation in December 2016 .  
Covariate variables  
The covariate variables use to accomplish the aim of the study are following these 
variables:  
Gender of rural and remote dentists is record in text in data set. Two value of dentists’ 
gender is recorded for male and female.  
Year of service is recorded in number in data set. Year of services is the duration that 
dentists working in any rural and remote primary hospitals under the MoPH. It is 
calculated from the different of recruitment date which is a date when dentist start 
working in MoPH and resignation date which is a date when dentist quit working 
in MoPH.  
Region is the geographic area. In Thailand is divided into 4 regions: 1=Northern region, 
2=Central region, 3=Northeastern region, and 4=Southern region.   
Distance is the distance from the dentist’s practice location (primary hospital) to the 
urban city in each province. The distance in this study is measured in kilometer (1 
kilometer = 0.62 mile). In the econometric model for this study the distance is 
categorized in 4 groups: 1=0-20km., 2=21-40km.,3=41-60km., and 4=61km.ups   
Data analysis  
Descriptive statistics are calculated to describe the characteristics of the study 
population. A bivariate analysis is used to demonstrate whether there is any difference 
between before and after December 2016. Mantel-Haenszel chi square test is conducted 




December 2016. The analysis is conducted at a 95% confidence interval (alpha =.05). A 
triple difference regression with random effect estimation for panel data is then used to 
estimate the differences in rural and remote dentist’s resignation and relocation where the 
area is changed after December 2016 implemented policy.   
Econometric Model: triple differences regression with random effect estimation: 
Yit = β0+β1ruraltourbanit + β2ageit+ β3postit+ β4post.ruraltourbanit + β5 post.ageit+ 
β6ruraltourbanit. ageit + β7 post.ruraltourbanit.ageit +βmXit + Ɛ it  
where : 
Yit  are the outcome variables including the resigned dentists, the relocated to urban 
dentists, and the resign and the relocated to urban dentists following these:  
1) Yit is whether rural and remote dentist ‘i’ resigned in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist 
‘i’ resigned in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 ;  
2) Yit is whether rural and remote dentist ‘i’ relocate to urban in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if 
dentist ‘i’ relocate to urban in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 ;  
3)  Yit is whether rural and remote dentist ‘i’ resigned in year ‘t’ , Yit = 1 if dentist 
‘i’ resigned in ‘t’, otherwise Yit = 0 t 
Ruraltourbanit is the changed areas, ruraltourban =1 if the rural areas became in urban 
areas in December 2016, otherwise ruraltourban=0  
Ageit is the dentist ‘i’ age in year‘t’, age is categorized in 4 groups: 1 = age 23-28 years, 2 
= age 29-35    years, 3 = age 36-45 years, 4 = 46-60 years  
Post is the time of policy implementation, post = 1 if year >= 2017, otherwise post = 0  
Post.ruraltourbanit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the changed 




Post.ageit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the age of dentist ‘i’ in 
year ‘t’  
ruraltourbanit.age is the changing status areas in year ‘t’interaction with the age of dentist 
‘i’ in year ‘t’  
Post.ruraltourbanit.ageit is the time after policy implementation interaction with the 
changing status areas in year ‘t’ interact with the age of dentis ‘i’ in year ‘t’  
Xit is covariate variables  
Results  
Dentist Characteristics  
Data of dentists’ characteristic of rural and remote areas by age groups from 2013 
to 2018 are shown in Table 6.1. The unit of the dentists’ number in this table is dentist-
year. In this study, the age groups of rural and remote dentists are categorized into 4 
groups: 22-28, 29-35, 36-45, and 46-60-year-old. The oldest age of dentists is 60 years 
old because they are the government employees. In Thailand, all government employees 
retire at age 60 years old. Most rural and remote dentists from 2013 to 2018 are age 
between 29-35-year-old (42%). About 28% of them age between 22-28-year-old, follow 
by the group of age 36-45-year-old is 23%. The oldest group (46-60-year-old) are the 
smallest groups at about 5.4%. It is found that there are more female than male dentists in 
all age groups except in the oldest group where there are more male dentists. The year of 
service is consistent with the dentists’ age. Most of the youngest dentist have served 1-3 
years and most of the oldest dentist group have more than 11 years of service.   
In 2013, that we initially only recruited rural and remote dentists’ data. These 




2014.  In 2017 and 2018, all location in changed areas became urban areas. Data shows 
that approximately 70% of rural dentists are the younger and youngest age groups. The 
middle age and the oldest age groups are in urban areas at 60% of all age groups.  
Data of dentists by region shows that most of the youngest groups are in 
the Northeast region while most of the oldest groups are in the North and Central regions, 
respectively. The dentists age 22-28 years most located in the Northeast region follow by 
the South, Central and North regions, respectively. The younger age groups and the 
middle aged group are distributed in any region proportionately. In contrast, the dentist 
age 46-60-year-old are mostly located in the North region, followed by the Central, 
Northeast, and South regions, respectively.  
The distance from hospital to the urban city in each province are categorized into 
4 groups: 0-20 km., 21-40km., 41-60km., and over than 61km. Most urban hospitals are 
in the urban city or distance less than 20km from the city. The rural hospitals are 
further from the urban city than the urban hospitals and the remote hospitals are the 
furthest among three areas. Data shows that the youngest age dentists group mostly 
located in the furthest areas (over than 61 km. from the urban city). It is found that the 
older age the dentist is the closer the dentist locates to the urban city.  
The results in Table 6.2 show the dentists’ location status in unchanged areas and 
changed areas by age groups. It is found that most of resigned dentists are the youngest 
group both in unchanged and changed areas. Although the number of dentists’ 
resignation is higher in the unchanged areas than in the changed areas, the proportion is 
equal at 14.6% and 14.0%, respectively. If consider only the number of the dentists, it 




However, data showed that the middle age dentists (36-45 years) have the lower 
percentage of resignation compared with the oldest group in both unchanged and changed 
areas.   
Mapping of the percentage of dentists age by group (22-28, 29-35, 36-45, 46-60 years 
old) by province  
The percentages of dentists’ ages by age group are mapped and shown in Figure 
6.1 to 6.6. The mapping graph of the youngest dentists group shows that most of them are 
in the Northeastern region of Thailand. The distribution of this group is mostly in the 
bordered provinces next to Laos and Cambodia in the Northeast and Southeast regions, 
respectively. The younger age dentists seem evenly distributed across country. However, 
the graph shows that they are light in the bordered provinces in the Northeast and 
Southeast regions. The middle age dentists are mostly distributed in the Central and the 
lower part of the Northern regions, as well as the oldest dentists’ group.   
Figure 6.1 shows the mapping of the resignation of dentists from 2013 to 2018. 
Comparing the mapping graph of the resignation of dentists with the dentists’ ages, the 
graph shows that the resignation of dentists mapping graph in Figure 6.5 is the most 
identical with the youngest dentists’ group mapping graph in Figure 6.1. In addition, the 
mapping graph of the relocation of the dentists in Figure 6.6 is the most alike with the 
younger dentists’ group in Figure 6.2.  
The resignation trend by age groups in changed and unchanged areas from 2013 to 
2018  
Figure 6.7 shows the resignation trend of dentists in unchanged areas by age 




Table 6.1 Rural and remote Dentist’s characteristic by age groups from 2013 to 2018 n 
(dentists-year) (%column)  
 









Gender             
Male (3,606)  1,049(32.9) 1,546(32.5) 707(26.5) 304(50.3) P<0.001 
Female (7,607)  2,135(67.1) 3,214(67.5) 1,958(73.5) 300(49.7)   
Year of service        
1-3 years  2,892(90.8) 239(5.0) 5(0.2) 0(0) P<0.001 
4-10 years  292(9.2) 4,372(91.9) 463(17.4) 5(0.8)   
11 years ups  0(0) 149(3.13) 2,197(82.4) 599(99.2)   
Area         
Urban(2,022)  168(5.3) 1,033(21.7) 630(23.6) 191(31.6) P<0.001 
Rural(7,437)  2,522(79.2) 3,004(63.1) 1,610(60.4) 337(55.8)  
Remote(1,718)  494(15.5) 723(15.2) 425(15.9) 76(12.6)  
Region        
North(2,928)  626(19.7) 1,301(27.3) 770(28.9) 231(36.3) P<0.001 
Central(2,859)  653(20.5) 1,317(27.7) 706(26.5) 183(30.3)  
Northeast(3,270) 1,241(38.9) 1,222(25.7) 686(25.7) 121(20.0)  
South(2,156)  664(20.9) 920(19.33) 503(18.9) 69(11.4)   
Distance from hospital to the urban city in each province.   
0-20km   193(6.1) 688(14.5) 344(12.9) 112(18.5) P<0.001 
21-40km   708(22.2) 1,430(30.0) 1,045(39.2) 251(41.6)   
41-60km   960(30.2) 1,176(24.7) 658(24.7) 111(18.4)   
61km ups   1,323(41.6) 1,466(30.8) 618(23.2) 130(21.5)   
 
highest resignation rate, and the oldest dentists group has the lowest resignation rate. The 
trend of the resignation in the dentists aged 22 to 28-year-old is increasing, and dropped 




constant until the trend increase in 2017. The resignation rate in-group of age 29 to 35 is 
lower than the youngest group but the pattern is similar. The resignation trend in-group of 
age 29 to 35 is increasing from 2013 but dropped in 2016 before raising again in 2017 
and 2018. The resignation trend in the dentists aged 36 to 45 is alike to the oldest group 
but more constant. The resignation trend in the 36-45 age group is quite straight 
compared with the other three groups.  
The graph shows that the youngest dentists have the highest resignation rate 
among four age groups and the oldest dentists have the lowest rate. The trend of 
resignation in unchanged and changed areas is quite similar, although in changed area the 
resignation rate is lower than in unchanged areas. The oldest dentists in changed areas 
also have the same scenario of the resignation trend in unchanged areas, that is quite 
stable from 2013 to 2017 then increasing in 2018. The overall resignation trend in 
changed areas is a similar pattern in unchanged areas but the rate is lower.   
The trend graph in figure 6.9 and 6.10 shows the relocation rate of rural and 
remote dentists in unchanged and changed areas respectively. Overall, the relocation rate 
in changed areas is lower than in unchanged areas. In the unchanged areas, the relocation 
trend drops in 2017 and raises again in 2018. However, in changed areas, the relocation 
trend of the dentists aged 29-35 group and 36-45 group is increasing, while the trend in 
the youngest group decreases.      
The triple differences regression analysis in resignation and relocation of dentists in 
changed and unchanged areas by age groups  
The regression results of the resigned dentist and dentists’ age in changed areas 




Table 6.2 Rural and remote Dentist’s location status by age groups in unchanged and 
changed areas from 2013 to 2018   








Resign   341(14.6) 144(5.4) 24(2.0) 12(5.2) 
Relocate_urban 64(2.7) 96(3.6) 21(1.8) 6(2.6) 
Relocate_ rural   88(3.8) 135(5.1) 33(2.8) 6(2.6) 
Stay   1,847(78.9) 2,287(85.9) 1,117(93.5) 208(89.7) 
Resign   127(14.0) 135(6.1) 34(2.3) 15(4.0) 
Relocate_urban  2(0.2) 21(0.9) 7(0.5) 1(0.3) 
Relocate_ rural   26(2.9) 45(2.0) 21(1.4) 3(0.8) 




Figure 6.1 Mapping graph of percent of dentists age 22-28-year-old by province from 






Figure 6.2 Mapping graph of percent of dentists age 29-35-year-old by province from 
2013 to 2018   
 
 
Figure 6.3 Mapping graph of percent of dentists age 36-45-year-old by province from 






Figure 6.4 Mapping graph of percent of dentists age 46-60-year-old by province from 
2013 to 2018  
 
 










Figure 6.7 The trend graph show the resignation rate of dentists in unchanged areas from 
























Figure 6.8 The trend graph show the resignation rate of rural and remote dentists in 




 Figure 6.9 The trend graph show the relocation rate of rural and remote dentists in 


















































Figure 6.10 The trend graph show the relocation rate of rural and remote dentists in 
changed areas from 2013 to 2018   
                                                                                                                 
policy implementation the resignation dentists are more likely to increase significantly 
although the resignation of dentists in unchanged and changed areas is no different. 
Among four age groups, it is found that the youngest group are the most likely to resign 
from the MoPH facilities compared with the other three groups. It is found that the higher 
age the dentist is, the less likely to resign from their location in rural and remote areas, 
significantly. In addition, the resignation of dentists after December 2016 in the youngest 
group is the highest among four groups. The younger group (29-35) and the middle group 
(36-45) are less likely to resign significantly compared with the youngest group (22-28), 
although the oldest group (46-60) is less likely to resign insignificantly after the policy 




The regression analysis shows that in the changed areas after the policy 
implementation in December 2016, the oldest dentists’ group (46-60) is the less likely to 
resign from their location practice significantly compared with the youngest group (22-
28). Data shows there is no difference of resignation between male and female dentists. 
But resignation of rural and remote dentists by region shows that dentists in the North 
and South regions are less likely to resign significantly, compared with the Northeast 
dentists.  
Nevertheless, the data shows that the distance between the dentists’ working 
location and the urban city in each province affected the decision of dentists to resign. It 
is found that dentists who were located the furthest away are less likely to resign 
significantly. Data shows that the further away the dentists were located, the less likely 
they resigned from their working place. The regression of the relocation to urban areas of 
dentists, with dentists’ age and other related factors shows in Table 6.4. Although there is 
no different of the resignation of dentists in unchanged and changed areas, the dentists’ 
relocation to urban in changed areas is less than in unchanged areas significantly, 
while the relocation of dentists after the policy implementation is less likely to 
increase insignificantly.   
The relocation data of dentists shows that the oldest group is the less likely to 
relocate among four age groups followed by the middle age group (36-45). On the other 
hand, the younger dentists(29-35) are also more likely to relocate to urban areas 
compared with the youngest dentists insignificantly.  
In the unchanged and changed areas, data showed that the relocation of dentists in 




the policy implementation in December 2016, there is no significant difference 
of dentists’ relocation in all age groups. Furthermore, in changed areas after December 
2016, the oldest groups are less likely to relocate the most, followed by the middle groups 
and the younger group insignificantly compared with the youngest dentists.  
The relocation of male and female dentists is no difference, as well as the 
resignation of male and female dentists. However, the relocation to urban areas by 
dentists in the North and the Central regions is increasing significantly compared with 
dentists in Northeast region. Furthermore, the relocation of dentists who are located close 
to the city are more likely to relocate to urban city significantly.  
Table 6.4 shows the regression of the resignation and the relocation to urban areas 
of dentists with dentists’ age and other related factors. The statistics shows that the 
dentists’ resignation and the dentists’ relocation to urban areas combined is likely to 
decrease significantly in changed areas. In contrast, the resignation and the relocation of 
dentists are more likely to increase after the policy implementation in 2016. As well, the 
resignation and relocation of dentists in changed areas after the policy implementation are 
more likely to increase significantly. The youngest dentists are more likely to resign and 
relocate the most among four age groups, as well as the oldest dentists are less likely to 
resign and relocate the most significantly. Data shows that the younger the dentist is, the 
more likely to resign and relocate to urban areas.   
It is found that there is still no significant difference of resignation and relocation 
of dentists between unchanged and changed areas in all age groups, except that the 
younger dentists are less likely to resign and relocate compared with the youngest. 




rate of the younger dentists(29-35) and the middle groups(36-45) decreased significantly 
compared with the youngest dentists’ groups.   
The data analysis shows that in the changed areas after the policy implementation 
in December 2016, the oldest dentists are less likely to resign and relocate significantly 
compared with the youngest dentists, followed by the middle-aged dentists.  
Nonetheless, the male and female dentists still have no significant difference of 
resignation and relocation to urban areas.   
It is found that the resignation and relocation of dentists in the Central region is 
not different compared with the dentists in the Northeast region. However, the dentists 
in the North and South regions are less likely to resign and relocate significantly. 
Moreover, data shows that dentists who are located in the areas close to the city (0-
20km., and 21-40km.) are more likely to resign and relocate significantly compared with 
the dentists who are located the furthest from the urban city.   
Discussion   
The study aims to determine the relationship between dentists’ age and their 
decision to leave or stay in rural and remote areas after the HA payment reduction, due to 
the December 2016 policy of recategorized the HA location areas. The finding shows that 
dentists’ age is related with dentists’ location choice. The regression analysis shows that 
the oldest group (46-60) is less likely to resign compared with the youngest dentists 
significantly. Therefore, the youngest group is the more likely to leave the practice 
location in the changed areas after the policy implementation. Although, the finding is 





Table 6.3 Regression analysis on resignation of dentists and changed areas and age after 
policy implementation  
  
Resignation Relocation  Resignation 
&relocation 
Intercept  .257**(.014) .017**(.005) .235**(.140) 
Post(after2016) .161**(.014) -.011(.009) .160**(.046) 
Ruraltourban .012(.014) -.056**(.006) -.082**(.017) 
Post.ruraltourban .064(.039) .058(.030) .129**(.006) 
Age 
(ref. 22-28 year-old) 
29-35year-old -.027**(.009) .001(.005) -.037**(.011) 
36-45year-old -.073**(.014) -.025**(.006) -.112**(.016) 
46-60year-old -.119**(.031) -.024(.013) -.169**(.035) 
Rualtourban.age 
(ref. 22-28 year-old) 
29-35year-old -.025(.014) -.013(.008) -.041**(.017) 
36-45year-old -.002(.021) .015(.009) -.002(.024) 
46-60year-old .034(.039) .013(.018) .047(.046) 
Post.age 
(ref. 22-28year-old) 
29-35year-old -.107**(.017) .010(.011) -.129**(.019) 
36-45year-old -.127**(.019) .022(.012) -.123**(.022) 
46-60year-old -.051(.030) .021(.021) -.044(.037) 
Rualtourban.post.age 
(ref.22-28 year-old) 
29-35year-old -.041(.042) -.026(.032) -.053(.049) 
36-45year-old -.080(.043) -.057(.032) -.132**(.051) 
46-60year-old -.128**(.053) -.073(.038) -.205**(.063) 
Gender(ref.male) 
   




Region (ref. NE) 
   
    North   -.080**(.014) .009**(.004) -.039**(.014) 
    Central -.027(.014) .009**(.004) .006(.014) 
    South -.062**(.015) -.005(.004) -.058**(.016) 
Distance from hospital to urban(ref. 60 km up) 
    0-20km -.045**(.014) .108**(.005) .183**(.016) 
    21-40km -.041**(.013) .038**(.004) .047**(.014) 
    41-60km -.031**(.012) .016(.004) .003(.013) 
R-sq within .011 .111 .035 
R-sq between .144 .084 .108 
No. of observation 11,213 10,381 11,213 
No. of groups 2,384 1,975 2,384 
Sigma_u .242 0 .229 
Sigma_e .181 .135 .223 
Rho .641 0 .513 
 
Prior evidences provide the indecisive conclusion whether health workers’ age 
related with the health workers’ location choice (Lehmann, 2008; Ruston, 2012). 
However, our study’s outcomes show that the youngest dentists are more likely to leave 
their location when the financial incentive reduction. The outcomes of the study differ 
from the study’ hypothesis that the older aged dentist who affects the reduction of HA the 
most, should be more likely to leave the practice location. Although, the outcomes of the 




2013; Antwi, 2013). For example, the study to explore the poor recruitment of physicians 
to rural areas in Beijing found that generally physicians who practice in rural areas were 
older than the average age of all physicians (Wang, 2013).  
Nonetheless, our outcomes are different from several findings which showed that 
the younger health workers were more likely to remain in rural and remote areas 
(Lexomboon, 2003; Richards, 2005; Ebuehi, 2011). For example, Lexomboon (2003) 
found that the young experience dentists were more likely to remain in the rural and 
remote areas. The author explained that the young dentists who serve for 1 to 3 years 
have the compulsory service contract with the government. The contract could keep them 
in their practice location at least 3 years. The more year they served, the more likely to 
leave their location. However, our study shows that the young dentists are more likely to 
leave their location.  
The reason of the different results of our study and Lexomboon’s maybe due to 
the low value of the payout rate of dentists who leave before completing the mandatory 
service. Since 1989, the government implemented the compulsory service policy for 
retaining new dentists working in community hospitals especially in rural and remote 
areas. The payout rate of punishment any dentists who could not complete the mandatory 
service within three year, have not been changed since the policy implementing. At the 
present, the rate has been reduced by the value of money reduced. Therefore, there are 
more young dentists decide to resign and payout at the current data set.  
In this study, we classified the dentists’ age into 4 groups. The youngest was aged 
from 22 to 28 years old. Most dentists in this group had working experience of 1-3-year. 




their practice location. We will explain the reason for the resigning of the youngest 
groups following these. First, the youngest groups mostly recruit to serve in the very rural 
areas in the Northeast region, as shown in the mapping graph. Some of them who are of  
urban origin cannot adjust to work in those rural locations and decide to leave 
(Wilson, 2009). However, every new dentist must serve at least two years before getting 
permission to relocate. Therefore, many of them decide to resign instead of waiting for 
the relocation permission. Second, the payout of punishment dentists who could not serve 
at least three years is the same rate which is not high compared with the income from the 
private sector (Wilbulpolprasert, 2003). Many young dentists who come from the 
affordable family could payout and resign from the MoPH. Third, the youngest group 
who have no spouse or kid are more flexible to resign or relocate compared with the older 
group. In addition, these young dentists have less relationship with the working place and 
community which made them decide to leave easier than the senior group who are 
accustomed with working and living in rural and remote communities.  
On the other hand, the oldest dentists are the less likely to leave from their 
practice location. There are several reasons could be explained this situation. First, there 
are several monetary supplements for dentists working in MoPH, for instance, the non-
private fee, the professional fee, etc. These supplements may be enough for motivate 
these groups to remain in their practice location despite the HA reduction 
(Wilbulpolprasert, 2003; Henderson, 2008). Second, the oldest dentists who settle in that 
areas, which make them get used to with their location areas. They have family, friend, 
and good relationship with the communities (Wilson, 2009; Buykx, 2010). The reduction 




group have no financial burden for family or children and free of financial issues. 
They choose to remain in the communities that make them happy rather than making 
more money.   
The findings that the oldest group is less likely to resign from their practice 
location despite the reduction of the financial incentives. This outcome demonstrates that 
financial factor is not only factor that motivate dentists’ location choice. The non-
financial factor such as age which is the personal factor also affects the decision of 
dentists choosing to leave or stay in rural and remote areas. This finding supports the 
concept of the integration of the financial and non-financial factors to motivate health 
workers working in rural and remote areas (Henderson, 2008; Humphrey, 2009).  Besides 
the personal factors, there are many non-financial factors which significant influence the 
health worker location choice. Non-financial factors are also including family aspect, 
working and living conditions, career aspects, professional and personal support (WHO, 
2010). Our findings which show the relationship of dentists’ age and dentists’ location 
choice demonstrate the significant of the non-financial incentives. There are many non-
financial incentives which required more study to investigate.  
Conclusion  
In conclusion, dentists’ age is related with the dentists’ decision to stay or leave 
rural and remote areas when the HA reduction. Although, the policy implementation 
caused the financial incentive reduction, most of the oldest group decide to stay in their 
practice location. Therefore, financial incentive may be not the only factors influence 






The data source of this study is obtained from the annual report of Human 
resource management which contained a few variables. There are some variables 
unavailable from the data set. For examples, variables which related with the non-
financial incentives is not included in the annual report. Based on the conceptual 
framework showed the factor related to the decision of dentists to leave or stay in rural 
and remote areas involved with financial and non-financial factors. However, the 
observational data is contained mostly the financial factor variables and some personal 
characteristics of dentists. Therefore, the outcome shows the restricted evidence to 



















This dissertation consists of 3 specific aims. Study Aim#1 is to examine the 
effectiveness of the direct payment financial incentive called HA, on retaining dentists in 
rural and remote areas. The difference in difference regression on resignation rates of 
dentists in response to the HA in 2008. It can be concluded that the HA direct payment is 
a significant factor to retain health workers in rural and remote areas. The outcome of 
the study shows that direct payment financial incentives affect the resignation rate of 
dentists in rural and remote areas. This study does not measure the retention rate of 
dentists directly. However, the decreasing of resignation rate after the 2008 financial 
incentive program implementation demonstrates that financial factors could retain dentist 
in rural and remote areas.  
Study Aim#2 is to examine the effect of HA reduction on dentists’ location 
choice. In December 2016, the government recategorized the HA areas; as a result, some 
rural areas became urban areas and the HA decreased by the area changing. From the 
different in different regression with fixed effect estimation on dentists’ resignation and 
relocation in response to the changed areas after the policy implementation in December 
2016, it can be concluded that the HA reduction is influencing dentists to relocate from 
their practice location. Although the resignation of dentists is not significantly different in 




relocation of dentists can infer that dentists are more likely to leave the practice location 
when the HA is reduced.   
Study Aim#3 is to examine the relationship of dentists’ age and dentists’ location 
choice when the HA is reduced. This is because the HA payment criteria depends on the 
areas (urban, rural, and remote areas) and year of service (1-3, 4-10, and over 11 
years). It is assumed that besides practice location, age should be another essential 
influence for dentists’ decisions to stay or leave their rural communities. From the triple 
difference regression with random effect estimation on dentists’ resignation and 
relocation in response to dentists’ age and changed areas after the policy implementation 
in December 2016, it can be concluded that dentists’ age is related to the location choice. 
It found that the oldest dentists (46-60) is the less likely to leave their location practice 
where the HA is reduced, compared with the youngest group. 
Although the observational retrospective data which we obtained has a limitation 
to provide the retention rate data, the resignation rate which is used in the study can 
illustrate the effectiveness of HA direct payment financial incentives. Nevertheless, the 
data is insufficient to reveal the extent of dentists remaining in rural and remote areas. 
The study can show the effect of HA payment on dentists’ location choice when either 
the HA increases or decreases.   
The responses of dentists’ decisions to stay or leave rural areas based on the HA 
direct payment both in positive and negative ways show that the financial factor is the 
essential factors on health worker’s location choice. However, the study shows that 




personal factors such as health workers’ age are also key factors on health workers’ 
location choice.   
It can conclude that the outcome of the study is consistent with the utility theory. 
Based on the utility theory, it is assumed that health workers choose practice locations 
which maximize their utility. The utility function includes financial and non-financial 
factors. Therefore, to develop the efficient strategies to address the disparity distribution 
of health workers, the policy maker should integrate both financial and non-financial 
incentives. Moreover, to conduct an efficient study to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
program, the researcher should create the effective method to collect and record adequate 
and quality information for optimal analysis.  
Lessons learned from the study 
The government have to consider how age of dentists relates with the decision to 
leave or stay in rural and remote areas. The outcome shows that the HA payment 
reduction did not affect the oldest dentist group to resign or relocate their location 
compared with the youngest group. This demonstrates that if the government have the 
budget constraint and the high resignation rate problem still exist. The effective strategy 
to retain dentists working in rural and remote areas including increase financial incentive 
to the youngest group while reduce the payment rate to the oldest group.  
In addition, the government should implement other non-financial incentives 
strategy which evidence show the relationship to health workers’ location choices. For 
example, improving the working and living condition or provide more opportunity to 
continuing education to attract the young dentists' group to stay longer in their practice 




leave or stay in rural and remote areas especially for dentists in Thailand (Lexomboon, 
2003). In addition, the results from the difference in difference regression with fixed 
effect analysis in Aim#2 shows that the distance between the practice location and the 
urban city related with the resignation and relocation of the dentists. The outcome for 
Aim#2 also demonstrated that the changed areas which have more amenities such as 
commercial banks, private clinics, convenient stores, etc., are more attractive compared 
with the unchanged areas. The finding shows that the dentists in the changed areas area 
less likely to resign or relocate to their location practice.   
The most important thing is the government should evaluate all the strategies that 
were implemented to improve the disparities distribution of dentists and other health 
professionals, including the educational strategies, the compulsory services, the financial 
and non-financial incentives programs. Besides, to improve the efficiency of the 
programs, persistently evaluating the program could prevent new issues. This is because 
the increasing of the dentists from the educational and compulsory service policy might 
cause the oversupply of dentists. However, the dentists still continuously resign or 
relocate from the unpleasant places in rural and remote areas. Therefore, the 
government have to create another policy to address the oversupply of dentists in urban 
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THE TABLE OF THE COMMUNITY HOSPITALS UNDER THE MOPH BY HA AREAS BY PROVINCES WHICH ATTACHED 
IN THE NOTIFICATION OF MOPH ON SEPTEMBER 5, 2013 
 
HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 














Chiangkong  Maefahluoung  
Wiengkan  





























HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1  Remote2  







Chiangmai  Chomthong  
Fang  











































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 
1 Lampang     Sobprab 
Sermngam Hangchat 
  





Li  Tunghuachang  






















Kaokor  Namnao  








Uttaradit   Nampad Tron  
Tongsankan 








HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 


















Pangsilatong   




























HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 












  Sainoi    



























HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 
4 Ayuthaya    Somdetprasankarat 
Uthai 
  







































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 

















































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 




Samutsongkram   Napalai  Ampawa    








Tatakieb   










Tapaya   
Samutprakan  Banchak 
Banbo 
Banpli  
  Pasamutchedisawatyanon    

















HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 
















Trad     Kaosaming 
Klongyai 
Lamngob 
Kochang  Kokud  
Rayong  Klang  
Mabtapud  






























HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote
2 

















































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote
2 






























Nongkai    Tabor  Ponepisai  
Sichiangmai 
Sakai 
Sangkom   























HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote
2 









        






























HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote
2 
8 Sakonnakorn    Songdao 
Akartamnoui 
  























































HR Province Hospitals  


















































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 

































































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 

















Chanuman   









 Patoh  





















HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 































 Kolanta  















HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 
11 Phuket  Patong 
Talang  
     













Kongrha   

























HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 
12 Naratiwat       Sisakorn 
Sukkirin 
Sungaipadi  







































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 




   





























THE TABLE OF THE COMMUNITY HOSPITALS UNDER THE MOPH BY HA AREAS BY PROVINCES WHICH ATTACHED 
IN THE THE NOTIFICATION OF MOPH ON DECEMBER 29, 2016 
 
HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 
















Chiangkong  Maefahluoung  
Wiengkan  

































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1  Remote2  
























































Maeprik   





  Li  Tunghuachang  
Tak    Bantak 
Wangchao  


















HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 
1 Pitsanulok   Prompiram 
Wangtong Watboad 
   










Kaokor  Namnao  







   







Fakta  Bankok  


























HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 








































   






   
Ayuthaya   Bangsai 
Bangsi 








HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 











   











    












Singburi    Kaibangrachan 
Tachang  
Bangrachan  








HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 







   
Nakornnayok    Banna 
Pakpli 
Ongkarak 
   

















Banka   






Nongyasai   
Pachaupkirika
n 













HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 







Samutsonkram   Napalai Ampawa    








 Tatakieb   













Tapaya   
Samutprakan  Banchak 
Banbor 
 Pasamutchedisawatyanon 
Bangsaotong   
   




















HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 
6 Chantabu
ri 
  Lamsing    


















Kochang  Kokud  



















































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 

























































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 
8 
 
Buengkan     Siwilai   






















Sangkom   







































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 

























Nikomnamun   















Pakdichumpon   

















HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 













































Nonedindang   


















HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 







































































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 










Chanuman   











 Patoh  
Nakornsitammar
at  















































HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 
11 Surattani     Panom 
Prasang 
  







 Kolanta  
Kopipi  






Kuraburichaipat  Koyaochaipat  
Phuket  Patong 
Talang  
     















Kongrha   





















HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 


















       
























HR Province Hospitals  
Urban  Suburban1 Suburban2 Rural  Remote1 Remote2 











Tungwa   






THE TOP 25 PROVINCES WHERE EARN THE HIGHEST REVENUE IN 2013 
 Provinces Sum of Revenue 
(Million Baht) 
District 
1 Nontaburi  562.78  
2 Songkla 466.02 Hatyai  
3 Patumtani  455.05  
4 Rayong  372.45  
5 Surattani  325.44  
6 Phuket  313.97  
7 Chonburi 262.66 Pattaya 
8 Chiangmai  251.33  
9 Nakornratchasima 213.38  
10 Samutprakan  207.53  
11 Khonkan 181.59  
12 Prachaupkirikan 154.57 Huahin  
13 Nakornsitammarat 139.72  
14 Nakornpathom 137.11  
15 Udontani 132.03  
16 Nakornsawan 125.87  
17 Samutsakorn 124.91  
18 Ubonratchatani 118.47  
19 Trang 104.30  
20 Lampang 100.26  
21 Chiangrai 92.11  
22 Pitsanulok 86.96  
23 Petburi 84.54 Chaum  
24 Saraburi 82.44  
25 Ayuthaya 81.47  
 
 
 
 
